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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks an elucidation of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 'operative' intentionality 
(l’intentionnalité opérante). This concept is central to Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of meaning and 
understanding throughout his career. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s early work, in which he articulates 
the nature and place of operative intentionality in agency and perception, makes available a general 
thesis concerning meaning and understanding. Merleau-Ponty’s central claim here is that meaning 
should not be conceived of as the outcome of acts of interpretation or judgement. I argue that this 
general thesis is unsatisfactorily represented in some of the most prominent secondary literature on 
Merleau-Ponty’s work. Nonetheless, there is a tension at the heart of Phenomenology of Perception that 
compromises the clarity and coherence of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of operative intentionality. The 
difficulty lies in the way Merleau-Ponty conceives the relationship between perception and language in 
the early work. It is this problematic that provides the key to appreciating the developments that 
Merleau-Ponty instigates through his attempts to formulate a phenomenology of language and 
expression in the 1950s. Tracing the developments of the middle period work on language in this way 
allows us to see how Merleau-Ponty’s introduction of a new philosophical lexicon of ‘the flesh’ (la 
chair) in his final writings is motivated by the attempt to accommodate the general thesis concerning 
meaning and understanding that originally emerged with Phenomenology of Perception’s conception of 
operative intentionality. 
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May 1959 
 
Everything comes down to this: to form a 
theory of perception and of understanding 
that shows that to understand is not to 
constitute in intellectual immanence, that 
to understand is to grasp by coexistence 
 
Tout revient à ceci: faire une théorie de la 
perception et de la compréhension qui montre que 
comprendre n’est pas constituer dans l’immanence 
intellectuelle, que comprendre est saisir par 
coexistence 
 
(VI, 188/239)
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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with Merleau-Ponty’s deployment of the concept of ‘operative intentionality’ 
(l’intentionnalité opérante). This concept not only lies at the heart of the thinking at work in Merleau-
Ponty’s most celebrated work, Phenomenology of Perception, but also remains central throughout his 
philosophical development. As such, a thematic focus on this concept will allow us to better appreciate 
the continuity and trajectory of Merleau-Ponty’s thought across his career.1  
Despite the fact that operative intentionality is left undeveloped beyond ‘meagre hints’ (Mohanty, 
2005: 15) in Husserl’s writings, it is one of the concepts that Merleau-Ponty seizes upon most 
enthusiastically in his reading of Husserl. Merleau-Ponty makes his first explicit reference to it in the 
Preface to Phenomenology of Perception, defining operative intentionality as ‘the intentionality that 
establishes the natural and pre-predicative unity of the world and of our life’ (PhP, lxxxii/18). The 
concept is definitive of Merleau-Ponty’s overarching philosophical endeavour to disclose the manner 
in which subjectivity does not stand apart from or outside of the world it experiences. As he puts it, 
consciousness must be recognized as ‘a project of the world, as destined to a world that it neither 
encompasses nor possesses, but toward which it never ceases to be directed’ (PhP, lxxxii/18). For 
Merleau-Ponty, subjectivity is to be understood as fundamentally situated within the world.  
Crucially, this situatedness is neither the achievement nor the object of an act of interpretation or 
judgement on the part of consciousness. For this reason, it is not something that might be 
deconstructed or analysed. All that philosophy can hope to do, claims Merleau-Ponty, is to ‘place it 
before our eyes and invite us to take notice’ (PhP, lxxxii/18). In doing so, philosophy would be able to 
overcome the seemingly insuperable problems that have traditionally surrounded our relationship with 
and understanding of the world.   
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty hopes to achieve this via a phenomenological study of the 
body and its place in perceptual experience. Through this study, Merleau-Ponty is able to articulate the 
manner in which consciousness is caught up within the world it explores in perception by virtue of its 
corporeal embodiment. The meaning of perceptual phenomena is not imparted by an act of judgement 
or interpretation on the part of consciousness. There is here a decidedly bodily form of comprehension 
that is made possible by the manner in which the perceiving body is capable of communicating with the 
sensible world.  
In this way, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of operative intentionality should be understood as 
consisting in a theory of meaning and understanding. Crucially, I suggest that this theory has 
ramifications beyond any strictly delineated perceptual domain. Merleau-Ponty himself is clearly 
sensitive to the way in which his study of perception made available more general insights concerning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I follow (Edie, 1987), (Dillon, 1997), (Besmer, 2007), and (Hass, 2008) in dividing Merleau-Ponty’s career into three distinct periods: the 
‘early’ (upto and including Phenomenology of Perception, published in 1945), the ‘middle’ (1945 – ~1958, during which time he was working on 
Introduction to the Prose of the World), and the ‘late’ (~1958 – 1961, when he turned his attention to what would become The Visible and the 
Invisible). 
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meaning and understanding. In a 1952 lecture course he proclaims that the philosopher ‘learns from his 
contact with perception an awareness of a relation to being which necessitates and makes possible a 
new analysis of the understanding’ (TfL, 3/11-12). The epigraph I have chosen for this thesis clearly 
demonstrates just how important Merleau-Ponty took this ‘new analysis’ to be.  
My task in what follows will therefore be to elucidate the account of meaning and understanding that 
is definitive of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of operative intentionality, and to trace its development 
over the course of his career. My discussion comprises of five chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 seek to 
explicate Merleau-Ponty’s conception of operative intentionality as it is initially developed in 
Phenomenology of Perception’s study of embodiment and perception. Each of these chapters centre around a 
critical engagement with recent literature in which Merleau-Ponty’s thought is given application in 
contemporary philosophical debates.  
Chapter 1 will explore the relationship Merleau-Ponty’s study of the body bears to the philosophy of 
action. I will begin by problematizing a prevalent way of presenting Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the 
contemporary literature on action and agency. On this kind of presentation, Merleau-Ponty appears to 
be offering a direct solution to a traditional problem that is central to the philosophy of action. This is 
the problem captured so concisely by Wittgenstein’s question: ‘what is left over if I subtract the fact that 
my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?’ (PI, §621, my emphasis). The problem lies in the 
search for criteria by which intentional actions might be distinguished from unintentional happenings. 
To this day, it continues to motivate a search for some particular kind of entity or state that might serve 
as the criterion of intentional action. On the kind of presentation being considered, Merleau-Ponty 
appears to be offering a solution, albeit an idiosyncratic one, to this problem. I will argue that Merleau-
Ponty offers no such solution. Instead, his thought is best understood as offering a means of eschewing 
the problem altogether.  
In this respect, there is an important confluence between Merleau-Ponty’s work and Elizabeth 
Anscombe’s 1957 monograph, Intention. I will therefore seek to elucidate this aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought by reading it through the lens of Anscombe’s much more explicit refusal of the problem lying 
at the heart of the philosophy of action. I will articulate the central line of argumentation offered in 
Intention, which culminates with Anscombe’s conception of ‘practical knowledge’. I will then turn to 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the pathological case of Johann Schneider. It is in this analysis that 
Merleau-Ponty articulates some of the most important aspects of his phenomenology of embodied 
agency and with it, his conception of operative intentionality.  
According to Merleau-Ponty, Schneider’s case discloses a kind of pre-reflective comprehension of the 
world as the setting of one’s projects and actions. The hinge of this kind of practical understanding of 
the world is the phenomenal or lived body, which Merleau-Ponty describes as ‘a posture toward a 
certain task, actual or possible’ (PhP, 102/129). It is this relationship with the world that Anscombe’s 
argument is grounded in, and which her conception of practical knowledge also serves to disclose. 
Demonstrating the confluence of Anscombe and Merleau-Ponty on this point thus allows us to 
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appreciate the proper relationship Merleau-Ponty’s thought bears to the philosophy of action. At one 
and the same time, it will explicate operative intentionality as it figures in Merleau-Ponty’s study of 
embodied agency. 
Chapter 2 continues to pursue an elucidation of the conception of operative intentionality developed 
in the Phenomenology. I will attend here to Merleau-Ponty’s study of perceptual meaning, or perceptual 
sens. I will begin by enumerating the main characteristics of perceptual sens. Of significance is the 
manner in which Merleau-Ponty describes perceptual sens as constituted by the perceiving subject’s 
bodily ‘hold’ or ‘grip’ (prise), and also how this grip is subject to a teleological development. It is here that we 
arrive at a fundamentally normative dimension of perceptual sens. I will bring this normative dimension 
out further by considering Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of perceptual constancy, and his notion of 
perceptual ‘norms’.  
The place of the body in perception is most often understood in terms of the concept of ‘motor 
intentionality’, which Merleau-Ponty first introduces in his discussion of Schneider. The remainder of 
the chapter will focus on the place of this concept in Merleau-Ponty’s overarching philosophical 
outlook. In particular, I will problematize the interpretation of motor intentionality popularized by the 
work of Hubert Dreyfus. Dreyfus incorporates Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motor intentionality into 
his own account of what he calls ‘absorbed-’ or ‘skillful coping’. Dreyfus describes absorbed coping as 
a mode of ‘unthinking activity’ (Dreyfus, 1993: 35) – a ‘non-mental’ (Dreyfus, 1991: 76) and ‘non-
rational’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 352) engagement with the world. Dreyfus portrays absorbed coping as a 
foundational stratum of our relationship with the world, and sharply distinguishes it from the 
‘mindedness’ of thought. I will argue that Dreyfus’ foundationalism misrepresents the overarching 
shape of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. Rather than disclosing a self-sufficient layer of bodily ‘coping’, 
Merleau-Ponty’s study of perceptual sens makes available much more general (and more philosophically 
profitable) insights into the nature of meaning and understanding.  
I will first challenge the apparent textual basis of Dreyfus’ presentation of Merleau-Ponty. I will then 
turn to Dreyfus’ primary, non-textual, motivation for the view he ascribes to Merleau-Ponty. Dreyfus’ 
idiosyncratic foundationalism is grounded in an argument derived from the famous ‘rule-following 
considerations’ of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. However, on an alternative reading of 
Wittgenstein’s discussion, Dreyfus’ argument is fundamentally misguided. I will argue that Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological account of meaning and understanding in perception echoes the insights 
McDowell finds in Wittgenstein. Far from supporting Dreyfus’ view, Merleau-Ponty actually enables 
us to resist the line of thought that motivates Dreyfus’ position. What Merleau-Ponty’s study of 
perception makes available is a general thesis concerning meaning and understanding that is not limited 
to a particular stratum of perceptual consciousness. The phenomenology of perception discloses to us 
the manner in which understanding a meaning is not the achievement of an act of interpretation or 
judgement. This is a thesis that runs ‘all the way up’, as it were, to Dreyfus’ ‘upper stories’ of the mind 
and thought. 
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Chapter 3 highlights a problem that emerges in Phenomenology of Perception. This problem becomes 
most conspicuous with Merleau-Ponty’s assertion of the existence of a ‘tacit’ or ‘silent’ Cogito that lies 
beneath the ‘spoken’ Cogito of Descartes. On inspection, we can see that this concept implicates a 
foundationalism of language and perception. Whilst it is ultimately not identical to Dreyfus’ 
foundationalism, the presence of this foundationalist line of thought in Phenomenology of Perception is 
fundamentally problematic, not least due to the manner in which it stands in tension with the 
conception of operative intentionality developed here. I will show how the foundationalist line of 
thought that culminates in the assertion of the tacit Cogito is in fact rooted in the Phenomenology’s 
discussion of speech and expression. Merleau-Ponty’s early discussion of speech certainly makes 
positive and original advancements, and at least begins to extend his general thesis concerning meaning 
and understanding to language and thought. However, the ‘gestural’ account of speech offered in Part 
I of the Phenomenology ultimately leads to a disconnect between creative acts of expression – what 
Merleau-Ponty terms ‘speaking speech’ – and the acquired significations of constituted language. I will 
show that, due to the manner in which it defines speaking speech as continuous with silent bodily 
gestures, the gestural account of speech drives a wedge between perceptual sens and linguistic 
signification.  
It is precisely this division between perception and language – and with it, the concept of the tacit 
Cogito – that Merleau-Ponty eventually came to criticize in the final few years of his life. Chapters 4 and 
5 will pursue the developments of ‘middle’ and ‘late’ periods in order to better understand the way in 
which Merleau-Ponty sought to address the problems of Phenomenology of Perception. Chapter 4 will 
focus on Merleau-Ponty’s ‘middle period’ work on language and expression. At the heart of all the 
middle period developments is Merleau-Ponty’s newfound enthusiasm for Saussurian linguistics. It is 
through Saussure that Merleau-Ponty is able to accommodate the cultural and historical conditioning 
of linguistic expression. Intriguingly, Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Saussure prompts clear parallels 
with his earlier study of the body’s place in the phenomenology of perception and agency. I will 
explicate the middle period developments by the light of these parallels. Ultimately we see that, for 
Merleau-Ponty, the possession and utilization of language must be understood as a form of 
embodiment. I will then proceed to show how the developments instigated in the middle period 
provide Merleau-Ponty with a means of overcoming the problems that beset his earlier discussions of 
language and expression. In this vein, I will end the chapter by considering how Merleau-Ponty is now 
able to successfully extend his conception of operative intentionality into the philosophy of language. 
This can be best appreciated when we attend to his talk, in the manuscript of The Prose of the World, of 
an operative language. 
The middle period articulation of language as a species of embodiment is pivotal to the overt 
modifications Merleau-Ponty makes in his final writings. The late period work is distinguished by the 
introduction of a new and challenging lexicon of ‘the flesh’ (la chair). In Chapter 5, I will show how 
the new lexicon that emerges in Merleau-Ponty’s final writings is tailored toward finding an adequate 
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expression of the continuity that holds between the world of perception and the ‘intelligible’ world 
reckoned with in thought via the ‘body’ of language. In this way, I seek to explicate how, towards the 
end of his life, Merleau-Ponty comes to explicitly renounce the foundationalist line of thought present 
in the Phenomenology as he readdresses the relationship between perception and language. I will begin by 
unpacking the lexicon of the flesh as Merleau-Ponty defines it with regard to the body and the sensible 
world. This will then facilitate an understanding of his subsequent, albeit underdeveloped, application 
of the new lexicon to the ‘less heavy, more transparent body’ of language (VI, 153/198). I will then 
explore how the application of ‘the flesh’ to language connects with Merleau-Ponty’s important critical 
engagement with Husserl’s late text, ‘The Origin of Geometry’. What we discover here is a critique of 
Husserlian foundationalism that can be seen to apply directly to Merleau-Ponty’s own earlier thought. 
Crucially, Merleau-Ponty effectively renounces the notion that phenomenology awakens ‘a primordial 
experience beneath traditions’ (PhP, 530n7/218n1, my emphasis). In doing so, Merleau-Ponty is able to 
explicitly articulate the mistakes of his earlier dichotomy of perception and language. By the end of his 
life, Merleau-Ponty was beginning to formulate a way of thinking that better realizes his definitive and 
fundamental philosophical aim: to adequately ‘[take] into consideration the operative world’ (VI, 
118/156).  
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1.  
Elucidating Operative Intentionality:  
Body, Agency, and Practical Knowledge 
 
 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty formulates his conception of operative intentionality by 
way of a phenomenological study of the body’s place in our engagement with and grasp of the world. 
In attending to the body in Part One of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the 
manner in which the subject’s body is available to her as a power for intentional movement and action. 
In doing so, he is led to assert a fundamental interdependence between bodily agency and perceptual 
meaning. What emerges here is a kind of pre-reflective understanding of the sensible world as the 
setting of one’s practical life. This understanding is not the outcome of any kind of act of consciousness 
or of a faculty of ‘the understanding’. Instead, it is grounded in one’s status as an embodied agent. 
Conversely, the subject is revealed as always already situated within the world she explores and acts 
within.  
 In light of this, Merleau-Ponty’s thought bears an intriguing philosophical relationship to the 
discourse within modern, predominantly Anglophone, philosophy of action. This relationship has 
become a prevalent theme within recent literature on Merleau-Ponty.2 Properly accounting for this 
relationship, as Jensen puts it, should prove to be ‘exegetically fruitful’ (Jensen, 2014: 44) for those 
interested in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. As things stand, however, I do not believe that the extant 
literature on the philosophical relationship Merleau-Ponty’s work bears to the philosophy of action is 
entirely satisfactory. It is for this reason that I intend to elucidate Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
operative intentionality by means of what I take to be the proper relationship his thought bears to the 
philosophy of action.  
The structure of this discussion is as follows. In Section 1.1, I detail a basic worry in terms of what I 
shall refer to as ‘Wittgenstein’s problem’. This worry motivates the greatest part of the literature in the 
philosophy of action. It concerns the identification of adequate criteria with which we might discern 
whether a given event is or was an intentional action. On my interpretation, Merleau-Ponty offers us a 
means of ignoring or even diffusing this worry, and I shall outline, by means of a recent example, why 
this has not been adequately articulated in the secondary literature in this area. Understanding Merleau-
Ponty in the way I propose places him in proximity to Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous interjection in the 
philosophy of action found in her 1957 monograph, Intention. I will therefore seek to illuminate 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of operative intentionality through the lens of Anscombe’s thought. In 
Section 1.2, I will unpack Anscombe’s argumentation and her conception of ‘practical knowledge’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, for instance, (Wrathall, 2005), (Rietveld, 2008), (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011), (Romdenh-Romluc, 2014) & (Jensen, 2014). The relationship 
is also something of a recurrent theme in Hubert Dreyfus’ use of Merleau-Ponty, e.g. (Dreyfus, 2002), (Dreyfus, 2005a) & (Dreyfus, 2005b). I 
will address Dreyfus’ reading of Merleau-Ponty at length in chapter 2. 
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Section 1.3 returns to Merleau-Ponty, specifically his analysis of the case of Schneider, through which 
he initially establishes much of his claims concerning bodily agency and its place in the agent’s 
intentional relationship with the world. One notion that I shall lay particular emphasis on here is what 
Merleau-Ponty calls the ‘intentional arc’. It is through the intentional arc that the agent grasps her world 
as the proper context of the entire range of her projects and acts. It is the intentional arc that Merleau-
Ponty cites as having ‘gone limp’ (PhP, 137/170) for Schneider. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the 
intentional arc comprises a central aspect of his conception of operative intentionality. Section 1.4 will 
conclude by providing a more general articulation of this aspect of operative intentionality, and the 
relationship it bears to the philosophy of action. 
 
 
1.1 Merleau-Ponty and ‘Wittgenstein’s Problem’  
 
i. Wittgenstein’s Problem 
 
A worry that occupies a central place in the philosophy of action is that there appears to be nothing 
that might constitute objectively available, ‘external’ criteria on the basis of which one could discern 
whether a given event was an intentional action (i.e., the outcome or expression of a deliberate effort or 
intention), rather than a merely unintentional or ‘mindless’ happening. Wittgenstein illustrates what is at 
issue here in the following way: 
 
Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up. And the problem arises: 
what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my 
arm?  
(PI, §621) 
 
In the case of arm raisings, the worry arises due to the fact that, to an impartial witness of my bodily 
behaviour, what I experience as an involuntary spasm in my arm will look just the same as if I had 
intentionally raised my arm. Yet, as the agent of this behaviour, I am immediately aware of a very 
definite difference between the two cases. Following Wittgenstein’s proposed problem, we are tempted 
to look for something – a private mental entity, sensation or state – as what would be ‘left over’ if we 
were to subtract the physical arm movement from the intentional arm raise. In this way, our task of 
striking upon a criterion according to which we would be able to define, identify, and explain 
intentional actions becomes the search for some kind of ‘inner’ mental item or state of consciousness 
understood as either causing or qualifying a given action. As Arthur Danto puts it, an intentional action 
is ‘a movement of the body plus x . . . and the problem . . . is to solve in some philosophically 
interesting way for x’ (Danto, 1981: 5). Whilst I shall refer to this thought as ‘Wittgenstein’s problem’, I 
recognize that Wittgenstein himself (in propria persona) took it to be deeply misguided. 
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It is this problem that has led to a proliferation of philosophical theories concerning the nature of 
‘what is left over’, and which thereby supposedly serve to distinguish intentional actions from 
unintentional happenings. Turning to Merleau-Ponty certainly offers us a way of engaging with these 
kinds of theories that continue to make up the general run of work in the philosophy of action. This 
engagement is not entirely straightforward, however, and it must be properly understood. Merleau-
Ponty should not be thought of as flatly opposed to particular theories that are offered in response to 
the worry Wittgenstein illustrates. It is in this respect that recent discussions of Merleau-Ponty’s 
relevance to the philosophy of action are problematic: they appear to be advancing a Merleau-Pontian 
solution to Wittgenstein’s problem, whereas Merleau-Ponty offers no such thing. Instead, the thinking 
that centres around his conception of operative intentionality – in particular his discussion of bodily 
agency, and of the ‘intentional arc’ – offers a means of resisting the apparent force of Wittgenstein’s 
problem. Merleau-Ponty thus undermines the general run of theories in the philosophy of action by 
refusing to accept certain pre-assumptions on which they are (often implicitly) founded. 
 
 
ii. Sketching a ‘Merleau-Pontian solution’ 
  
Before I substantiate this claim, I should illustrate what I mean by a ‘Merleau-Pontian solution’ to 
Wittgenstein’s problem by means of an example. In her 2011 paper, ‘Agency and Embodied Cognition’, 
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc presents Merleau-Ponty’s account of agency as an alternative to what she 
refers to as ‘the dominant account’. The dominant account is defined by the claim ‘that actions are 
essentially brought about and guided by intentions that represent the agent’s performance of the action’ 
(Romdenh-Romluc, 2011: 80). The dominant account can thus be understood as an attempt to ‘solve 
for x’, as Danto puts it, by asserting the existence of a particular type of mental state: intentions, 
understood as having determinate representational content of the form ‘I intend to Φ’. On this account, 
intentional actions are those that have been brought about (in the right kind of way) by intentions. 
After motivating some discomfort with this account on the grounds that it over-intellectualizes 
agency, Romdenh-Romluc turns to Merleau-Ponty as an alternative. She asserts that the central claim of 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of agency is that ‘[t]he agent’s apprehension of her surroundings can bring 
about her actions without the need for any intervening thoughts – such as intentions – that represent 
the agent’s performance of the action’ (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011: 89). Since Merleau-Ponty conceives 
perception as involving a pre-reflective ‘bodily’ apprehension, or grip (prise), of one’s surroundings, 
Romdenh-Romluc subsequently translates this central claim as ‘the agent’s perception of her 
environment can bring about her behaviour without any contribution from thought’ (Romdenh-
Romluc, 2011: 91). Thus, on Romdenh-Romluc’s interpretation, Merleau-Ponty claims that, whilst 
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intentions are sufficient, they are not necessary for the bringing about of intentional actions. Instead, 
intentional actions can be brought about by perception.3 
Presented in this way, it seems as if Merleau-Ponty is offering his own solution to Wittgenstein’s 
problem, according to which ‘what is left over’ when the physical facts – i.e., the bodily movements 
constituting an action – are subtracted from intentional actions will be one of two things: either an 
‘intention’, understood as a mental state that has representational content; or a perceptual experience of 
one’s environment, understood as involving a kind of pre-reflective apprehension.  
There are certainly elements of Phenomenology of Perception that lend credibility to such a presentation of 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of agency. Firstly, there is an explicit anti-representationalist line of thought 
that does indeed place him at odds with the ‘dominant account’ Romdenh-Romluc discusses. Merleau-
Ponty claims that the agent’s relation with her body is such that she is capable of executing movements 
without having to represent either her present situation or the goal of the movement to herself in a 
reflective act of thought. There is no need for a mediating reflective act, since ‘I move my body directly’ 
(PhP, 96/123). In addition to this thought, Merleau-Ponty discusses a kind of malleability of the 
perceptual field, such that the subject’s ‘projects polarize the world, causing a thousand signs to appear 
there as if by magic, that guide action, as signs in a museum guide the visitor’ (PhP, 115/143). This 
presence of action-guiding ‘signs’ in perception is what Romdenh-Romluc appears to be emphasizing in 
her presentation of Merleau-Ponty’s account of agency.4  
I want to suggest that, despite making use of these elements of Phenomenology of Perception, Romdenh-
Romluc ultimately misrepresents the philosophical relationship Merleau-Ponty’s thought bears to the 
philosophy of action. Presenting Merleau-Ponty’s ‘account’ of agency in opposition to the ‘dominant 
account’ creates a false dichotomy between intention and perception that simply is not present in 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought. On such a presentation, it looks as if Merleau-Ponty is offering a rival 
solution to Wittgenstein’s problem. Yet what we find in Merleau-Ponty is a wholesale rejection of the 
very approach to the philosophy of action that the passage from PI, §621 encapsulates. Crucially, it is 
through his conception of operative intentionality that Merleau-Ponty makes this rejection available.  
It is in this way that understanding the relationship Merleau-Ponty bears to the philosophy of action is 
a viable means of elucidating operative intentionality. The presence of a rejection of Wittgenstein’s 
problem in his thought is somewhat obscured by the fact that Merleau-Ponty does not thematically 
develop such an engagement himself.5 Someone who does thematically pursue such a rejection is 
Elizabeth Anscombe, in her 1954 monograph, Intention. For this reason, and despite obvious 
methodological differences, I consider Merleau-Ponty’s thought to be deeply confluent with an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 (Romdenh-Romluc, 2014) further details the Merleau-Pontian alternative to the ‘dominant account’ in terms of his discussion of bodily 
habits and attention.  
4 Hubert Dreyfus also seems to place emphasis on this thought when articulating his concept of ‘absorbed’ or ‘skillful coping’, e.g. (Dreyfus, 
2002). It is a thought that is often taken to be synonymous with J.J. Gibson’s discussion of perceived ‘affordances’ for action. Interestingly, 
the only direct quotation Romdenh-Romluc offers when discussing Merleau-Ponty in the paper cited is from Gibson’s The Ecological Approach 
to Visual Perception (Gibson, 1979), which itself does not contain any references to Merleau-Ponty. 
5 (Jensen, 2014) does a thorough job of isolating the places where Merleau-Ponty most explicitly formulates a dissatisfaction with the general 
run of philosophical reflection concerning agency, especially in The Structure of Behaviour. I consider his discussion and my own to be 
complimentary to one another, although my own focus will be on Phenomenology of Perception, as it is only there that the concept of operative 
intentionality explicitly surfaces.  
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Anscombean approach to the philosophy of action. Reading Merleau-Ponty through the lens of 
Anscombe’s discussion provides one way of properly accounting for the relationship his thought bears 
to the philosophy of action. In particular, Anscombe’s emphasis on a kind of ‘practical knowledge’, and 
its contrast with the ‘contemplative’ conception of knowledge, provides a very helpful means by which 
to illuminate the more general philosophical significance of operative intentionality. I will unpack these 
aspects of Anscombe’s work in the next section.  
 
 
1.2 Anscombe on Action, Intention, and Practical Knowledge 
 
i. Intention and the ‘Causal Theory of Action’ 
 
For my purposes, I shall be focusing on just one of the stated goals of Intention, which is to 
understand the sense of the distinction between actions that are intentional and those that are not (I, 
§5).6 Anscombe maintains that we must resist the temptation to think of the ‘intentional’ component 
of ‘intentional action’ as referring to a special kind of entity or mental state. As such, she is certainly 
opposed to the ‘dominant account’ presented by Romdenh-Romluc. There is, however, a second 
temptation that Anscombe is also keen to resist, since it goes hand in hand with the first. Indeed, it is 
really no more than the other side of Wittgenstein’s problem: the assertion of the existence of a highest 
common factor between a token intentional action and a token unintentional happening (e.g. ‘the fact 
that my arm goes up’ as a common factor between intentional arm raises and involuntary arm spasms). 
It is once this idea of a fundamental description that is common to the two events is in play that the 
notion of intention (or at least, of whatever constitutes an action as intentional) as ‘what is left over’ 
once the shared element is subtracted comes to seem not only sensible, but somehow inescapable.  
Anscombe’s rejection of Wittgenstein’s problem is sufficient for her own positive discussion being 
decidedly at odds with the general run of discourse in the philosophy of action, both before Intention’s 
publication and since. Crucially, Anscombe is not interested in accounting for intentional actions in 
terms of their causal antecedents. Such an enterprise trades on the (sometimes implicit) assertion of a 
highest common factor as outlined above. Since there are no objectively available criteria concerning 
the event itself (as we saw in Section 1.1, above), whether an event is an intentional action or an 
unintentional happening is supposed to reside in its causal history. Of course, there are many different 
possible conceptions of what this causal history involves, from Cartesian substance dualism to 
reductive kinds of physicalism. Nonetheless, they all share in the basic thesis that what mark 
intentional actions out from all other events are their causes, and that it is thus to these causes that we 
must appeal if we wish to explain the occurrence of intentional actions. This fundamental thesis, 
generally referred to under the banner of ‘the causal theory of action’, remains at the heart of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In line with the convention in the secondary literature on Intention, I shall provide references to section numbers rather than page numbers.  
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contemporary discourse in the philosophy of action.7 On the reading I problematized in Section 1.1, 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of agency might be thought commensurate to this thesis, with the 
possible causal antecedents being twofold: either intention or perception.8 I seek to show that, as does 
Anscombe, Merleau-Ponty entirely rejects the causal theory of action.  
 
 
ii. The Argument at §19 
 
The rejection of the causal theory of action in Intention would appear to be largely implicit, since 
Anscombe makes no great pains to discuss such an approach directly. This is not to say that her 
rejection is unsupported. As we shall see, once Anscombe’s own positive contribution is articulated the 
very impetus behind the causal theory is undermined. Before attending to this it is worth considering a 
point in the text at which there is a direct and highly condensed piece of argumentation that, whilst not 
aimed at the causal theory of action per se, is intended as a strike against the mode of thinking about 
intentional action that the causal theory of action typifies. At §19, Anscombe argues against the idea 
that we should suppose the presence of some ‘additional feature’9 to be what constitutes an agent’s 
bodily movements as moments of an intentional act, rather than ‘mere’ muscle contractions and the 
like. Anscombe claims that it is thanks to this idea that we are led into ‘inextricable confusions’ when 
considering action. 
I take her argument to run in the following way. Firstly, she notes that the bare presence of the 
additional feature is insufficient, since there is often an array of different descriptions under which one 
and the same event might be deemed an intentional act. This emphasis on the multitude of different 
possible descriptions of one and the same event is a defining feature of Intention. For instance, John’s 
current action, which can be described as ‘filling the kettle with water’, might also be describable as 
‘leaking water into the kitchen cupboard’, or as ‘startling the dog’. Now, all that the bare presence of an 
additional feature can do here is confirm that some intentional action has taken place, rather than a 
merely unintentional happening. Yet it is highly unlikely that each of these descriptions of the event 
could be ascribable to John as the intentional action or actions that he took himself to be performing. 
The assertion of a bare presence of some additional feature in the case of intentional action is thus too 
coarse-grained to properly distinguish the intentional from the unintentional act. So the stipulated 
additional feature is in need of further characterization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Its contemporary prominence is in no small part thanks to the work of Donald Davidson, and his famous rebuttal of the idea that reasons 
for action cannot be understood as causes of action (see ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events 
(Davidson, 2001)). The details of Davidson’s argument certainly muddy the waters as far as the causal theory of action is concerned. Whilst I 
cannot pursue the specific details of the philosophical relationship between Anscombe and Davidson here, (Hornsby, 2011) provides a rich 
discussion of the (often underappreciated) distance between the two accounts to which I can find nothing to add. 
8 Whilst Romdenh-Romluc rightly emphasizes that the Merleau-Pontian account she offers is non-mechanistic (i.e., it does not present certain 
actions as the end result of a meaningless physical mechanism) (Romdenh-Romluc, 2014: 15), much more would need to be said to 
demonstrate that this account does not cohere with the overarching desire to delineate intentional actions by way of their causal history.  
9 Presumably, Anscombe intends ‘additional feature’ as a neutral term so that her argument might hold against the widest possible range of 
positions. The term could be replaced by something more specific depending on the position being considered (e.g. ‘intention’, ‘volition’, 
‘belief-desire pair’, etc.). 
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Seemingly, then, what is required is a characterization of the additional feature as a particular 
description, or as intrinsically related to a particular description, of an action (e.g. ‘filling the kettle with 
water’). So there will be a vast (potentially infinite) array of tokens of this type of feature. Furthermore, 
if we are to avoid the notion that the presence of a token additional feature in a given situation is 
merely accidental, we shall need to suppose some kind of mechanism that brings about an appropriate 
token additional feature thanks to the agent’s awareness of his current situation. Perhaps John holds a 
belief that might be expressed by the proposition ‘such-and-such bodily movements would result in 
the kettle being filled’, and this brings about the presence of a suitable token additional feature 
alongside the given bodily movements. Yet this seems unlikely, since it is extremely rare even that one 
knows, in anything like a sufficiently precise sense, which physical movements are involved in one’s 
actions. Furthermore, in supposing such a mechanism, we would effectively strip the additional feature 
itself of any efficacy in relation to what actually happens (i.e. the bodily movements), since it would 
now be the agent’s belief that is doing the causal work. Perhaps, then, it is that the individual’s 
awareness includes beliefs about how token additional features bring about the actions whose 
descriptions they involve. On the basis of such beliefs, the subject summons up the token additional 
feature that he believes will bring about the desired effect in the given situation. But to do this would 
be to appeal to a second intentional action: the act of summoning up the token additional feature, for 
which a second additional feature would be required, and we would be thereby committed to the 
absurdity of an infinite regress.  
For Anscombe, these difficulties in making any sense of the role of a supposed additional feature 
constitute ample evidence in favour of rejecting the idea that such a notion can play any role in 
accounting for intentional action. She thus concludes §19 with her clearest rejection of the two sides of 
Wittgenstein’s problem: 
 
…in describing intentional actions as such, it will be a mistake to look for the fundamental 
description of what occurs – such as the movements of muscles or molecules – and then 
think of intention as something, perhaps very complicated, which qualifies this. The only 
events to consider are intentional actions themselves, and to call an action intentional is to 
say it is intentional under some description that we give (or could give) of it.  
(I, §19) 
 
The argumentation of §19 is useful because it both trades upon and reinforces Anscombe’s 
discussion, already initiated by this point in the text, of actions as intentional ‘under some description’. 
As is clear in her conclusion to §19, this is an idea that Anscombe takes to be of great importance if we 
are to avoid the mode of thinking expressed by Wittgenstein’s problem, and the idea thus generates a 
great deal of the positive claims made in Intention. Considered in isolation however, this idea would 
appear to concern the conventions of language. As such, it is not a particularly controversial claim, or 
one that an exponent of the type of view Anscombe is hoping to undermine necessarily must reject, 
since we might think that the conventions of language bear a wholly contingent relationship to our 
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philosophical concerns. 10 To understand the alternative view offered in Intention is therefore to 
understand the use that Anscombe makes of the idea that ‘to call an action intentional is to say it is 
intentional under some description that we give (or could give) of it’. 
 
 
iii. The Certain Sense of ‘Why?’ – Knowledge Without Observation 
 
Early on in the text, Anscombe considers how it is that we distinguish an agent’s intentional actions 
from their unintentional actions. It is here that she offers her well-known suggestion that intentional 
actions are those ‘to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application’ (I, §5). This 
sense of ‘Why?’ is given application when the answer serves as, or leads us to, the agent’s reasons for 
acting. Such a characterization is insufficient however, since the sense of ‘reasons for acting’ invoked 
here itself needs to be defined without a circular appeal to the ‘certain sense of the question ‘Why?’’.11 
It is for this reason that Anscombe considers the kinds of cases in which her sense of the question 
‘Why?’ is refused application. These considerations are what lead Anscombe to conclude that it is the 
nature of the agent’s knowledge of their own intentional actions that truly distinguishes them from those 
that are unintentional. At one and the same time, it is in her account of the agent’s knowledge of her 
own actions that we find the true locus of the Anscombean rejection of the causal theory of action.   
The sense of the question ‘Why?’ that Anscombe is pursuing will be refused application if the agent 
is completely unaware of his performing the action under the given description in relation to which the 
question is posed. Returning to our earlier case, if we were to ask John ‘Why are you leaking water into 
the cupboard?’ we might imagine him responding with something like ‘I didn’t realize that I was’ or 
‘What? Oh no! What a mess!’. In this case, John did not know that he was performing the action so 
described, and as such he rejects application to the question ‘Why?’ in the sense Anscombe is 
interested in.  
Yet knowledge of one’s action simpliciter is insufficient for Anscombe’s sense of ‘Why?’ to be granted 
application. Let us suppose John to have been idly watching his dog whilst filling up the kettle. He 
watches as the noise made by the pipes wakes the dog with a start. If we now were to ask John ‘Why 
did you startle the dog?’ he would be able to say of himself ‘I knew I was doing that, but only because I 
observed it’.12  Under the description ‘startling the dog’, John again refuses application to Anscombe’s 
sense of ‘Why?’ because his knowledge of his action under this description was arrived at through 
observation. It is an instance of observational knowledge.  
Against this kind of knowledge, Anscombe contrasts the class of things an agent knows to be true of 
himself without observation. According to Anscombe, an agent’s intentional actions are one sub-class of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Indeed, this idea, thanks to Anscombe’s influence, plays a central role in Davidson’s work on action, which as I have already noted is 
deeply embedded in the causal theory of action.  
11 As Anscombe puts it, ‘the questions “What is the relevant sense of the question ‘Why?’” and “What is meant by ‘reason for acting’?” are 
one and the same’ (§5). 
12  This is perhaps not the most likely response John might actually give. More likely would be something like either (a) ‘It was 
unintentional/accidental’ or (b) ‘I was filling up the kettle’. Since (a) appeals to a notion that Anscombe is seeking to elucidate, it is unhelpful 
to consider it here, whilst in (b) John redescribes his action in such a way that the question would no longer be refused application when 
asked of the action under this description (i.e., ‘filling up the kettle’). 
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the things of which he has this kind of knowledge. Whereas my knowledge that John is filling up the 
kettle comes from my witnessing him to be doing so, John’s own knowledge that this is what he is 
doing requires no observational mediation, and is not based on any evidence. As she puts it in a later 
paper, this is ‘knowledge without clues’ (Anscombe, 1981: 71). John does not discover himself to be 
filling up the kettle. It is in this respect that Anscombe classes an agent’s knowledge of their intentional 
actions as non-observational. An action’s being known non-observationally is insufficient for 
Anscombe’s sense of ‘Why?’ to be given application, however, since I am very often non-
observationally aware of myself performing actions that are involuntary. One kind of case is 
exemplified by the kicking out I perform when my knee is tapped. This is something I do and of which 
I am immediately aware without observation. Yet to ask of me why I kick out as I do will only, if at all, 
issue in an appeal to certain facts about physiological mechanisms and the like. The facts thus cited in 
explaining my movement are only made available to me by observation. And this fact is sufficient to 
rule them out from being positive responses to Anscombe’s sense of ‘Why?’. According to Anscombe, 
such cases refuse application to this question because, whilst the bodily movement is known without 
observation, there is here ‘no such thing as a cause known without observation’ (I, §8). 
This appeal to the agent’s knowledge of the causes of their action is liable to being misunderstood. 
Anscombe does not want to claim that what distinguishes intentional actions from unintentional 
actions is that the agent knows the causes of their intentional actions without observation. Besides, I 
do know the causes of certain kinds of unintentional actions without observation, such as when 
someone’s creeping up behind me causes me to drop all the books I’m carrying. Clearly, I must be 
sensitive to the person’s presence in some way, and in this sense I surely do observe it, but its status as 
the cause of my action of dropping the books is not something I must discover or arrive at through 
inference, and so the cause qua cause is something I know without observation. Nor is there room here 
for laying on further qualifications regarding the causes involved in intentional actions by appealing to 
things such as volitions, desires, or indeed, intentions understood as mental entities or states that are 
the exclusive causes of intentional actions. Even if we ignore the risk of circularity here, we have 
already seen that Anscombe wants to reject such attempts to account for an action’s being intentional 
by appeal to any kind of additional feature that is present over and above the fact of the action’s 
occurrence.  
 
 
iv. The Certain Sense of ‘Why?’ – Practical Knowledge 
 
If we now turn our attention to cases in which the certain sense of ‘Why?’ is given application, we can 
begin to see more clearly what the defining characteristics of the agent’s knowledge of her intentional 
actions are. When this question ‘Why?’ is given application, it is seen to issue in teleological explanations – 
i.e. explanations that ultimately appeal to some kind of aim (or aims) for the future; a goal (or goals). 
According to Anscombe, the teleological character of explanation that her sense of ‘Why?’ demands is 
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‘essential to the existence of the concept of intention or voluntary action’ (I, §20). This might initially 
appear to be strictly a claim about our language – i.e. that the concept of intention or voluntary action 
only finds an application or use, and thus a sense, insofar as it is internally related to our practice of 
demanding teleological explanations of one another’s actions. If this were taken to be the extent of 
Anscombe’s claim, one might be misled into attributing to her a kind of crude linguistic behaviourism, 
according to which all that is involved in intentional actions – in contrast to other events, including 
unintentional actions – is the linguistic practice or ‘language game’ surrounding her certain sense of the 
question ‘Why?’ As a species of behaviourism, not only would there be no private mental entities 
involved in intentional actions; there would not even be any kind of privileged perspective from which 
intentional actions are carried out and experienced. All of this would become reducible to our 
empirically observable linguistic behaviour. 
Yet this attribution would be wrongheaded since Anscombe does not seek to reject the notion of a 
privileged perspective in regards to action. Indeed, her aim in attending to the linguistic conventions 
surrounding the certain sense of ‘Why?’ is to shed light upon the nature of this perspective in terms of 
the agent’s knowledge of their actions. The central claim that Anscombe finally arrives at in this regard 
is that an agent’s knowledge of his intentional actions must be understood as practical knowledge.13 This 
concept first appears in the following passage, where it is contrasted with modern philosophy’s 
‘incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge’: 
 
Can it be that there is something that modern philosophy has blankly misunderstood: 
namely what the ancient and medieval philosophers meant by practical knowledge? Certainly 
in modern philosophy we have an incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge. 
Knowledge must be something that is judged as such by being in accordance with the 
facts. The facts, reality, are prior, and dictate what is to be said, if it is knowledge. And this 
is the explanation for the utter darkness in which we have found ourselves.  
(I, §32) 
 
According to the contemplative conception of knowledge, there is a certain gap that holds between a 
subject’s possession of a piece of knowledge and the thing known. An upshot of this gap is that the 
thing known is completely independent of the subject’s knowledge of it. For instance, the Eiffel Tower 
is and would remain in Paris independently of whether or not I know its location. In the other 
direction, as it might be said, however, there is a necessary dependency, since I cannot be said to know 
the location of the Eiffel Tower unless my belief that it is in Paris is in fact true (i.e., unless the Eiffel 
Tower is in Paris, independently of my belief). Hence, in cases of contemplative knowledge, it is the 
belief-independent facts that ‘dictate what is to be said, if it is knowledge’.  
We can see that this conception of knowledge is appropriate in respect to observational knowledge. 
Through observation the subject is able to discover certain facts that obtain independently of his 
knowledge of them. There is in this way an essential passivity to all observational knowledge: the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The concept of practical knowledge derives, via Aquinas, from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  
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knower does not play a role in the constitution of the object of knowledge. Yet contemplative 
knowledge is not to be identified with observational knowledge, for the contemplative conception often 
applies to knowledge that is non-observationally acquired. One example that Anscombe offers of non-
observational knowledge is one’s knowledge of the objective position of one’s own limbs.14 Despite 
being known without observation, it remains the case that the object of knowledge here is independent 
of whether or not the subject actually possesses any beliefs (true or false) regarding it. Again, the facts 
dictate what is to be said, and if my leg goes to sleep, I might conceivably form a belief regarding its 
position that will be directly contradicted by the facts. 
Despite its legitimate applications, Anscombe argues that we would be mistaken in thinking that the 
contemplative conception of knowledge is the only one available (and herein lies her complaint with 
modern philosophy). Indeed, she appears to cite this thought as responsible for the errors of the mode 
of thinking epitomized by Wittgenstein’s problem. In the case of an agent’s knowledge of her 
intentional actions, if we stick to the contemplative conception of knowledge it appears necessary to 
distinguish between an action as an event – as ‘what happens’ – and the agent’s knowledge of this 
event. As before, the thing known is conceived as completely independent of the agent’s knowledge of 
it, and this can make the notion of a highest common factor between intentional and unintentional 
actions seem irresistible. In the case of an intentional arm raise, I know without observation ‘that my 
arm goes up’, but this fact is independent of whether I come to know it or not, and, indeed, of whether 
it was intended by me or not. Adhering to the contemplative conception of knowledge thus relegates 
the distinction between intentional and unintentional actions to a purely subjective or internal realm. It 
is in this way that it is felt necessary to posit the presence of some kind of private mental entity or state 
in the case of intentional action. The presence of this inner item might well mean that the agent’s 
beliefs regarding her intentional actions are acquired in a very different manner from beliefs about her 
unintentional actions. Nonetheless, this knowledge is not itself the ground of the distinction between 
intentional actions and other events. It is the presence of the supposed mental entity or state that 
becomes the necessary and sufficient condition of an event’s being an intentional action. 15  For 
Anscombe, this attempt to apply the contemplative conception of knowledge to the knowledge I have 
of my actions is mistaken.  
We have already seen some of the ways in which Anscombe argues that this mode of thinking about 
action is confused. As the passage quoted above indicates, she considers the notion of practical 
knowledge to be essential if we are to avoid the ‘utter darkness’ of such philosophical confusion. But 
what does it mean to say that an agent’s knowledge of his own intentional actions is practical 
knowledge? The pithiest definition of practical knowledge offered in Intention derives from Aquinas, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Concerns have been expressed over the appropriateness of Anscombe’s example as one of non-observational knowledge, e.g. (Pickard, 
2004). Nevertheless, what I say here concerning this example holds for other cases of non-observational knowledge. 
15 It is worth noting that naturalist or physicalist positions in the philosophy of mind still implicitly trade upon the move made here by which 
the distinction between intentional and unintentional actions is deferred to a subjective or internal realm, despite their explicit rejection of the 
existence of such a realm or its supposed contents. They remain committed to the same form of enquiry: the attempt to fill an apparent ‘gap’ 
in the causal chain that terminates in an intentional action (Anscombe, 2005). The difference is that such positions attempt to reduce talk of 
an ‘inner’ realm to talk of physical or physiological facts and events. 
	  32  
whom practical knowledge is ‘the cause of what it understands’ (§48). Such a definition is clearly at odds 
with the contemplative conception of knowledge, since it implies that what is understood – the object 
of knowledge – is dependent upon the knowledge itself, insofar as it is ‘caused’ by it. The key question 
is what ‘cause’ can mean in this context if we are correct in claiming that Intention involves a wholesale 
rejection of the causal theory of action.  
Neither Anscombe nor Aquinas want to say that John’s knowledge that he is filling the kettle is the 
efficient cause of his action of filling up the kettle. John’s knowledge does not make his action happen in 
the sense that we consider the motion of one billiard ball to bring about the motion of a second upon 
colliding. It is not a causal antecedent of his action. Rather, practical knowledge is to be understood as 
the formal cause of ‘what it understands’.16 John’s knowledge causes his action insofar as his action is 
intentional – i.e., it determines which descriptions of what happens count as intentional actions. Here, 
knowledge and fact are internally related to one another. We can contrast this with the knowledge John 
has of his unintentional actions. In such cases, the action bears only an external relationship with John’s 
knowledge of it (where he does have knowledge of it), and occurs independently of whether John knew 
of it or not. In this way, defining intentional actions in terms of practical knowledge is to reject the 
appeal to causal antecedents that is the essence of the causal theory of action.  
Anscombe’s appeal to the concept of practical knowledge clarifies the manner in which an agent’s 
knowledge of his own actions is a subset of the set of things known without observation. Not all non-
observational knowledge is practical knowledge, and it is not the non-observational character that has 
priority here. An agent’s knowledge of his own actions is non-observational because it is practical 
knowledge; because it is ‘the cause of what it understands’. This priority must be emphasized if it is to 
be clear just how knowledge of one’s own actions differs from other species of non-observational 
knowledge. The agent’s knowledge is not derived from the factual occurrence of their intentional 
actions; the facts do not have priority here. Unless this idea is made sufficiently clear, it can be impossible to 
make proper sense of Anscombe’s claims regarding the non-observational character of an agent’s 
knowledge of their intentional actions. Without it, it seems unavoidable that there must be some kind 
of limit to how far reaching non-observational knowledge can be; that non-observational knowledge 
falls somewhere short of the action itself17, which can only be known via observation. Either that or 
Anscombe is positing something like ‘a very queer and special sort of seeing eye in the middle of acting’ 
(I, §32) that magically enables the agent to see events as they unfold without looking. 
Anscombe is positing no such thing, but neither is she positing that there must be ‘two objects of 
knowledge’ involved in intentional action: the action itself and something short of it. We are only 
presented with such alternatives if we assume that the contemplative conception of knowledge is the 
only one available to us. To say that an agent has practical knowledge of his intentional actions is to say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The distinction between these different species of causation derives from Aristotle’s Physics (II 3) and The Metaphysics (V 2). Anscombe does 
not make explicit reference to these sources, although given the avowedly Aristotelian roots of her thought, applying Aristotle on causation 
seems an apt way of making better sense of her discussion.  
17 This might be the ‘intention’, or – if we allow for non-observational knowledge of one’s own body – the bodily movements involved in the 
executed action. 
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that he knows without observation what is happening beyond the limits of any supposed ‘inner’ realm 
and the limits of his physical body.18 
 
 
v. Practical Knowledge and ‘Knowing One’s Way About’ 
 
The alternative to the causal theory of action offered in Intention hinges upon the emphasis on 
practical knowledge. Once the agent’s knowledge of her own actions has been sufficiently elucidated, 
the mode of thinking that seeks to define intentional actions in terms of their causal antecedents can be 
seen to be fundamentally misguided. As Anscombe phrases it in a later paper, ‘[t]he mistake is to think 
that the relation of being done in execution of a certain intention, or being done intentionally, is a causal relation 
between act and intention’ (Anscombe, 2005: 95). 
Intentional actions occupy a certain place in the personal history of the individual. The explanations 
of action that are offered in response to the probing of Anscombe’s sense of ‘Why?’ serve to show this. 
They unpack the intention with which the given action was executed insofar as they disclose the sense 
in which the agent understood the action to be contributing to the achievement of a certain aim, or as 
constituting part of a broader description of their activity. To explain an action in this way is to show in 
precisely what sense the agent understood it to be an appropriate thing to do. It takes us beyond the 
action itself as a bare physical event in order to situate it within its proper context. This thought is 
clearly anticipated in some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on intention, such as the following: 
 
Why do you want to tell him about an intention too, as well as telling him what I did? Not 
because the intention was also something which was going on at that time. But because I 
want to tell him something about myself, which goes beyond what happened at that time.  
(PI, 659) 
 
Of course, in talking of ‘myself’ here, Wittgenstein is not referring to any kind of private, ‘inner’ realm 
or entity. I tell you about myself insofar as I reveal what kinds of things I take to be suitable reasons for 
acting. In asking ‘Why?’ we are hoping to discover precisely to what the given action is a response or, in 
Anscombe’s own words, ‘we are implicitly looking away from the individual and into his world’ 
(Anscombe, 2005: 99-100).  
An individual’s practical knowledge of their intentional actions – knowledge that is explicitly 
articulated in responding to the certain sense of ‘Why?’ – comprises a moment within a larger whole. 
Practical knowledge is not entirely episodic or momentary; it does not only arise at the moment a given 
action is initiated and carried out. Rather, such instances refer us to a more general kind of relationship 
that the individual bears with the world insofar as he is an agent who is practically situated in the world. 
This is the world as the setting of the agent’s practical life. Whilst Anscombe does not pursue this idea 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 An objection might seem to emerge here. I can discover an error in my execution of an intention via observation. This would suggest that 
my knowledge of my successful execution of an intention must be based on observation. I am unable to discuss this worry here, but I do not 
take it to be a genuine objection. (Haddock, 2011) comprehensively deals with it, demonstrating that Anscombe has all the resources to 
accommodate such ‘hiccups’, as Haddock calls them. Haddock’s response hinges on the thought that practical knowledge can be vulnerable to 
observational evidence without itself being grounded in such evidence.  
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at any great length, it is certainly present in Intention. The following passage, for instance, illustrates this 
sense in which practical knowledge is constitutive of a general form of engagement with the world:  
 
Although the term ‘practical knowledge’ is most often used in connexion with specialized 
skills, there is no reason to think that this notion has application only in such contexts. 
‘Intentional action’ always presupposes what might be called ‘knowing one’s way about’ 
the matters described in the description under which an action can be called intentional, 
and this knowledge is exercised in action and is practical knowledge.  
(I, §48) 
 
Now, I believe that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of operative intentionality should be understood as 
deeply confluent with the thought Anscombe expresses here. Considering Merleau-Ponty against the 
background of Anscombe’s discussion – particularly the account of practical knowledge that we have 
now unpacked – will thus allow us better to appreciate the relationship his thought bears to the 
philosophy of action. This will facilitate an elucidation of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of operative 
intentionality, which is my primary goal in this chapter. I shall begin, in the next section, by reading 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the pathological case of Schneider in the light of the foregoing discussion 
of Intention. It is here that we will be able to detail the fundamental emphasis Merleau-Ponty gives to 
embodiment in his articulation of operative intentionality. This emphasis constitutes a clear difference 
between Phenomenology of Perception and Intention. It should be clear, however, that this difference is not a 
critical one, and that Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body is confluent with the Anscombean line of 
thought detailed above. Section 1.4 will then look beyond Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of Schneider in 
order to draw out the proper relationship Merleau-Ponty’s conception of operative intentionality can be 
seen to bear to the philosophy of action.  
 
 
1.3 The Intentional Arc and the Body Schema in the Case of Schneider 
 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty seeks to move beyond a traditional account of 
intentionality, and it is by means of a phenomenological account of one’s own body (le corps propre) that 
he pursues this aim. What this turn to the body reveals is the manner in which an individual finds 
himself to be practically situated in the world, and it is Merleau-Ponty’s description of this that sees him 
converge with Anscombe’s critical engagement with the philosophy of action. According to Merleau-
Ponty, this situatedness involves a fundamental reciprocity between subject and world such that neither 
can be considered in abstraction from the other. The subject cannot be separated from this practical 
‘hold’ (prise) he has on the world; he is inextricably tied to the world through what Merleau-Ponty refers 
to as an ‘intentional arc’: 
 
The life of consciousness – epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life – is 
underpinned by an “intentional arc” that projects around us our past, our future, our 
human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our moral situation, or 
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rather, that ensures that we are situated within all of these relationships. This intentional 
arc creates the unity of the senses, the unity of the senses with intelligence, and the unity 
of sensitivity and motricity.  
(PhP, 137/170) 
 
Merleau-Ponty arrives at the notion of the intentional arc through a systematic juxtaposition of the 
normal subject’s experience with a particular pathological subject called Johann Schneider. Merleau-
Ponty makes use of pathological case studies throughout the Phenomenology. As Mooney expresses it, 
pathological cases provide Merleau-Ponty with ‘a means of suspending the familiar so as to gain a 
distance from it and thereby explicate it’ (Mooney, 2011: 361). The case of Schneider is perhaps the 
most well known of Merleau-Ponty’s pathological examples. It is certainly the one that Merleau-Ponty 
discusses most extensively, articulating some of his most central concepts in the process.  
Schneider received shrapnel injuries to the brain whilst serving in the German army during the First 
World War. These injuries resulted in various pathological impairments that led to Schneider becoming 
a major case study in several joint works by the psychologist Adhémar Gelb and the neurologist Kurt 
Goldstein.19 In the present section, I will unpack Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the Schneider case. I will 
begin by outlining how the distinction drawn between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ movements applies in 
relation to Schneider’s pathology. I will then consider how this aspect of Schneider’s illness illustrates 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the ‘body schema’. I will explore this concept in terms of the different 
species of knowledge discussed by Anscombe; first, I will demonstrate how it is the body schema that 
subtends our ‘non-observational’ knowledge of our body, and secondly I will consider how we might 
think of the body schema as a region of practical knowledge. I will end the section, with further 
reference to the Schneider case, by explaining how Merleau-Ponty understands the body schema to 
open out onto the more general situatedness in, and understanding of the world that is definitive of 
operative intentionality.  
 
 
i. Schneider and ‘Abstract’ Vs. ‘Concrete’ Movements 
 
The nature of Schneider’s illness is most clearly demonstrated in his varying abilities to perform 
certain actions. Two actions that involve precisely the same bodily movements are not equally possible 
for him due to a difference between the contexts in which they are produced. Were a mosquito to land 
on Schneider’s arm he would be able, like the normal subject, to perform the movement necessary to 
swat or bat the insect away without a problem and without the need of an observational awareness of 
the location of his arm. If he is requested to perform broadly the same movement in an act of pointing 
to his arm however, Schneider begins to struggle. In the case of pointing, Schneider is unable to locate 
his arm without recourse to visual observation or certain preparatory movements of other parts of his 
body in order to ‘find’ it (shaking his torso, for instance). The disjunction between Schneider’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It seems certain that Schneider suffered from a form of visual agnosia following his injury, although the precise nature of his illness remains 
unclear. (Jensen, 2009) catalogues the multitude of specific types of visual agnosia that have historically been imputed to the Schneider case. 
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competent performances and his incapacities motivates a distinction, made by Goldstein, between 
‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ movements (Goldstein, 1923). Schneider is able to perform concrete movements 
– i.e., common or habitual actions that relate to a well-defined and familiar situation – yet he is unable 
to perform actions that are abstracted from a familiar setting. For instance, he finds the task of tracing a 
circle in the air with his hand extremely difficult. As was the case with pointing to a part of his own 
body, he must first ‘find’ the limb in question, after which he makes several arbitrary and unsuccessful 
attempts until he finally happens upon a circular movement, recognizes it, and completes the task (PhP, 
112/140).  
It is worth noting that something of Schneider’s problems in performing abstract movements is 
present even in his successful performances of actions that are related to a well-defined milieu. 
Merleau-Ponty recounts that Schneider, when asked to perform a concrete movement such as a 
military salute, must first repeat the order to himself before his body ‘settles into the overall position 
required by the task’ (PhP, 106/134). Schneider subsequently performs the task with what seems to be 
an odd kind of attention to detail in which every element of the situation in which the salute usually 
takes place finds expression. Whereas the normal subject would, if she wished, be able to perform a 
salute by means of an isolated movement of the arm, Schneider must make use of his entire body and 
perform the salute with the same kind of formal rigidity that the actual presence of a commanding 
officer would call for. While the normal subject is able to grasp their performance as 
decontextualized20 and perform it in a correspondingly stripped down fashion, Schneider can only 
perform movements successfully if they are grasped as a response to a situation in which they find 
their context, and so he executes them in the very same way in which he originally became habituated 
to. In this respect, Merleau-Ponty suggests that Schneider displays an abnormal relation to the 
imaginary insofar as he is only able to entertain an imaginary situation if it somehow ceases to be 
imaginary for him and is instead treated as real. If this attitude is interrupted or unavailable, then the 
action becomes impossible for him (PhP, 107/135). 
 
 
ii. Knowledge of One’s Own Body: The ‘Body Schema’ 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the pathology of Schneider’s behaviour displays an abnormal experience of his 
own body. The normal subject does not need to find his limbs in the way Schneider seems to do. In 
articulating this point, Merleau-Ponty echoes Anscombe’s claim – which she makes more or less in 
passing, though it has often been disputed nonetheless – that one knows the position of one’s limbs 
without observation. Anscombe makes this claim on the basis that there are no ‘separately describable 
sensations’ (I, §8) that serve as the criterion for stating what the position of one’s limbs is. We are able 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 We might alternatively say that the normal subject is able to ‘re-contexualize’ the performance in the context of an empirical psychological 
study. The idea remains the same: this context is not the one in which the given action was originally learned or most regularly performed. 
Tim Mooney suggests that such cases should be thought of as ‘concrete-like’ movements, given the absence of their original or proper 
context. He thus offers a three-part distinction between ‘concrete’, ‘concrete-like’, and ‘abstract’ movements (Mooney, 2011: 362). In what 
follows, I shall stick to the two-part distinction that Merleau-Ponty takes from Gelb and Goldstein’s discussion of the Schneider case.  
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to make statements about such things immediately, without the need to perform any kind of inference. 
It is of course possible that such statements turn out to be false – such as when my leg ‘goes to sleep’ – 
but this does not debar them from being expressions of knowledge when they are true. These 
statements are not guesses, and the beliefs they express are justified although it seems that they are not 
based on any kind of evidence that stands apart from them.  
As we saw in Section 1.2, insofar as Anscombe discusses non-observational knowledge of one’s own 
body, it remains amenable to the ‘contemplative’ conception of knowledge. My left arm (or any other 
part of my body) occupies a certain spatial position independently of whether or not I know what this 
position is. As such, the facts are here ‘prior, and dictate what is to be said, if it is knowledge’ (I, §32). 
On Merleau-Ponty’s terms, it looks as if the object of this knowledge is the body as a mere physical 
thing – what he refers to as the ‘objective body’ (PhP, 74/100) – and not the phenomenal body (le corps 
propre) – i.e., the body experienced as the seat of one’s perceptual and agential powers. However, when 
Merleau-Ponty discusses the non-observational knowledge one has of one’s own body, he does so in 
terms of its relation to the subject’s experience of bodily motility and agency. As a result of this, he 
accounts for a type of knowledge that is not amenable to the contemplative conception. It is here that 
the concept of the ‘body schema’ (le schéma corporel) comes to the fore in Phenomenology of Perception. 
For Merleau-Ponty, it is the body schema that properly distinguishes bodily spatiality from the 
spatiality of objects. The subject’s spatial awareness of their body is holistic: the parts of the body bear 
what one might call ‘internal’ relationships to one another as moments of a systematic whole. These 
are meaningful relationships, in direct contrast to the relationships that hold between the parts of purely 
physical objects, which bear only external, contingent relations to one another. It is thus in virtue of a 
holistic awareness that the subject knows the position of his limbs: ‘I know the position of each of my 
limbs through a body schema that envelops them all’ (PhP, 100-1/127). Crucially, the body schema is not 
any kind of mental image or ‘representation’, or a product of associations.21 It is instead to be 
understood as the very condition or ‘law’ that underpins and makes such associations possible. The 
body schema is ‘an in principle unity’ (PhP, 102/129).  
According to Merleau-Ponty, it is the body schema that makes available the kind of non-
observational knowledge Anscombe speaks of. This is only part of the story, however. Merleau-
Ponty’s main focus is the role played by the body schema in the experience of agency, to which there 
are two aspects.  
First, through the body schema, I am pre-reflectively aware of and able to execute possible bodily 
movements. This awareness is operative without requiring any mediation in a deliberate act of 
consciousness. For instance, in raising my arm, I need not represent to myself or observe my arm’s 
current position, nor the movement required of it if the action is to be executed, nor any of the 
positions lying between my current situation and my goal. I move my arm directly: there are no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Merleau-Ponty inherits the concept of ‘body schema’ from the work of psychologist Henry Head, who makes the same kind of distinction 
emphasized by Shaun Gallagher between body-schema and body-image (Gallagher, 2005). The body-image is primarily a representational 
awareness of one’s body as an object – an amalgamation of perceptual, cognitive, and affective relations to one’s body – whilst the body-
schema is a pre-reflective awareness of one’s body as the vehicle of one’s agency. 
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mediators lying between the decision to move and the movement. This is what Merleau-Ponty means 
when he writes that, in movement, ‘the relations between my decision and my body are magical ones’ 
(PhP, 97/123). 
The second aspect of the body schema’s role in the experience of agency consists in its status as a 
situational awareness of my body. Merleau-Ponty places special emphasis on the way in which the body 
schema is geared into the subject’s practical engagements with the world beyond the physical limits of 
his body. The parts of the body have a variable value or sense for the subject that is pre-reflectively 
determined at any given moment by the posture, movement, or task being engaged in. This is 
illustrated by the nice description Merleau-Ponty gives of himself leaning over his desk: 
 
If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are 
accentuated and my whole body trails behind them like a comet’s tail. I am not unaware of 
the location of my shoulders or my waist; rather, this awareness is enveloped in my 
awareness of my hands and my entire stance is read, so to speak, in how my hands lean 
upon the desk. 
(PhP, 102/129) 
 
The body schema is thus not purely reflexive, but rather it ‘exists toward’ its various tasks (PhP, 
103/130). In this way, the ‘dynamic’ system of the body schema provides an awareness of the body 
that is profoundly different to that of any kind of object. In the body schema, the parts of my body are 
internally related, not only to one another, but also to my surroundings as the setting of actual and 
possible tasks. Merleau-Ponty thus offers the following gloss on the body schema: 
 
Reduced to a precise sense, this term means that my body appears to me as a posture 
toward a certain task, actual or possible. And in fact my body’s spatiality is not, like the 
spatiality of external objects or of “spatial sensations,” a positional spatiality; rather, it is a 
situational spatiality.  
(PhP, 102/129)22 
 
 
iii. The Body Schema as a Region of Practical Knowledge 
 
Whilst the body schema constitutes a non-observational form of knowledge of the body, it would 
appear that this knowledge, unlike that discussed by Anscombe, cannot be accommodated by the 
contemplative conception of knowledge. Indeed, we might understand the body schema as 
constituting practical knowledge of one’s own body. Such a claim might seem impossible given that, 
following Anscombe and Aquinas, the very definition of practical knowledge states it to be ‘the cause 
of what it understands’. Clearly, a subject’s knowledge of the position of his arm cannot be understood 
to cause the arm to be where it is – we have already clarified that such a fact holds independently of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 It is here that the concept of the body schema is intimately connected with that of ‘motor intentionality’. I will postpone a thematic 
discussion of motor intentionality until Chapter 2, where I seek to explicate its place in the constitution and development of perceptual 
meaning. 
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knowledge. What is important, however, is that according to Merleau-Ponty the subject’s non-
observational knowledge of such facts – facts of the ‘objective’ body – should be seen as grounded in 
the subject’s knowledge of his body as the vehicle of his practical engagements with the world. This 
knowledge is an integral aspect of the subject’s status as an agent, and in this sense must be conceived 
as ‘the cause of what it understands’ insofar as it is (at least partly) constitutive of the subject’s bodily 
agency.  
This point will perhaps become clearer if we return to Schneider. Outside of the immediately 
familiar contexts associated with his acquired habits or his trade as a leatherworker, it appears 
Schneider is only capable of relating to his body if he is allowed to ‘find’ it through some form of 
observation. Now, we might initially be tempted to say that Schneider simply lacks non-observational 
knowledge of his body in just the sense Anscombe discusses – i.e., knowledge whose object is the 
body as a physical thing. Abstract movements seem to require some kind of awareness of one’s body 
as an object, and Schneider’s difficulties in performing such decontextualized movements certainly 
have to do with the fact that he must replace missing non-observational knowledge with knowledge 
acquired by observation. This would explain, for instance, why Schneider is unable to point to the 
part of his body being touched if his eyes are closed. Conversely, Schneider’s competent performance 
of concrete actions might then be thought to exhibit that Schneider’s knowledge of his body as a 
vehicle of situated or context-driven action has been left intact. If these two kinds of knowledge – i.e. 
non-observational knowledge of one’s body as a physical thing, and knowledge of one’s body as a 
vehicle of context-driven action – can indeed come apart in this way, then it seems that they must be 
independent of one another. This is something that I am claiming Merleau-Ponty rejects insofar as he 
considers the non-observational knowledge of the position of one’s limbs to be made available 
through the body schema.  
In contrasting Schneider with the normal subject, Merleau-Ponty places a strong emphasis on the 
place of possibility in the experience of one’s own body. Merleau-Ponty’s own diagnosis of Schneider’s 
pathology is focused around the idea that Schneider no longer ‘has’ his body as a vehicle of merely 
possible action. This claim is initially motivated by Schneider’s abnormal relationship with imaginary 
situations and actions. As noted above, when requested to perform a familiar action outside of its 
proper context, Schneider must begin by engaging in a sort of intellectual ritual by means of which he 
is able to grasp the requested action as a response to a real situation. Schneider is no longer able to 
unproblematically entertain imaginary possibilities. Outside of the demands of a real situation, and 
without observation, Schneider’s body is merely an ‘amorphous mass’ (PhP, 112/140), lacking the 
inner articulation by which the different parts of the body each have a place and relate to one another 
as moments of a systematic whole. In the normal subject this inner articulation involves a pre-
reflective grasp of the body as the seat of motor possibilities. It is this grasp that makes available non-
observational knowledge of the position of one’s limbs. Each part of the body has its identity for the 
subject as a ‘certain power for action’ (PhP, 111/139). It is because Schneider’s body is no longer 
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articulated in this way that he is wholly unable to locate the parts of his objective body without 
observation. We see here that the kind of knowledge of one’s body that is discussed by Anscombe is 
itself grounded in the kind of practical knowledge of one’s own body that Merleau-Ponty describes. 
The locus of Schneider’s disabilities lies in his phenomenal body.  
 
 
iv. A Bodily Understanding of the World  
 
Schneider’s illness is not limited to his motor functions, however. There are further aspects of his 
behaviour that reveal a deterioration of his experience and understanding of the world more generally. 
The motif that we find repeated here is Schneider’s inability to grasp the merely possible, and to 
thereby understand the actual in relation to possibilities. 
 
The normal person reckons with the possible, which thus acquires a sort of actuality 
without leaving behind its place as a possibility; for the patient, however, the field of the 
actual is limited to what is encountered in real contact or linked to these givens through 
an explicit deduction.  
(PhP, 112/139-140) 23 
 
Exploring Schneider’s illness further discloses, in non-pathological cases, a kind of understanding of 
the world that is not that of an abstract faculty of intellection or of ‘the understanding’, but of an 
embodied agency. It is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty speaks of the body as ‘our anchorage in a 
world’ (PhP, 146/180). This anchorage is not simply physical, and Merleau-Ponty is not – at least not 
primarily – advancing a kind of materialist thesis here. Indeed, he explicitly wants to reject the 
assumption that the body is primarily to be understood under a purely material, physical description. 
Rather, the body is the means by which I relate to the world as the setting in which my various 
intentional engagements find their context. There is no fundamental description of my body: it has a 
sense and is articulated for me insofar as it is the vehicle of my engagement with the world under the 
huge variety of different descriptions that together constitute my practical situation; my intentional life. 
As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the normal subject has ‘several holds’ upon his body insofar as it places him 
in touch with the world under various different descriptions (PhP, 111/138). In this way, practical 
knowledge of one’s own body is the other side of a pre-reflective form of understanding of the world. 
The deterioration of Schneider’s relationship with the world is no more than the other side of his 
pathological form of bodily motricity and agency.  
 This deterioration is perhaps most prominent in Schneider’s perceptual experience. We find that 
Schneider is only able to grasp the properties of a perceived thing via the medium of language and the 
conceptual connections that hold between words. For instance, when Schneider attempts to draw a 
sketch of a perceived object, his perceptual exploration of the object is never translated immediately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 It is this same ‘capacity of orienting oneself in relation to the possible … and not in relation to a limited milieu’ (SB, 176/190) that Merleau-
Ponty had already stressed as ‘the essence’ of a decidedly human dialectic in his first work, The Structure of Behaviour.  
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into the movements of his pencil. Instead, Schneider must verbally articulate the particularities he is 
able to recognize (e.g. ‘a right angle’, ‘a straight edge’, etc.), and then construct his drawing freehand on 
the basis of his grasp of the meaning of the words. For Schneider, the perceived object lacks an 
immediate or pre-reflective sense that is present in normal perception. Whilst the normal subject enjoys 
a spontaneous communication with the world in perception, Schneider must engage in a laborious 
process of interpretation. 
 
For the normal person, the object is “speaking” and meaningful, the arrangement of 
colours immediately “means” something, whereas for the patient the signification must be 
brought in from elsewhere through a genuine act of interpretation.  
(PhP, 133/164) 
 
Merleau-Ponty states that Schneider’s perceptual deficiencies lie at ‘the junction of sensitivity and 
signification’ (PhP, 132/164). In order to understand the perceived object, Schneider must subsume 
what is sensibly given under conceptual categories in a reflective act. We can thus identify two distinct 
moments of Schneider’s perceptual experience. There is, on the one hand, an entirely passive reception 
of sensible givens – a bare sensible ‘impact’ of the world – and, on the other hand, a categorial 
subsumption of these givens through an explicit act of intellectual reflection. In Schneider’s case, 
perceptual sensitivity comes apart from the signification of the perceived. 
The normal subject understands the perceived object in an entirely different way, which Merleau-
Ponty, following Gestalt psychologists such as Werner and Köhler, refers to as ‘physiognomic 
perception’ (PhP, 134/165). In physiognomic perception, the sensible has a sense (sens) that is not 
bestowed upon it from an act of “the understanding”. This is because the normal subject grasps the 
perceived thing as a pole of possible active engagements. The object exists ‘for’ his body (PhP, 
140/174). He is not limited to bare sensible ‘givens’ because his own agential and motor possibilities are 
reflected in the organization of the perceptual field. The actual stands out against the background of a 
‘horizon of possibilities’ (PhP, 523n87/169n1) that is no longer available for Schneider.24  
We can see further aspects of this absence in the fact that the world no longer suggests opportunities 
for spontaneous or creative activity to Schneider. For instance, he appears to have lost the capacity to 
take any kind of sexual initiative. He is simply no longer sensitive to the world in this way, or as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, ‘[p]erception has lost its erotic structure’ (PhP, 158/193). He is unable to form 
intentions that would guide a sexual engagement with the world. Similarly, he finds himself unable to 
form political or religious opinions, despite expressing a desire to do so (PhP, 136/168). Schneider is 
no longer pre-reflectively situated in relation to such matters, and finds himself ‘on the outside looking 
in’, as it were. 
Furthermore, Schneider barely speaks at all unless he is asked a direct question. When he does take 
the initiative of asking a question, he only ever asks those questions that have become habitual for him, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Once again, the concept of ‘motor intentionality’ is employed in articulating this reciprocity between the body schema and the perceived 
world. This shall be brought out in detail as the thematic focus of Chapter 2.  
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such as asking his children about their day when they return home from school. A conversation does 
not present Schneider with a meaningful situation that might give rise to new or spontaneous thoughts 
in him. Instead, he must plan what he is going to say in advance. As Merleau-Ponty describes it, 
 
Schneider never feels the need to speak, his experience never tends toward speech, it 
never raises a question, and it never ceases to have this sort of evidentness and self-
sufficiency of the real that stifles all interrogation, all reference to the possible, all wonder, 
and all improvisation.  
(PhP, 202/238) 
 
Schneider has not lost language altogether, just as he has not altogether lost the power of movement. 
He has retained a vocabulary and a conceptual understanding of words in much the same way as he has 
retained the habitual actions and practical skills acquired prior to his injury. Schneider’s problem is that, 
beyond habitual contexts and constituted meanings, his body and his language are no longer available to 
him as vehicles of merely possible, as yet undetermined, uses, thereby leaving him ‘“bound” to the 
actual’ (PhP, 137/169). 
 
All things considered, the world no longer suggests any significations to him and, 
reciprocally, the significations that he considers are no longer embodied in the given 
world.  
(PhP, 133/165) 
 
The world is no longer immediately given to Schneider as the space in which his intentional 
engagements find their context and, thereby, their sense. To borrow Anscombe’s phrase, Schneider no 
longer ‘knows his way about’ the world under various different descriptions, and this is found reflected 
in the peculiarities of his behaviour and loss of spontaneity. It is thus a form of understanding that has 
been compromised for Schneider. His illness reveals a reciprocal or dialectical relationship between a 
pre-reflective grasp (prise) of the world and one’s capacities for spontaneous intentional behaviour. The 
‘intentional arc’ is nothing more than the movement of this dialectic, and it is in this sense that 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of the intentional arc as having ‘gone limp’ for Schneider (PhP, 137/170).25  
 
 
1.4 Operative Intentionality 
 
It is in disclosing this dialectic between the pre-reflective, bodily grasp of the world and the capacity 
for spontaneous intentional behaviour that Merleau-Ponty articulates his conception of operative 
intentionality. This ‘primordial’ intentionality does not involve an intentional object held before a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This diagnosis is also formulated in terms of ‘a certain leveling out of the “world”’ for Schneider (PhP, 132/163). As the quotation marks 
indicate, ‘world’ is used here in a technical sense to refer to what Merleau-Ponty describes as the ‘double moment of sedimentation and 
spontaneity’ (PhP, 132/163). Once again, Merleau-Ponty is positing a dialectical relationship in virtue of which one’s ‘sedimented’ acquisitions 
or constituted understanding is what makes available new possibilities for spontaneous acts, which in turn constitute a development of one’s 
understanding; of one’s situation. Schneider’s acquisitions (motor, linguistic, conceptual) are no longer given to him in such a way that 
spontaneous and new usages are pre-reflectively possible, and as such the dialectic flounders and ossifies. We shall see (in Chapters 3-5) how 
this ‘double moment’ surfaces repeatedly throughout Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of language, expression, and tradition. 
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subject, but an original directedness towards the world and towards things, through which the subject is 
situated in the world and cannot be considered outside or apart from it. It is here that Merleau-Ponty 
appropriates Heidegger’s ‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-sein/être au monde) as a concept that is to be 
juxtaposed with a dualism of, on the one hand, the self-transparent and reflexive existence of a 
Cartesian ego (‘being-for-itself’) and, on the other, the impersonal and determinate existence of an 
objective world (‘being-in-itself’).26 For Merleau-Ponty, the true insight of phenomenology lies in its 
potential to disclose a form of intentionality that involves neither a transparent subjectivity nor an 
opaque objectivity. 
Despite how alien Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological lexicon might initially appear to Anscombe’s 
approach, her account of ‘practical knowledge’ leads to a thought that lies at the heart of Merleau-
Ponty’s entire philosophy: that there is a form of understanding of the world in which the ‘facts’ – i.e., 
the world considered independently of the individual’s grasp of it – do not have priority.27 This 
understanding, which is precisely not the outcome of any kind of subjective act of judgement, is 
constitutive of the subject’s situatedness in the world, and thus ‘the cause of what it understands’, in the 
sense that Anscombe means these words. In at least this regard, we can see that there is a convergence 
between the two despite the fact that they arrive at this thought in very different ways. Anscombe 
pursues a grammatical investigation of the linguistic practices that surround our explanations of action, 
whilst Merleau-Ponty works through a phenomenological articulation of the body’s place in agency and 
perception. The differences in the paths they each follow serve only to make their convergence more 
intriguing and more fruitful, both exegetically and philosophically. 
It is the thinking behind the concept of operative intentionality that places Merleau-Ponty, like 
Anscombe, completely at odds with the mode of thinking that seeks a solution to Wittgenstein’s 
problem. Such a solution appears necessary so long as we assume that priority must be given to an 
‘objective’ description of events; a description in which the agent’s understanding of his actions are by 
definition excluded. It is this assumption that motivates the idea that there must be a highest common 
factor between unintentional and intentional actions that involve the same physical movements, and 
which thereby pushes the ‘intentional’ component of intentional actions – Danto’s ‘x’ – back into a 
purely subjective realm or sphere of the mind. This mode of thinking thus tacitly assumes and supports 
the dualism of mind and world that Merleau-Ponty is seeking to supplant. As Jensen expresses it, the 
problem here ‘resides in the assumption that the subjective component (the intention or trying) and the 
objective component (the movement) of a bodily action can be made intelligible independently of one 
another, i.e. in a conceptual dualism’ (Jensen, 2014: 54). Romdenh-Romluc’s framing of Merleau-
Ponty’s thought in relation to Wittgenstein’s problem prohibits her from adequately articulating the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 A more or less explicit target here is Sartre, who, in Being and Nothingness, lays great emphasis on the ontological bifurcation of being-in-itself 
and being-for-itself (Sartre, trans. 1957). 
27 Of course, the subject’s understanding may be contradicted or undermined in various ways by the realization of certain mind-independent 
facts. I take this to be the case in various forms of repression, such as the phantom limb patient who continues to relate to the world through 
a limb that no longer exists. In such a case, there is a friction between the facts and the subject’s pre-reflective understanding. Merleau-Ponty 
offers an analysis of phantom limb cases along these lines that I am unable to pursue here (see PhP Part I, Chapter I d-e). Nonetheless, as in 
the case of the agent’s knowledge of his own actions, this sensitivity to the observed facts does not necessitate that the subject’s pre-reflective 
understanding of the world is originally arrived at on the basis of observational reasons. 
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fundamental challenge his conception of operative intentionality offers to the general run of work in 
the philosophy of action.  
Like Anscombe, the Merleau-Pontian rejection of Wittgenstein’s problem begins with a refusal to give 
the ‘objective’ description of events its assumed priority. In Phenomenology of Perception, this refusal is 
initially pursued through the phenomenology of one’s own body. For Merleau-Ponty, the subject’s 
relationship with his body cannot be adequately accounted for if a physical or physiological description 
of the body is given explanatory priority. What Merleau-Ponty offers is an account of the body in which 
the subject’s grasp of his body must be understood as partly constitutive of the body insofar as it is the 
‘vehicle of being in the world’ (PhP, 84/111). The subject’s relationship with his own body is thus 
revealed as the ‘other side’ of his pre-reflective understanding of, or situatedness in, the world. The 
various uses the subject puts his body to in the performance of intentional actions are expressive of this 
relationship with the world. A description of the world in which this relationship does not figure is one 
in which the concept of ‘intentional action’ has no sense, since it is a description of the world in which 
actions are not considered in their proper context(s). The intentional actions that a subject performs have 
their context, and thus their sense, insofar as they are responses to a given situation. Intentional actions 
are moments of a dialectical form of understanding of the world that is the focus of Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of operative intentionality. 
Finally, then, we can begin to see how it is this conception of operative intentionality that underpins 
the aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception that Romdenh-Romluc, amongst others, 
emphasizes in her own discussion of the relationship Merleau-Ponty’s thought bears to the philosophy 
of action. As I noted in Section 1.1, Merleau-Ponty discusses what we might think of as a malleability of 
the perceptual field, such that that the normal subject finds her intentions and practical interests 
immediately reflected in her perceptual experience: ‘they polarize it, put their stamp on it, or finally, 
effortlessly give birth there to a new wave of significations’ (PhP, 133/165). Merleau-Ponty also 
discusses this ‘polarization’ in terms of the presence of what he calls ‘lines of force’ in perception, as in 
the following example from The Structure of Behaviour: 
 
For the player in action the football field is … pervaded with lines of force (the “yard 
lines”; those which demarcate the “penalty area”) and articulated in sectors (for example, 
the “openings” between the adversaries) which call for a certain mode of action and 
which initiate and guide the action as if the player were unaware of it. The field itself is 
not given to him, but present as the immanent term of his practical intentions  
(SB, 168/182-3) 
 
Romdenh-Romluc considers the significance of such cases to consist in the fact that they provide 
examples of actions that are brought about by perception without recourse to intentions (understood as 
reflective mental states with representational content). Insofar as Merleau-Ponty offers a psychological 
description of action, Romdenh-Romluc is surely right, for here we have cases of actions being 
	  45  
performed without recourse to any kind of explicit deliberation or representation.28 Considered in 
isolation and without an eye for Merleau-Ponty’s more general conception of operative intentionality, 
however, his descriptions of such cases begin to look like material for a solution to Wittgenstein’s 
problem in which perceptions are conceived as sometimes, or even most of the time, taking the place 
of intentions as ‘what is left over’. I suggest that the role of such examples in Merleau-Ponty’s work is 
in fact to make perspicuous our pre-reflective understanding of the world as the setting or context of 
our multifarious practical projects and engagements.  
Anscombe herself echoes the psychological point that is the focus of Romdenh-Romluc’s discussion 
when Anscombe notes that a great deal of the time, the formulations we offer in response to her sense 
of ‘Why?’ are not explicitly entertained (qua representational state) in thought before or during the 
execution of the given action. Yet, as Anscombe argues, this does not disclose a different species of 
action – one that is brought about by perception rather than intentions. Instead, it illustrates the way in 
which reporting one’s intention in performing a given action does not involve remembering the 
experience of a particular thought or state that brought the action about (Anscombe, 2005). In 
illustrating this, it lends support to thinking about intentional action in a way that does not look to solve 
Wittgenstein’s problem, whether by appeal to an immanent sphere of mental states or items, or 
otherwise. 
Indeed, for Merleau-Ponty, cases such as the football player described above serve to illustrate the 
nature of the operative intentionality by means of which consciousness or agency is always already ‘in 
the world’. It is this situatedness that provides the meaningful context or background against which our 
actions have the sense that they do. Perception itself is shown to participate in this pre-reflective 
understanding of the world, and the sense of perceptual experience – like the sense of the subject’s 
intentional actions – is shown to be incomprehensible if we begin from a ‘fundamental’ or ‘objective’ 
description of the world and the perceiving body. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, ‘One’s own body is in the 
world just as the heart is in the organism: it continuously breathes life into the visible spectacle, 
animates it and nourishes it from within, and forms a system with it’ (PhP, 209/245). It is thus that the 
experience of one’s own body as directed towards one’s actual and possible tasks is constitutive of an 
experience of the world in perception as the setting of these engagements. The richness of one’s 
perceptual experience is thereby found reflected in the richness of one’s spontaneous intentional 
actions, as is evidenced by Schneider’s behaviour. The pathological nature of Schneider’s behaviour is 
not caused by his perceptual deficiencies, however. His impaired agential capacities and his perceptual 
deficiencies are each symptoms of his more general disassociation from the world – the deterioration of 
the pre-reflective form of understanding of the world that constitutes Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
operative intentionality.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Similar kinds of cases, gathered from Merleau-Ponty and elsewhere, are also central to Rietveld’s account of what he calls ‘unreflective 
action’ (see (Rietveld, 2008)). Such cases are also definitive of Hubert Dreyfus’ concept of ‘absorbed coping’, which I will engage with in the 
following chapter.   
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The next chapter will continue to pursue operative intentionality in Phenomenology of Perception, with a 
thematic focus on the perceptual, rather than agential, side of things. It is in Merleau-Ponty’s study of 
perceptual meaning or sense that the details of a general thesis concerning meaning and understanding 
emerge.  
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2.  
The Sense of Perception:  
Bodily Understanding and the Need for 
Foundations 
 
 
Having established what I take to be the proper significance of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of operative 
intentionality for the philosophy of action, the present chapter will consider how this concept plays out 
in Merleau-Ponty’s study of perception. Of course, these two topics – embodied agency and perception 
– cannot truly be understood apart from one another in Phenomenology of Perception, and the thematic 
distinction between these first two chapters is somewhat artificial with regard to Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought. We have already seen, in the discussion of Schneider, how Merleau-Ponty is keen to note the 
way in which a pathological experience of one’s bodily agency is reflected in one’s perceptual 
experience. Indeed, he goes on to explicitly state that the ‘theory of the body schema is implicitly a 
theory of perception’ (PhP, 213/249). Despite this intertwining of embodied agency and perceptual 
experience, however, it is certainly possible to attend thematically to each of these two sides or 
moments of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion in turn. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty does this himself insofar as the 
first two parts of Phenomenology of Perception ostensibly cover ‘The Body’ and ‘The Perceived World’ 
respectively. 
My overarching aim here is to bring out the broader philosophical significance of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological study of perception. Merleau-Ponty himself certainly considered his work on 
perception to bear critical and far-reaching consequences, beyond the strict remits of the philosophy of 
perception. This belief is concisely articulated in a lecture course he delivered at the Collège de France 
in 1952 titled ‘The Sensible World and the World of Expression’, where he offers the following 
synopsis of his earlier investigations: 
 
[T]he philosopher learns from his contact with perception an awareness of a relation to 
being which necessitates and makes possible a new analysis of the understanding.  
(TfL, 3/11-12) 
 
This statement arises at an interesting point in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical career. By 1952, a study 
of expression and language is at the forefront of his investigations. It was at this time that he was 
working on the manuscript of what was intended to be a book-length monograph on this topic under 
the title of The Prose of the World. The above passage captures the way in which Merleau-Ponty took this 
study to be profoundly informed by his earlier work on perception. In the study of perception, we can 
gain generalizable insights concerning the nature of the understanding, and of meaning. His study of 
perception thus feeds into his overarching analysis of operative intentionality. 
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The following discussion, whilst lengthy, is fairly compartmentalized. In Section 2.1, I begin by 
drawing out what I take to be the four definitive characteristics of Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
perceptual meaning, which fall out of his purposive play on the French word sens. In doing so, I arrive 
at a vital normative dimension of perceptual meaning. In Section 2.2, I offer further clarification of this 
normative dimension by means of Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptual constancy. This account 
discloses an essentially ‘bodily’ form of understanding in perception. This bodily understanding is 
generally interpreted in terms of a concept Merleau-Ponty first introduces in his analysis of Schneider: 
that of ‘motor intentionality’.  
The remainder of the chapter will focus on this concept of motor intentionality in relation to the 
broader significance Merleau-Ponty sees his study of perception as having. In Section 2.3, I raise some 
general concerns about Hubert Dreyfus’ influential and resolutely foundationalist presentation of this 
aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. In Section 2.4, I consider and challenge what I take to be the 
primary textual motivations of Dreyfus’ presentation. Section 2.5 then deals with Dreyfus’ non-
exegetical arguments for the need of a particular kind of foundationalism in the philosophy of mind, in 
which he appeals to Merleau-Ponty’s thought as providing both a model and the conceptual framework 
for this foundationalism. I will suggest that Dreyfus’ argument rests on an assumption about meaning 
and understanding that is not compulsory. Far from supporting Dreyfus’ claims, I will argue that the 
features of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception explored in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 can help 
liberate us from the assumption under which Dreyfus labours. I will draw this out by appeal to one of 
Dreyfus’ other primary sources: Wittgenstein’s famous ‘rule-following considerations’ in Philosophical 
Investigations. It is thus by way of a critical engagement with Dreyfus’ presentation that I shall develop a 
reading of Merleau-Ponty’s study of perception that is better able to appreciate the philosophical 
insights it makes available concerning the nature of meaning and understanding beyond any strictly 
defined perceptual domain. 29  What we find is that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological study of 
perception elaborates the manner in which to understand a meaning, perceptual or otherwise, is not the 
achievement of an act of judgement or interpretation.  
 
 
2.1 The Characteristics of Perceptual Sense 
 
The term lying at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of meaning, both in perception and more 
generally, is the French word sens.30 As with its closest English equivalent “sense”, sens has a very rich 
meaning, finding use both as a noun (e.g., the sense of a word, the five senses, a sense of humour, to be 
‘making sense’) and as a verb (e.g., to sense that something or someone is present, to sense a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Conversely, we might think of Merleau-Ponty as attempting to extend the domain of perceptual consciousness far beyond its traditional 
remit. This is certainly one way to make good sense of his claim that all consciousness is, ‘in some measure, perceptual consciousness’ (PhP, 
416/455). 
30 Merleau-Ponty does occasionally also use the French word signification (translated as ‘signification’ by Landes) when discussing meaning. As 
far as I am aware, his use of this term does not disclose the idiosyncratic account of meaning that I believe we find in his use of sens. Donald 
Landes addresses the distinction in his ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to Phenomenology of Perception.  
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temperature or colour). One meaning of sens that we might think “sense” fails to capture, however, and 
one that Merleau-Ponty often plays upon, is direction (e.g., dans le bon sens – in the right direction).31 It is 
important to bear these various meanings of sens in mind when considering Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
meaning in perception, as he is often found to be drawing implicitly on the relationships that hold 
between them.  
There are four defining characteristics of perceptual sens that Merleau-Ponty tracks, and which I shall 
explore in turn in the present section. First, perceptual sens involves the structure or organization of the 
perceptual field. Secondly, there is an essential role for indeterminacy in the constitution of perceptual 
sens. Thirdly, Merleau-Ponty describes perceptual sens as immanent, as opposed to transcendent, in 
relation to perceptual phenomena. We shall see how this point is central to Merleau-Ponty’s double 
rejection of both ‘empiricist’ and ‘intellectualist’ approaches to perception. Finally, Merleau-Ponty 
describes the manner in which perceptual sens is constituted by the perceiving subject’s bodily ‘hold’ or 
‘grip’ (prise), and also how this grip is subject to a teleological development. It is here that we arrive at a 
fundamentally normative dimension of perceptual sens. I shall offer further clarification of this dimension 
in Section 2.2.  
 
 
i. The Structure of Sens 
 
The account of perceptual sens that Merleau-Ponty develops in Phenomenology of Perception is animated 
throughout by the theories and principles of the ‘Gestalt’ school of psychology that flourished in Berlin 
in the early part of the 20th century through the work of figures such as Kurt Koffka, Max Wertheimer, 
and Wolfgang Köhler.32 For Merleau-Ponty, Gestalt psychology makes a philosophical reappraisal of 
perception, and consciousness more generally, both possible and necessary. In particular, the notion of 
the perceptual Gestalt, or form, is fundamentally at odds with the traditional philosophical conception 
of sensation, and undermines this latter’s claim to be the most basic constituent of perceptual 
experience. Indeed, the ‘Introduction’ to Phenomenology of Perception begins in no uncertain terms with 
Merleau-Ponty’s renunciation of sensation as  ‘the most confused notion there is’, and his accusation 
that the central role afforded to sensation in philosophy has had the consequence that philosophers 
‘have missed the phenomenon of perception’ (PhP, 3/25). 
In the words of Koffka, the notion of the Gestalt is to be understood in terms of the principle that 
‘the whole is other than the sum of its parts’ (Koffka, 1935: 176). In perception, Gestalt phenomena are 
those that are irreducible to a mere collection of atomic sensations or parts. Instead, priority must be 
accorded to the overall configuration or structure of the phenomenon. Perhaps the clearest examples of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 There is good reason to think that this failure is not a complete one. “Sense” can be used in the context of rotation, which is perhaps itself 
an instance of direction. For instance: ‘in the solar system, almost everything rotates in an anti-clockwise sense’. Thanks to Bob Clark for 
raising this point.  
32 Both Adhémar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein, whose studies of the Schneider case provide both the source material and primary foil for 
Merleau-Ponty’s own analysis, were also involved with the Gestalt movement. Merleau-Ponty’s enthusiasm for Gestalt psychological theory 
can be traced at least as far back as his original doctoral proposal at the École Normale Supérieure, published in Texts and Dialogues as ‘The 
Nature of Perception: Two Proposals’ (1933).  
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Gestalt phenomena are found in famous cases of perceptual illusions, such as the Necker cube (fig. 1), 
or Kanizsa’s triangle (fig. 2). In such cases, the particular configuration of lines or shapes results in an 
experience of something other than the component parts alone, such that we see something that is not, 
in a certain sense, actually given. Such phenomena are not to be thought of as mere curiosities or rare 
occurrences, however. According to Gestalt psychology, such cases instantiate principles or laws that 
can be found in all perceptual experience. 
 
       
 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the ubiquity of Gestalt phenomena in perception has two fundamental, albeit 
intimately related, consequences. First, as I have already mentioned, the philosophical adequacy of the 
notion of sensation is put in doubt, and I shall return to this consequence in more detail below. The 
second consequence, and one that will be of ultimate relevance to the concerns of this chapter, is the 
necessity to recognize in perceptual experience the presence of a kind of sense that cannot be 
accounted for as the product any kind of acts of interpretation or judgement, or, in the language of 
Kant or Husserl, of the constituting activity of a transcendental subject. Merleau-Ponty thus sees it to 
be the task of a phenomenological ‘return’ to perception to disclose and account for this fundamental 
or ‘primordial’ presence of ‘a whole already pregnant with an irreducible sense’ (PhP, 23/45). As such, 
the discussion of perceptual sens serves to strengthen the anti-Cartesian line of thought outlined in 
Chapter 1. Even the most elementary or simple of our perceptions – that of a plain figure against a 
homogenous background – can only be adequately described in terms of the meaning it offers to the 
perceiving subject:  
 
Consider a white patch against a homogeneous background. All points on the patch 
have a certain common “function” that makes them into a “figure”. The figure’s colour 
is denser and somehow more resistant than the background’s colour. The borders of the 
white patch “belong” to the patch and, despite being contiguous with it, do not join with 
the background. The patch seems to be placed upon the background and does not 
interrupt it. Each part announces more than it contains, and thus this elementary 
perception is already charged with a sense.  
(PhP, 4/25-26) 
 
It is worth dwelling for a moment on the last sentence of this passage, since it surely refers us to 
something crucial in Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptual sens. The parts of the perceptual Gestalt bear 
Figure 2 Figure 1 
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what I described in Chapter 1 as internal relations to one another. These are meaningful relations, such 
that each part ‘announces more than it contains’. Merleau-Ponty is here claiming that these relations are 
in some way constitutive of the sense of the phenomenon. The rich meaning of sens is certainly being 
traded upon here, and by equating sense with the organization of the Gestalt, Merleau-Ponty is drawing 
on the meaning of sens as “direction”. We have here a configuration of points relative to one another, 
just as in plotting a route from York to Manchester we consider the two cities in terms of their relations 
to one another and their respective functions as the start and end points of our proposed journey. And 
as the route I plot from York to Manchester has a meaning that is different from the route I plot from 
Manchester to York, seeing the lower left face of the Necker cube as front-facing has a meaning that is 
different from seeing the upper right face as front-facing.33 There is thus a making sense through 
organization in the grasping of a perceptual Gestalt. Furthermore, it is the organization that is accorded 
primacy, and through which we are able to grasp the meaning of the parts. The parts of the perceptual 
Gestalt are thus made available to the perceiving subject via, and according to, their interrelations. 
This unity of the whole through its organization is to be contrasted with the supposed independence 
of individual sensations, understood as a kind of bare ‘sense-datum’ or Humean impression. If Gestalt 
phenomena are ubiquitous, there can be no room in a description of perceptual phenomena for the 
classical concept of sensation or for the supposition of a layer of ‘pure sensing’ devoid of the kind of 
holistic structures – and thus the kind of sense – found in normal perception. To maintain that the 
traditional notion of sensation has a place in a philosophical account of perception, argues Merleau-
Ponty, is to overlook the nature of perceptual phenomena. The source of this error is continuous with 
the mechanistic conception of the body considered in Chapter 1. It arises out of the attempt – often 
implicit – to read the structure of the objective world – the world of objects ‘in themselves’ as they are 
apparently revealed and described by the natural sciences and ‘objective knowledge’ – into the very 
experience by which they are originally made available to be known or, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, it is to 
view perception ‘through the lens of its results’ (PhP, 17/40). Fundamentally, this involves the positing, 
within consciousness, of the exclusively external relations – of ‘parts outside of parts’ (partes extra partes) 
– that are taken to hold in objective being. A further consequence of this error consists in the attempt 
to read the sensible qualities of objects (i.e., colour, sound, temperature, etc.) into sensations, understood 
as mind-dependent entities. These qualities thus come to be defined as contents of consciousness, 
rather than as properties of objects themselves, as perception originally presents them as being.  
 
 
ii. The Indeterminacy of Sens 
 
It is in terms of this ‘realist prejudice’ (PhP, 10/33) that Merleau-Ponty defines and hence rejects a 
collection of philosophical and psychological theories that he brings under the general banner of 
‘empiricism’. A further symptom of the empiricist concept of sensation is that the content of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Such shifts in meaning are often described as involving a kind of ‘seeing-as’ or ‘aspect perception’.  
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perception is assumed to be fully determinate, since the causation of sensations is explained in terms of 
the reception of stimuli via the physical mechanisms of the senses, and a constant relation is deemed to 
hold between stimulus and sensation as between cause and effect.34 Yet, argues Merleau-Ponty, if we 
properly attend to perceptual experience, we find it to be permeated with indeterminacy. Merleau-Ponty 
considers the clearest example of such indeterminacy to be the limit of the visual field. Were this limit 
rigorously determined by the sensory surface of the retina, he argues, we should expect vision to be 
contained within a clearly defined area, surrounded by a clear absence of vision. Yet this is simply not 
the case, and in reality ‘the precise moment at which a previously seen stimulus ceases to be seen can 
never be identified’ (PhP, 6/28). In other words, the limit of the visual field is indeterminate, and if we are 
to properly understand perception, ‘we must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon’ 
(PhP, 7/28). Crucially, this positive presence of indeterminacy in perception is an essential feature of 
perceptual sens. Before developing this point, we should already be in a position to glimpse something 
of the role played by indeterminacy for Merleau-Ponty’s account of sens. Within the most elementary 
figure-ground Gestalt, in order for the figure to possess its function and, indeed, to appear, it must do so 
against a background that is not itself the thematic object of the experience. In comparison to the 
figure, the background is an indeterminate presence, yet one that is essential to the sense of the Gestalt. 
Even if this question of indeterminacy can be overcome by the empiricist, an explanation is required 
of precisely how perceptual sens is possible if we begin from the concept of sensation. If we think of a 
perception as involving, at least at some fundamental level, the passive reception of punctual 
sensations, then we are left having to explain how such sensations receive a sense: how they are capable 
of being organized into the meaningful wholes emphasized by Gestalt psychology. The traditional 
approach sought by empiricist theories is to develop a picture of the psychological according to which 
it is governed by the operation of determinate causal laws, such as Lockean laws of association. Yet this 
approach, Merleau-Ponty argues, is unable to correct the error with which it began, and is rather a mere 
attenuation of it. Once the traditional notion of sensation is on the scene it becomes ubiquitous, and we 
cannot expect to construct the sense found in the perceptual Gestalt from these supposedly ultimate 
building blocks of consciousness, since they have their identity insofar as they are externally related to 
one another, whilst the Gestalt consists in a network of internal (i.e., meaningful) relations.35 
Empiricism thus presupposes perceptual sense whilst at the same time rendering it impossible by 
casting perception purely in terms of external relations. As such, the subject of perception is seemingly 
excluded from the empiricist’s account altogether, and ‘there is no one who sees at the center of this mass 
of sensations and memories’ (PhP, 23/45). The need to accommodate the subject’s place in perception, 
contrary to empiricism, leads to an emphasis on the role played by judgement in perception. Yet this 
apparent remedy, argues Merleau-Ponty, is equally problematic, and in steering ourselves away from the 
Scylla of empiricism we are in danger of becoming sucked into the Charybdis of what Merleau-Ponty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Following Köhler, Merleau-Ponty refers to this empiricist tenet as the ‘constancy hypothesis’ (PhP, 8/30). 
35 At the very least such a construction cannot be achieved via a process of association since, as Merleau-Ponty claims, the very possibility of 
an association presupposes the subject’s grasp of a sense of the present perceptual phenomena and is conditioned by it. Merleau-Ponty thus 
asserts that ‘the signification of the perceived, far from resulting from an association, is in fact presupposed in all associations’ (PhP, 16/39).  
	  53  
refers to as ‘intellectualism’. According to intellectualism, it is judgement that adds what is missing from 
the empiricist’s conception of sensation and gives rise to complete perceptions. For the intellectualist, it 
is the subject herself who organizes perceptual phenomena, thereby imbuing them with a sense. 
Directly citing French Neo-Kantians such as Alain and Lagneau, Merleau-Ponty articulates 
intellectualism in the following way: 
 
Perception becomes an “interpretation” of the signs that sensibility provides in 
accordance with bodily stimuli; it becomes a “hypothesis” made by the mind in order to 
“explain to itself its own impressions.”  
(PhP, 35/58)  
 
Although intellectualism appears to make room for the subject’s understanding of perceptual 
phenomena, it remains fundamentally confused, and immediately faces a dilemma. Either the activity of 
the intellectualist subject is performed on sensations or wholly apart from them. On the first horn, we 
have not truly left empiricism behind, since the act of judgement is performed on sensations and would 
thus be caught up in the wholly external relations of a determinate causal mechanism, effectively 
reducible to ‘a general function of connecting’ (PhP, 34/56). On the second horn, we truly leave the 
notion of sensation out of perception, and thereby lose sight of the common sense distinction between 
sensing and judging. This distinction ‘disappears in intellectualism because judgement is everywhere 
that pure sensation is not, which is to say that judgement is everywhere’ (PhP, 36/59). Perception would 
thereby become a form of judgement.36 
 
 
iii. The Immanence of Sens 
 
As a result, according to Merleau-Ponty, just like empiricism intellectualism manages to miss the 
phenomenon of perception altogether. Perceptual experience, he insists, cannot be dissected into a 
sensible matter and an intelligible form, and the organization that is definitive of the Gestalt does not 
result from a deliberate imposition in an act of judgement. What we learn from Gestalt psychology, he 
claims, is that ‘there is no matter without form; there are only organizations, more or less stable, more 
or less articulated’ (TD, 79). Perceptual sens must therefore be understood as immanent to the 
phenomena.37 This immanence or, in the language of the Gestaltists, this “pregnancy” (prägnanz) of the 
sensible is in stark contrast to the intellectualist’s bestowal of meaning through acts of judging: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Kant seems to acknowledge a closely similar dilemma in Critique of Pure Reason with his famous phrase, ‘Thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’ (A 51/B 75). Like Kant, Merleau-Ponty seeks to unify understanding and intuition. However, he 
clearly does not want to advocate Kant’s transcendental idealism, which he ultimately considers to be an intellectualist doctrine, albeit one 
that attempts to make room for the passivity of the empirical subject in the constitution of the sensible world.  
37 It would seem that the transcendental idealism of Kant’s first Critique involves an empirical immanence of form in matter, but reverts to a 
necessary separation of the two at the transcendental level. Merleau-Ponty sums up what he considers the Kantian’s mistake thusly: ‘The 
intellectualist … does not reach the living cluster of perception because rather than unveiling the operation that makes it actual or by which it 
is constituted, it seeks the conditions that make it possible or without which it would not exist’ (PhP, 40/64). Once again, the complaint here is 
that the intellectualist reconstrual of perception fundamentally misses the phenomenon it is seeking to explain. In the Kantian case, this would 
be due to the transcendental move, and the reintroduction of a form-matter distinction at the transcendental level. 
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To perceive in the full sense of the word (as the antithesis of imagining) is not to judge, 
but rather to grasp, prior to all judgement, a sense immanent in the sensible. The 
phenomenon of true perception thus offers a signification that is inherent in the signs 
and of which the judgement is but the optional expression.  
(PhP, 36-7/60) 
 
Whilst it is the locus of his respective rejections of empiricism and intellectualism, Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of sens as ‘immanent in the sensible’ remains obscure, and has so far been posed as little more 
than a philosophical problem arising from Gestalt psychology rather than a developed account of 
perceptual meaning in its own right.  
One means by which we might illuminate Merleau-Ponty’s more developed account of perceptual sens 
is by considering his use of the motif of perception as a kind of communication. Throughout 
Phenomenology of Perception, we regularly find perception described by means of metaphors of language 
and expression. We are told that perception is ‘an original text’ (PhP, 22/45); that it speaks to us a ‘silent 
language’ (PhP, 50/75) that ‘teaches itself’ (PhP, 333/375), and is expressive of ‘a perceptual syntax that 
is articulated according to its own rules’ (PhP, 38/61). Now, we must be clear on the partly 
metaphorical quality of such descriptions. It is certainly not the case that Merleau-Ponty is advocating 
the notion that perception involves the comprehension of a propositionally structured content. 
Nonetheless, these descriptions are not intended as wholly metaphorical either. When Merleau-Ponty 
declares that ‘every perception is a communication or a communion’ this is intended literally insofar as 
perception involves ‘the taking up or the achievement by us of an alien intention’ (PhP, 334/376), and 
in offering his own account of sensation, he says, in no uncertain terms, that ‘sensation is, literally, a 
communion’ (PhP, 219/257, my emphasis).38  
This motif of communion is an important means by which Merleau-Ponty holds the intellectualist at a 
distance from himself, whilst at the same time providing a condensed articulation of his own, positive 
account of perceptual meaning. The ‘sort of dialogue’ (PhP, 334/376) that Merleau-Ponty considers to 
be definitive of perception cannot be satisfactorily recognized by the intellectualist, since he supposes 
the content of perception to be determined by the thinking subject in acts of predicative judgement. This 
supposition results in a picture of perception in which subject and object are explicitly posited and held 
apart from one another in an act of consciousness. The essential aspect of perceptual experience that 
this picture fails to acknowledge, and which the motif of communion serves to stress, is the kind of 
passivity involved in perception. As with the empiricism to which it considers itself the corrective, 
intellectualism is only able to make proper sense of the kind of causal passivity involved in the brute 
impact of sensation. Beyond the bare givens of sensation, the perceived thing is taken to be the product 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 I am here understanding ‘communion’ in the sense of a bringing together of individuals. Of course, we might also read certain theological 
connotations in the talk of ‘communion’ here. Merleau-Ponty was raised a Catholic, and we might therefore think that with the notion of 
‘communion’, he is implicitly invoking the doctrine of transubstantiation. On such a reading, Merleau-Ponty would appear to be suggesting 
that, in the dialectical relations that hold between the sensible world and the body, there is literally a transformation of the one into the other. 
An intriguing kind of hylomorphic account of perception would thus emerge here. Merleau-Ponty doesn’t develop such a thought at great 
length in Phenomenology of Perception. However, his ‘late period’ work, with its new lexicon of ‘the flesh’, does appear to somewhat justify a 
strong reading of his earlier talk of sensation as communion. For my present purposes, however, we need only to emphasize the dialectical or 
dialogical sense of ‘communion’.  
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of the rational activity of a disembodied understanding or intelligence. As a result, the perceptual 
phenomena themselves are overlooked in favour of a reconstruction in which the sense of the 
perceived is taken to be the responsibility of the thinking subject, insofar as it is the product of mental 
acts. By defining itself in direct contrast to empiricism and the concept of sensation, intellectualism 
exposes a tacit commitment to a dualism of sensation and judgement in its account of perception. 
Intellectualism invokes judgement wherever the phenomena cannot be accommodated by the 
empiricist’s conception of sensation, and hence becomes ubiquitous. 
What intellectualism fails to make sense of is the proper manner in which the subject of perception 
must discover or work towards the sense of the perceived. It is this difficulty that Merleau-Ponty thinks we 
can find to be anticipated in Cartesian philosophy, particularly that of Malebranche, with the concept of 
a ‘natural’ or non-voluntary species of judgement (Malebranche, trans. 1997: Elucidation 6). Indeed, 
Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to claim that ‘“Natural judgement” is nothing other than the phenomenon 
of passivity’ (PhP, 44/68, my emphasis).  Equally, the Kantian or Husserlian turn to a transcendental 
ego as the synthesizing or constituting subject may also be considered as a way of accounting for the 
passive role played by the perceiving, empirical subject in the constitution of sense. Yet the Cartesian 
and the Kantian solutions are necessarily unsuccessful, and cannot undo the confusion they are 
founded on, argues Merleau-Ponty. Most pressing for our current concerns is the claim that even a 
nuanced intellectualism is unable to account for perceptual sens – i.e., a sense that is not completely 
constituted or perfectly determinate, but that instead involves indeterminacy, contingency, and is 
subject to development. According to Merleau-Ponty, intellectualism makes the same basic mistake as 
empiricism, which is to begin not with the perceived world, but with an objective description of the 
world arrived at through the representations of natural science. And like empiricism, he argues, 
intellectualism attempts to read this description back into perception itself, with the difference being 
that it is thought that is now posited as the ultimate ground of experience, rather than a transcendent 
reality ‘in-itself’.  With this shift ‘we pass from an absolute objectivity to an absolute subjectivity’ (PhP, 
41/64).39  
 
 
iv. The Bodily Teleology of Sens 
 
The motif of communication, or dialogue, expresses the manner in which perceptual sens is not held 
before consciousness or known through the a priori categories of Kantian philosophy. Instead, Merleau-
Ponty describes perceptual sens as unfolding and developing in a diachronic perceptual process. This 
process involves a reciprocity between the perceiving subject and the perceived things that is 
inconceivable for the intellectualist, since intellectualism drives a wedge between the acts of 
consciousness and their objects. Yet perception, states Merleau-Ponty, ‘is not a science, it does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 A further consequence of this, claims Merleau-Ponty, is that we lose touch with ‘authentic’ subjectivity – i.e., the embodied subject of 
perception and agency (PhP, 507n53/70n3). I will touch on this issue in Section 2.4, before taking it up again in Chapter 3. 
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posit the things upon which it bears, and it does not step back in order to observe them’ (PhP, 
336/378).  
It is here that Merleau-Ponty sees it possible (and necessary), in his own words, to ‘give the notion of 
“sense” a value that intellectualism refuses it’ (PhP, 219/257). Essentially, he is seeking to unite “sense” 
with the senses (les sens). According to Merleau-Ponty, the senses are not instruments of a bare causal 
receptivity, but the means by which the subject is able to understand the sensible world through his 
own inherence within it. It is thus the body that holds the key to a proper understanding of perceptual 
sens, but only so long as we refuse to treat the body as a mechanism or instrument of causal receptivity, 
and instead learn to recognize it as a ‘knowing-body’ (PhP, 431/470, 548n23/363n2). It is the body that 
grasps a meaning that is immanent to the deliverances of the senses, without the contribution of acts of 
interpretation or judgement. 
 
When I say that I have senses and that they give me access to the world, I am not the 
victim of a confusion, nor do I mix up causal thought and reflection. I merely express 
the truth that forces itself upon a complete reflection, namely, that I am capable 
(through connaturality) of finding a sense in certain aspects of being, without myself 
having given them this sense through a constitutive operation.  
(PhP, 225/262) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, it is insofar as the subject of perception is a body-subject, and not a disembodied 
thought or intelligence, that the dialogical development of perception is possible, and that the subject is 
capable of grasping the sense of perceptual phenomena. The sense of perception is not the product of a 
conceptual subsumption of sensory givens in an act of judgement, but rather the attainment and 
development of what Merleau-Ponty describes as a bodily ‘grip’, ‘hold’, or ‘take’ (prise) on the present 
perceptual scene, and the sensible world more generally. This hold is not a representation or idea 
entertained in an act of consciousness, but what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the body’s ‘gearing into’ 
(PhP, 260-3/298-300) the sensible environment as the setting of the subject’s actual and possible 
behaviour. The perceived thing is not a signification posited by something like a Kantian faculty of the 
understanding, but rather it is ‘a structure available for inspection by the body’ (PhP, 334/376). 
Perceptual sense unfolds in the reciprocal relation that holds between the body as a ‘system of possible 
actions’ (PhP, 260/297), and the structure or ‘horizon’ of appearances of the perceived thing.40 It is this 
reciprocity that Merleau-Ponty intends the motif of dialogue to capture: the intentional interlocking, in 
perception, of the perceived thing and the body-subject. In perception, one’s own body figures as part 
of a broader Gestalt or, as Merleau-Ponty puts the point himself, ‘external perception and perception of 
one’s own body vary together because they are two sides of a single act’ (PhP, 211/247). 
An important aspect of this notion of bodily hold is that it invokes a normative dimension of 
perception that is not reducible to the kind of normativity involved in assessing the correspondence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Merleau-Ponty derives the concept of ‘horizon’ from Husserl. As (Moran & Cohen, 2012) notes, Husserl’s talk of ‘horizon’ leans heavily on 
an analogy with the term’s meaning in ordinary language. It serves to define the manner in which each meaningful experience or intentional 
object is caught up within a system of relationships, both actual and possible, that it bears to other experiences or objects. Merleau-Ponty, like 
Husserl, applies the term in a wide variety of contexts, including sense perception, language, temporality, culture, and history.  
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between an immanent or subjective realm of propositions, judgements, or ideas and a transcendent or 
objective reality. The normativity involved here is of a different order, involving what Merleau-Ponty 
describes as a ‘bodily teleology’ (PhP, 337/379). Once again, we find Merleau-Ponty playing on the 
meaning of sens as “direction,” although this time it is intended in a temporal sense, rather than a spatial 
one.41 My initial encounter with a thing or a scene solicits a perceptual process for which a more precise 
hold is the goal or end.42 This process might involve one, some, or all of my sensory modalities, and 
may be constituted by a variety of different bodily behaviours, such as a focusing of the eyes, a turn of 
the head, or a modulation of the rhythm or force of palpation, until such a moment that I arrive at a 
more articulated hold on the quality, thing, or scene in question. According to Merleau-Ponty, to have a 
hold on a given object or scene is to tacitly anticipate how subsequent moments of a perceptual 
exploration will unfold and concord with the present appearances. It is ‘to commit to an entire future of 
experiences in a present that never, strictly speaking, guarantees that future’ (PhP, 311/350). My hold 
on a given object is thus capable of becoming ever more precise, whilst at the same time being liable to 
suffer mistakes and failures and to become confused. A nice example Merleau-Ponty offers is that of 
mistaking a distant patch of light on the ground for a stone: 
 
If I believe I see a large flat stone, which is in reality a patch of sunlight, far ahead on the 
ground in a sunken lane, I cannot say that I ever see the flat stone in the sense in which I 
will see the patch of sunlight while moving closer. The flat stone only appears, like 
everything that is far off, in a field whose structure is confused and where the 
connections are not yet clearly articulated. In this sense, the illusion … is not observable, 
that is, my body is not geared into it and I cannot spread it out before myself through 
some exploratory movements. … I see the illusory stone in the sense that my entire 
perceptual and motor field gives to the light patch the sense of a “stone on the lane.” 
And I already prepare to sense this smooth and solid surface beneath my foot.  
(PhP, 310/349-50) 
 
Thus, the sense of a given perceptual spectacle is arrived at in the hold that my body, as a system of 
sensory and motor ‘fields’, has upon it, and as such it is capable of a more or less precise articulation, 
and of being clear or confused. The normative dimension of perceptual experience thus consists in this 
standard of precision that is internal to the perceptual process, against which appearances will, whether 
retroactively or concurrently, be measured as veridical, confused, or illusory. According to Merleau-
Ponty, it is this standard that serves as the driving force behind the ‘bodily teleology’ of perception – 
i.e., the movement towards a more precise hold on the spectacle. It is thus definitive of Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of perceptual sens and the ‘bodily’ form of understanding that corresponds to it.  
I will now proceed, in the next section, to attend to this normative dimension of perceptual sens in 
greater detail. In particular, I will consider how it is developed in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This temporal aspect of sens is developed further, and in several ways, in the ‘Temporality’ chapter of Phenomenology of Perception. The chapter 
has two revealing epigraphs from Claudel and Heidegger, each of which asserts an important relationship between sense and time or 
temporality (PhP, 432/471). Given limitations of space, I will not attend to this chapter in any detail here since it would distract from the 
central claims concerning meaning and understanding that I am seeking to draw out of Merleau-Ponty’s study of perception. 
42 Crucially, this goal is implicit, rather than explicitly posited in an act of consciousness.  
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perceptual constancy in Phenomenology of Perception. I will articulate my own understanding of this 
discussion by way of a critical engagement with the reading offered by Sean Kelly. It is my contention 
that Kelly’s discussion of perceptual constancy leads him to distort the details of Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of perceptual sens. Appreciating this distortion for what it is will help elucidate Merleau-Ponty’s 
claims about meaning and understanding in perception.   
 
 
2.2 Bodily Hold, Norms, and Perceptual Constancy 
 
 
i. Perceptual Constancy and Perceptual ‘Norms’ 
 
Merleau-Ponty dedicates a great deal of Phenomenology of Perception – especially Part II, ‘The Perceived 
World’ – to exploring perceptual sens in terms of the normative dimension of perception outlined 
above. For my present purposes, I would like to focus on one species of phenomena that Merleau-
Ponty discusses and which he brings under the broad rubric of ‘perceptual constants’. The traditional 
problem of perceptual constants consists in the apparent friction involved in the manner in which we 
speak of objects as having stable or ‘real’ properties throughout the myriad of different perspectival or 
contextual appearances we are presented with in perception. For instance, I might say of a table that it 
is rectangular, yet when I attend to my experience it seems I am actually presented with a range of 
different shapes throughout the various perspectives I take up in relation to the table, the vast majority 
of which are not rectangular. It might then seem that our talk of the ‘real shape’ or the ‘real size’ is in 
fact nothing more than a conventional or even arbitrary selection of one appearance (i.e., a certain 
‘perspectival’ shape or size) from amongst the many.43  
Merleau-Ponty is clearly sceptical towards the traditional problem of perceptual constants. He gives 
short shrift to the conventionalist solution for the reason that it ‘takes for granted what was to be 
explained, namely, a range of determinate sizes and forms from amongst which it would suffice to choose 
one, which would become the real size or the real form’ (PhP, 313/353). Taking the apparent shapes 
and sizes of objects to be themselves determinate makes the very same mistake that Merleau-Ponty 
diagnosed above in relation to empiricism and intellectualism: the overlooking of perception in favour 
of the objective understanding of the world that perception itself makes possible. As before, what is 
overlooked here is the positive and fundamental presence of indeterminacy in perception. In this instance, 
Merleau-Ponty hopes to account for the perceiving subject’s grasp of real or constant properties of 
objects by expanding on the normative dimension of perception, which he describes as having both an 
implicit and indeterminate presence in experience.  
Whilst the passage at (PhP, 313/353), cited just above, rejects the idea that we can identify the ‘real’ 
shape or size of an object with an isolated perspectival appearance, Merleau-Ponty does acknowledge, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 This response to the traditional worry about perceptual constants was particularly popular in the first half of the twentieth century. Its 
prevalence is evidenced by Bertrand Russell’s matter of fact formulation of the view in the first chapter of his The Problems of Philosophy. 
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as a phenomenological fact, that there are certain ‘privileged’ perspectives that an object solicits the 
perceiving subject to take up in relation to it, and which facilitate his understanding of it. Merleau-Ponty 
puts this point in the following way: 
 
For each object, just as for each painting in an art gallery, there is an optimal distance 
from which it asks to be seen – an orientation through which it presents more of itself – 
beneath or beyond which we merely have a confused perception due to excess or lack.  
(PhP, 315-6/355) 
 
Any given presentation of the object is experienced, not in terms of a determinate geometrical 
projection from myself to the object, but rather in terms of a deviation from a privileged ‘norm’ (norme). 
I am aware of this deviation insofar as my present hold on the object is deficient in some way, and 
there is a thus a felt ‘tension’ or ‘disequilibrium’ that I seek, or could seek, to resolve or overcome (PhP, 
316/356). If this description is correct, it still remains to be seen precisely what role these perceptual 
norms play in the subject’s grasp of the real or constant properties an object has throughout or in spite 
of its various appearances. At the very least, we can safely say that Merleau-Ponty considers the 
privileged presentations as those from which the perceiving subject is best able to grasp the properties 
of the given object. Yet it seems that we cannot say that the real or constant properties of an object are 
to be flatly identified with the qualitative appearances given in these privileged presentations. Instead, as 
Merleau-Ponty explains, we want to hold onto the idea that the real qualities of an object are present 
throughout their various presentations, rather than being given in one determinate set of perceptual 
contexts. This accommodates the sense in which qualities are experienced as constant throughout 
appearances: each appearance is an appearance of a real and constant quality, and so no single appearance 
can be exclusively isolated and identified as the real quality, since no single appearance is present across 
all perceptual contexts or perspectives.  
Perceptual norms, then, cannot be thought of as the point at which we pass from the merely apparent 
to the real. Nonetheless, they play an essential role in the subject’s grasp of an object’s qualities, and of 
the object more generally. For Merleau-Ponty, a more precise grasp of a quality requires that the subject 
better understands how his relation with the object must be altered if the optimal presentation that 
constitutes the norm is to be realized. For instance, in the case of size, to arrive at a precise grasp or 
hold is to anticipate how a change in the distance between oneself and the object, either through a 
movement of one’s own body or the object itself, would realize a presentation that better satisfies the 
felt norm. In this way, to perceive a real quality in perception is to grasp its appearances, and the 
relations they bear to one another, in terms of the norm. This is because it is in terms of this norm, and 
the teleological process that tends toward it, that appearances have their sense as appearances of a self-
identical object with constant properties:  
 
I identify the object in all of its positions, at all of its distances, and through all of its 
appearances, insofar as the perspectives converge toward the perception that I obtain for 
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a certain typical distance and orientation. This privileged perception assures the unity of 
the perceptual process and gathers all of the other appearances into itself  
(PhP, 315/355)  
 
Thus, whilst the norm is not to be exclusively identified with the real quality – i.e., at the expense of 
all other appearances, which would become, at best, ‘mere’ appearances and at worst illusory – it is in 
terms of it that all other appearances have their sense for me as appearances of a constant quality or 
object in general. In grasping the shape or size of an object, I understand the system of actual and 
possible appearances, and this understanding is coordinated in terms of the privileged norm, which thus 
serves as the keystone of the perceptual process. Of course, this process is susceptible to error, and I 
may, for example, in certain circumstances, perceive an object that I later learn to be large and far away 
to be small and nearby. What is important for Merleau-Ponty is that to perceive the object in this way is 
for the current appearance to have its sense (i.e., that of a small object nearby) insofar as one pre-
reflectively anticipates how a certain change in one’s relation to the object would make available the 
optimal perspective from which to perceive objects of such a size.44 It is in this way that a grasp of a 
perceptual norm is constitutive of the subject’s experience of constant properties throughout 
appearances.  
 
 
ii. Kelly on Norms 
 
An essential facet of the perceptual norms Merleau-Ponty appeals to is that they are realizable in 
perceptual experience. In this way, there is a dual sense of ‘norm’ that is in play here and that we should 
bear in mind. First, the norms involved in the perceptual process are experienced in term of a felt 
deviation between one’s current experience and the anticipated norm(s) from which a given property, 
object, or scene will be optimally available. It is in this sense that perceptual norms are experienced 
normatively. Crucially, however, this involves a normative pull towards privileged moments of perception 
itself. The second sense of ‘norm’ therefore expresses the manner in which perceptual norms constitute 
a familiar, preferred, or even habitual perceptual standard. Perceptual norms are by their very nature 
realizable in perception.  
This crucial aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s talk of perceptual ‘norms’ is something that is almost entirely 
missed by Sean Kelly in his work on perceptual constancy ((Kelly, 2005) & (Kelly, 2007)). In presenting 
Merleau-Ponty’s view, Kelly overlooks the fact that ‘norms’ must be familiar to the subject qua 
perceiver and, a fortiori, achievable within perception itself. Instead, Kelly lays the entire emphasis of his 
discussion on Merleau-Ponty’s description of norms as those orientations from which a given object or 
quality ‘presents more of itself’ (PhP, 316/355) – i.e., the first sense of ‘norm’ given above. This 
emphasis has a distorting effect on Merleau-Ponty’s actual position, as is evidenced by the fact, as we 
shall see below, that Kelly finds himself having to attribute a view to Merleau-Ponty that he openly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Indeed, it may even be that the current appearance is taken to be optimal – i.e., the deviation from the norm is zero, and there is no 
experience of tension or disequilibrium.  
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admits is not found explicitly stated anywhere in Merleau-Ponty’s published work. Rather than 
motivating a reappraisal of his reading however, Kelly attributes this absence of textual support to 
Merleau-Ponty’s own inability fully to articulate his own position (Kelly, 2005: 96). Properly 
appreciating the distortion this reading involves will help to expedite a full understanding of Merleau-
Ponty’s account of perceptual sens and bodily understanding.  
I shall focus on the area of Kelly’s discussion in which his error becomes most perspicuous. This 
happens as Kelly turns his attention away from the constancy of particular properties (shape, size, 
colour, etc.) in favour of considering the manner in which we perceive objects more generally as 
constant and real. Kelly extrapolates from Merleau-Ponty’s description of perceptual norms as optimal 
presentations to the conclusion that the primary norm that must be involved in general object 
perception must be the object ‘seen from everywhere all at once’ (Kelly, 2005: 91). ‘The view from 
everywhere’ claims Kelly, ‘is the optimum perspective from which to view the object, the perspective from 
which one grips it maximally’ (Kelly, 2005: 91). 
The problem with such a proposal, as Kelly notes, is that the view from everywhere ‘is not itself 
achievable by me’ (Kelly, 2005: 91). It is for this very reason that it cannot feature as a perceptual norm 
in the sense Merleau-Ponty describes. The view from everywhere cannot be a privileged perspective or 
orientation that my experiences tend towards since, by its very definition, it is not any single perspective 
or orientation, but all perspectives and orientations at once. To posit such an ideal is to leave behind 
perception itself, since it involves the overcoming of perception’s facticity: its perspectival and bodily 
condition. This gives us further grounds upon which to object to Kelly’s reading, since the perceptual 
norms Merleau-Ponty is seeking to describe are themselves aspects or expressions of this condition. 
These privileged distances, lighting contexts, or orientations are not the result of a judgement or laid 
down by a reflective act. They are the product or expression of our bodily facticity: of the kind of 
sensory and motor apparatus with which we are equipped. The view from everywhere, in transcending 
this facticity, is necessarily something other than what Merleau-Ponty means in his talk of perceptual 
norms. 
Indeed, we find that this rejection of Kelly’s proposal is offered by Merleau-Ponty himself, although 
somewhat indirectly. This rejection consists in the idea that the ideal of a ‘view from everywhere’ marks 
the transition away from perception and towards the idealizations and reconstructions of ‘objective 
thinking’ in relation to which phenomenology, according to Merleau-Ponty, provides a vital corrective. 
In the Introduction to Part One of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty discusses the notion of a 
‘view from everywhere’ as expressing a ‘full realization’ of the object in the following way: 
 
The fully realized object is translucent, it is shot through from all sides by an infinity of 
present gazes intersecting in its depth and leaving nothing there hidden.  
(PhP, 71/97) 
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Out of context, this passage might seem to support Kelly’s proposal that the view from everywhere is 
the ideal or norm of object perception,45 but reading it in this way would, I suggest, be a mistake. The 
key to avoiding this mistake lies in Merleau-Ponty’s description of the ‘fully realized’ object as 
‘translucent’, and of the view from everywhere as ‘leaving nothing hidden’. Such descriptions are in 
direct conflict with Merleau-Ponty’s own repeated descriptions of perceived things, and indeed the world 
of perception itself, as ‘opaque’. This opacity consists in the fact that objects are never completely 
presented in experience and solicit further exploration or perspectives that ‘pass into’ each other (PhP, 
344/386). As far as Merleau-Ponty is concerned, this opacity is essential to the sense of perceived things 
as transcendent of my experience of them and thereby as real:46 
 
The aseity of the thing – its irrecusable presence and the perpetual absence into which it 
withdraws – are two inseparable aspects of transcendence.  
(PhP, 242/280) 
 
The real lends itself to an infinite exploration, it is inexhaustible.  
(PhP, 338/380) 
 
[T]hings, which owe their sense to the world, are not significations presented to the 
intelligence, but are rather opaque structures, and … their final sense remains foggy. The 
thing and the world only exist as lived by me, or as lived by subjects like me, since they 
are the interlocking of our perspectives; but they also transcend all perspectives because 
this interlocking is temporal and incomplete. It seems to me that the world itself lives 
outside of me, just as absent landscapes continue to live beyond my visual field, and just 
as my past was previously lived prior to my present.  
(PhP, 349/390-391) 
 
The view from everywhere, in overcoming this opacity and making objects ‘translucent’, cannot 
constitute a moment of perception for Merleau-Ponty, and instead is the product of a thinking that 
isolates and thematizes individual perspectives before building them into an objective system. In doing 
so, the ‘pre-objective being’ of the perceived world, and with it, perceptual sens, is bypassed. The ideal 
of a ‘view from everywhere’ is a paradigmatic expression of objective thought; a representation of a 
world ‘in-itself’ beyond the experience of any given subject. Whilst the above passage from (PhP, 
349/390-391) suggests how this ideal develops out of genuine perception, the objectivist mistake lies in 
thinking that the ideal can be coherently read back into the phenomenology of perception.  
The normative ‘tension’ that governs the grasp and development of perceptual sens is conditioned by 
the perceiving subject’s status as an embodied agent. It reflects the subject’s experience of his own 
body as a system of possible actions, and the norms towards which it pulls involve the realization of 
particular perceptual relationships between the body and a given object of perception. The normative 
dimension of perception that Merleau-Ponty describes thus invokes the meaning of sens as ‘direction’ 
in a quite literal way, since it involves the perceiving subject’s implicit attraction towards particular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Indeed, Kelly himself appeals to this passage in developing his proposal. 
46 This claim is key to Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the real and the hallucinatory, see (PhP, 349-357/391-9). 
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perceptual relationships with objects, and thus motivates the performance of the requisite bodily 
movements in order to achieve them. The experience of such norms is a vital aspect of what it is to 
hold a ‘bodily grip’ on a perceived thing, a particular property, or a perceptual situation more generally. 
As such, these norms are themselves elements of the facticity of perceptual experience: its inherence in a 
given spatio-temporal situation through a body, and so they cannot transcend this facticity, which is 
precisely what a ‘view from everywhere’ would achieve. 
 
 
iii. Norms and Bodily Understanding 
 
It is with the concept of a bodily grip or hold that we arrive at Merleau-Ponty’s own manner of 
accounting for the converse side, as it were, of perceptual meaning or sens: the understanding of 
perceptual phenomena on the part of the perceiving subject. The bare task of this account of 
perceptual understanding has already been set in and through the joint rejection of empiricism and 
intellectualism. For Merleau-Ponty, a rejection of empiricism is necessary if a philosophy of perception 
is to make room for the notion of perceptual meaning – and thus understanding – at all. Meanwhile, the 
intellectualist’s effort to account for perceptual meaning as the outcome or product of an act of 
interpretation or judgement is unacceptable, argues Merleau-Ponty, since it wholly distorts the 
phenomenology of perception in misrepresenting the nature of the perceiving subject’s means of 
understanding the perceived world and its contents. 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
The various facets of perceptual sens that Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, and which I have set out above 
in Section 2.1, serve to disclose what we might call an irreducible unity of sign and signification – or 
indeed, sense and sensible – in perception. This unity is such that a perceptual sign47 cannot be held 
apart from and experienced independently of the signification it is presently grasped as having without 
the sign itself thereby being fundamentally altered. It is this unity that Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the 
immanence of perceptual sens is intended to draw our attention to. For instance, the isolation of the 
principal lines from the auxiliary lines in Zöllner’s illusion (fig. 3) causes them to have a sense that is 
different to the one that they have when in the presence of the auxiliary lines. The auxiliary lines 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 By ‘sign’ here I am referring to a wide array of different perceptual phenomena, from the parts of a present visual Gestalt to a present 
perspectival appearance or moment of intersensory perception within an extended horizon. 
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‘import into the figure a new signification that henceforth clings to it and can no longer be detached 
from it’, and with this the perceptual phenomenon is ‘transformed’ (PhP, 37/60), such that it is 
impossible to see the principal lines as parallel to one another, as they are in isolation. It is through 
their signification that the signs are made available in perception – i.e., that they are perceived at all – 
and we thus reach the sensible by grasping perceptual sens. In perception, there is an ‘absolute 
simultaneity of matter and form’ (PhP, 522n67/160n2); any thoroughgoing distinction between the two 
is made after the fact of perception itself, and cannot be read back into the phenomenology of 
perception, as it would have to be if the intellectualist explanation was correct. 
 
* * * 
 
We are now in a position to appreciate the more general task that Merleau-Ponty sets for himself in 
his study of perception. He wants to be able to speak positively of an understanding or grasping of 
perceptual sens without any kind of appeal to ‘acts’ of judgement on the part of the perceiving subject, 
or equally to the activity of a transcendental subject or faculty of ‘the understanding’ in Kant’s sense 
(der Verstand). Intellectualism is unable to accommodate what Merleau-Ponty characterizes variously 
(and perhaps unhelpfully) as the ‘pre-personal’, ‘impersonal’, or ‘anonymous’ nature of perceptual 
consciousness. Such terms serve, at least in part, to refer to the fact that the grasp of perceptual sens is 
not the outcome of a deliberate or reflective ‘bestowal’ of meaning on the part of the subject, and that 
perception is thus ‘not a personal act by which I myself would give a new sense to my life’ (PhP, 
249/287).48 It is in place of the intellectualist’s construal of the subject’s understanding of perceptual 
sens that Merleau-Ponty develops the notion of a bodily grip, yet the details and wider ramifications of 
this ‘originary comprehension of the world’ (PhP, 342/383) facilitated by the body in perception are 
still in need of elucidation. Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 will continue to pursue this elucidation in terms of 
the concept of ‘motor intentionality’, which Merleau-Ponty first introduces in his analysis of Schneider. 
I will consider the proper role this concept plays within Merleau-Ponty’s broader view concerning 
meaning and understanding. This will proceed by way of a critical engagement with Hubert Dreyfus’ 
influential interpretation and application of Merleau-Ponty’s work.  
 
 
2.3 The Philosophical Significance of Motor Intentionality 
 
i. Motor Intentionality and Schneider 
 
The concept of ‘motor intentionality’ (intentionnalité motrice) has come to be synonymous with 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of the body’s role in the comprehension of perceptual sens, although the 
term itself appears only twice in Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty first introduces the concept 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This sense of anonymity is a recurrent motif by which Merleau-Ponty seeks to define operative intentionality in Phenomenology of Perception. I 
shall discuss it further in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, before considering the potential problems that arise from it in Chapter 3.  
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as a further means by which to describe Schneider’s pathological relationship with his own body in 
executing movements. In Schneider’s efforts to perform abstract movements on command, it is clear 
that he possesses a conceptual understanding of what is expected of him and the inadequacies of his 
failed attempts, yet he is unable to translate this understanding into a successful execution of the 
movement with the kind of ease and immediacy found in a normal subject. As Merleau-Ponty phrases 
it, ‘even if the instructions have for him an intellectual signification, they do not have a motor signification, 
they do not speak to him as a motor subject’ (PhP, 113/140). The deficient manner in which 
Schneider’s body is available to him as a result of his injury – as ‘an amorphous mass’ (PhP, 112/140), 
rather than a richly articulated system of possibilities – has, at one and the same time, compromised his 
grasp of the full significance of abstract movements and the instructions that serve to refer to them. 
Schneider can represent the desired movement to himself in thought, and he can recognize a 
successful performance once it is achieved, yet ‘he does not find the movement himself; rather, he 
agitates his body until the movement appears’ (PhP, 112/140). What he lacks is an immediate and non-
representational grasp of the movement as one of his own possibilities: 
 
He is missing neither motricity nor thought, and we must acknowledge, between 
movement as a third person process and thought as a representation of movement, an 
anticipation or a grasp of the result assured by the body itself as a motor power, a 
“motor project” (Bewegungsentwurf), or a “motor intentionality” without which the 
instructions would remain empty.  
(PhP, 113/141) 
 
As I noted in Chapter 1, Merleau-Ponty cites this deficiency as carrying over to Schneider’s 
perceptual grasp of objects, and as a consequence, Schneider’s grasp of perceptual sens has been 
compromised. The immanence of a sense in the sensible – or as I put it above, the unity of sign and 
signified in perception – is lacking for Schneider, and his recognition of objects is mediated by a use of 
language and the intellectual connections that hold between words.49 In contrast to the normal subject, 
perception is no longer ‘spontaneous’ for Schneider, and a signification of the perceived is only arrived 
at as the achievement of a deliberate act of consciousness. As such, the communication or dialogue in 
which perceptual sens is constituted and develops has been stifled: 
 
For Schneider, this familiarity, this communication with the object is interrupted. For 
the normal person, the object is “speaking” and meaningful, the arrangement of colours 
immediately “means” something, whereas for the patient the signification must be 
brought in from elsewhere through a genuine act of interpretation.  
(PhP, 133/164) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, Schneider’s perceptual deficiencies lie ‘at the junction of sensitivity and 
signification’ (PhP, 132/164), which in the normal subject’s experience is constituted by a motor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Merleau-Ponty references the example of Schneider’s recognition of a fountain pen: ‘the recognition clearly progresses by following the 
connections of language, from “oblong” to “the form of a stick,” from “stick” to “instrument,” then to “instrument for writing something 
down,” and finally to “fountain pen.”’ (PhP, 133/164) 
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intentional grasp of the perceived quality, thing, or scene. The loss of his body as a system of 
possibilities – pre-reflectively and immediately available to the normal subject in the body schema – is 
reflected in the structure of Schneider’s perceptual field. The normative dimension of perception – the 
normal subject’s movement towards a more precise bodily grip on a perceived thing – founders in 
Schneider’s case, since it is itself conditioned by the correlations that hold between the subject’s 
horizon of motor possibilities and the perceived thing’s possible appearances. As the motor 
possibilities have ‘leveled out’ for Schneider, so has his grasp of a given presentation in relation to the 
system of possible appearances. Schneider is thus unable to comprehend the perceived thing by means 
of his body, and he must compensate by making use of the conceptual connections of constituted 
language and the inferences they facilitate.  
A degree of caution is necessary here, however, if we are to avoid misrepresenting how the concept 
of motor intentionality functions in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. Perhaps the most important mistake to 
avoid involves casting Schneider’s illness as involving a total absence or loss of a specific layer or 
discrete element of experience. We cannot say that Schneider no longer ‘has’ motor intentionality, 
since his competence in performing the familiar and habitual actions learnt prior to his injury displays 
precisely the kind of immediate and non-representational motor relation to objects that is lacking in his 
attempts to execute movements and to understand perceived objects outside of familiar or habitual 
tasks.  
Equally, it would be folly to suppose the exact opposite revelation to be demonstrated in the analysis 
of Schneider – i.e., that the motor intentional engagement exhibited in Schneider’s successful execution 
of ‘concrete’ movements discloses a ‘pure’ or original form of motor intentionality.50 For one thing, if 
this were Merleau-Ponty’s own conclusion he has gone about expressing it in a very odd manner, since 
the term ‘motor intentionality’ is only introduced in the passage at (PhP, 113/141) quoted above, where 
it is explicitly connected with Schneider’s deficiencies in executing ‘abstract’ movements. More 
importantly, such a conclusion directly conflicts with Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the appropriate 
methodology when utilizing pathological case studies. Merleau-Ponty explicitly stresses that ‘the 
normal cannot be deduced from the pathological’ (PhP, 110/138, my emphasis); the differences between 
the two cannot be given a neat differential or causal explanation in terms of the total absence or 
presence of discrete variables.51 In this case, he states that ‘[t]he distinction between abstract and 
concrete movement does not … merge with that between the body and consciousness’ (PhP, 
125/156). Schneider has neither preserved nor lost a ‘pure’ stratum of motor intentionality. It would 
therefore be a mistake to take Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Schneider to be disclosing a dichotomy of 
body and consciousness, or perception and intellection. What we must say is that Schneider exhibits a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Such an interpretation of the Schneider case is offered in (Kelly, 2000) and (Kelly, 2002). (Jensen, 2009) reads Merleau-Ponty as 
equivocating on this point, arguing that elements of his discussion of Schneider do commit him to something like the view Kelly advocates. 
This view seems ultimately to collapse into a crude kind of automatism, according to which concrete actions unfold with a mechanical kind of 
causality. Crucially, however, Jensen demonstrates how this aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion is the consequence of a misinterpretation of 
a passage from Gelb and Goldstein’s original case documents. (Mooney, 2011) builds upon Jensen’s discussion in order to show that 
Merleau-Ponty’s fully developed position avoids any kind of automatism. 
51 Jensen illustrates this point adroitly and at greater length in (Jensen, 2009). 
	  67  
pathological form of motor intentionality; one that reflects the pathological experience he has of his own 
body, and the world more generally, as we explored in chapter 1.52 
 
 
ii. The Place of Motor Intentionality: Dreyfus’ Reading 
 
How one interprets the place of motor intentionality in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has direct 
repercussions for how one construes the relationship that holds between the body and consciousness 
in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, as well as the nature and extent of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of 
intellectualism. The more general and overarching issue that I believe gives these questions their 
pertinence is the thesis expressed in the passage quoted at the outset of this chapter, which we have yet 
to address directly: 
 
[T]he philosopher learns from his contact with perception an awareness of a relation to 
being which necessitates and makes possible a new analysis of the understanding.  
(TfL, 3/11-12) 
 
If this thesis is truly expressive of the broader philosophical significance Merleau-Ponty sees his work 
on perception as having, it would surely be appropriate, in our efforts to elucidate that region of his 
thought, for us to ask ourselves quite how ‘a new analysis of the understanding’ might appear to be 
both facilitated and necessitated by it. As is to be expected this thesis will take on a decidedly different 
meaning depending on how we make sense of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the subject’s ‘relation to 
being’ in perception. As such, there is a lot riding on how we interpret Merleau-Ponty’s use of the 
notions of motor intentionality and bodily grip, and the body’s role in perception more generally.  
Now, the greatest stumbling block lying in the way of this interpretative task is the often ambiguous 
and potentially problematic manner in which Merleau-Ponty expresses the relationship between, on 
the one hand, consciousness and intellection, and on the other, the body’s movement towards a 
‘maximum grip’ that is realized in and through a motor intentional engagement with the perceived 
world. It can seem as if he takes the two to be thoroughly distinct from one another, and that motor 
intentionality is somehow independent from or other than what is meant when we talk of a subject’s 
‘understanding’ the world and its contents. If this were indeed the case, then Merleau-Ponty’s rejection 
of intellectualism would be only a partial or regional one, in the sense that the intellectualist’s 
conception of the intellect would be left unchallenged. The significance of the phenomenology of 
perception would be that it discloses a self-sufficient ‘layer’ of meaning which the categorial activities 
appealed to by intellectualism do not constitute and cannot penetrate, but which leaves the 
intellectualist conception of the intellect itself, or of a faculty of ‘the understanding’, essentially as it 
was. On this reading, it looks like a potentially troubling schism emerges between the bodily ‘motor’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 It may indeed be necessary, as Jensen suggests, to think of the clearly defined distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ movements in 
the description Gelb and Goldstein give of Schneider’s case as itself expressive of an aspect of his pathological form of motor intentionality, 
rather than as determining a distinction that can be properly thought of as common to the normal case. 
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intentionality of perception, and the intentionality of ‘the understanding’ in representational or 
propositionally structured acts of thought.53 At bottom, what this amounts to is a kind of schism 
between the perceiving body and the thinking mind. In passages such as the following, it appears as 
though Merleau-Ponty might indeed be committed to such a schism: 
 
By saying that this intentionality [sc. motor intentionality] is not a thought, we mean that 
it is not accomplished in the transparency of a consciousness, and that it takes up as 
acquired all of the latent knowledge that my body has of itself.  
(PhP, 241/279) 
 
In perception, we do not think the object and we do not think the thinking, we are 
directed toward the object and we merge with this body that knows more than we do 
about the world  
(PhP, 248/286) 
 
 It is this reading of Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception and motor intentionality that plays a 
significant role in the work of Hubert Dreyfus. Whilst Dreyfus has introduced his own philosophical 
concepts and argumentation, he considers his work to be continuous with that of both Merleau-Ponty 
and the early works of Martin Heidegger. Indeed, Dreyfus often presents himself to be simply 
articulating and applying their ideas. At the heart of Dreyfus’ work is the concept of ‘skillful-’ or 
‘absorbed coping’. Dreyfus uses this concept to refer to the significant portion of our day-to-day lives 
– passed over in silence by traditional philosophy and psychology – in which we engage with the world 
in a mode of ‘non-mental’ (Dreyfus, 1991: 76), ‘non-rational’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 352), ‘unthinking 
activity’ (Dreyfus, 1993: 35) which as such ‘cannot be understood in subject/object terms’ (Dreyfus, 
1991: 5).54  
Dreyfus casts perceptual receptivity as one aspect of this ‘non-mental’ engagement with the world, 
although he stresses that it cannot be thought of as properly distinguishable from the active, practical 
character of absorbed coping that consists in the enacting of specifically ‘embodied’ skills or expertise 
(Dreyfus, 2005a: 17). According to Dreyfus, the nature of these skills will vary to a certain degree 
depending on the individual, since we are able to acquire and develop new skills throughout our lives 
through coaching and practice.55 Nonetheless, he argues, once acquired, embodied skills can be 
executed without any recourse to the ‘detached attitude’ (Dreyfus, 2005a: 18) of reflective thought, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 It is precisely this way of reading Phenomenology of Perception that gives rise to the presentation of his relationship to the philosophy of action 
that I problematized in Chapter 1.  
54 In illustrating the concept of ‘absorbed coping’, Dreyfus leans heavily on examples such as the football player in Structure of Behaviour that I 
considered in Chapter 1. His emphasis on such examples when reading Merleau-Ponty has led Dreyfus, in his graduate school lectures, to say 
that a more apt title for Phenomenology of Perception would be ‘Phenomenology of Sports’ (ist-
socrates.berekeley.edu/~hdreyfus/188_s05/html/Lectures.html). This is a slightly odd claim given the total lack of any sporting examples in 
the Phenomenology.  
55 A popular aspect of Dreyfus’ work that I will not go into here has consisted in describing the process involved in acquiring an embodied 
skill, and the stages passed through in arriving at expertise and, in so doing, extending one’s capacity for absorbed coping to different or niche 
situations. See, e.g., (Dreyfus, 2002). The acquisition and nature of bodily habits and skills is certainly something Merleau-Ponty stresses in his 
discussion of embodiment, such as the famous example of the organist at PhP, 146-7/180-182. I shall discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 
4.  
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since they enable the agent to respond immediately to the salient aspects of a perceived situation.56 
Indeed, Dreyfus argues that the phenomenology of paradigmatic cases of absorbed coping such as 
playing sports shows that thought is in fact ‘the enemy of expertise’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 354).  
According to Dreyfus then, absorbed coping constitutes a mode of engagement in which the mind is 
simply not on the scene at all, and involves the body alone as it grasps and responds to the perceived 
environment. In attributing such a position to Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus identifies the notion of motor 
intentionality introduced in Phenomenology of Perception with the embodied and ‘non-rational’ experience 
of absorbed coping. Thus, on Dreyfus’ interpretation, motor intentionality constitutes a distinct and 
self-sufficient ‘ground-floor level’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 363) on the basis of which the ‘upper stories of the 
edifice of knowledge’ – i.e., the conceptual, linguistic, and inferential capacities of the thinking and 
reflecting mind – must be constructed (Dreyfus, 2005: 19). This is also taken to account for Merleau-
Ponty’s appeal to Heidegger’s concept of ‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-Sein), which Dreyfus treats as 
the general term for the total ‘background’ of embodied skills possessed by the individual, ready to be 
enacted in specific cases. Being-in-the-world is the ‘holistic background coping that makes possible 
appropriate dealings in particular circumstances’ (Dreyfus, 1991: 104). For Dreyfus, then, the 
significance of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and perception lies in disclosing the 
foundational stratum of absorbed coping, in which consciousness or the mind plays no part:57  
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, at the most basic level of being in the world, what does the 
grasping is not the mind but the body with its nonconceptual coping skills  
(Dreyfus, 2007a: 359)58 
 
 
iii. Problematizing Dreyfus’ Reading 
 
The sharp distinction between consciousness and the body that Dreyfus insists upon is what 
ultimately renders his position problematic, both in its own right and, crucially, as an interpretation of 
Merleau-Ponty. The interpretative worries become more determinate at those moments where Dreyfus 
is seeking to relate absorbed coping to what he takes to be the traditional (i.e., pre- or non-
Heideggerian) ontological categories of ‘the brute physical world’ and ‘the intrinsic intentionality of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 It is in this respect that Dreyfus’ work incorporates the kind of ‘Merleau-Pontian’ approach to the philosophy of action we saw is 
articulated by Romdenh-Romluc in the preceding chapter (e.g., (Dreyfus, 2000a)). 
57 This interpretation thus coincides with Kelly’s, insofar as Dreyfus takes it that motor intentionality is a distinct and self-sufficient level of 
experience. Unlike Kelly, however, Dreyfus does not seem to think that we can understand Schneider’s case as disclosing an undistorted, 
non-pathological instantiation of this level. For his most recent discussion of the case of Schneider, see (Dreyfus, 2007b). Once again, 
(Jensen, 2009) provides a succinct analysis of this difference between Kelly and Dreyfus.  
58 It is with this claim that Dreyfus’ reading has also led to the attempt to utilize Merleau-Ponty’s work in the debate concerning the presence 
of nonconceptual content in perception. For my part, I believe that this issue is essentially orthogonal to Merleau-Ponty’s own project. 
Furthermore, despite the claims of Dreyfus and others, it is far from clear that Merleau-Ponty’s work supports the case of 
‘nonconceptualism’. Indeed, in places such as the following passage, Merleau-Ponty would appear to be making quite the opposite case: 
 
One of Kant’s discoveries, whose consequences we have not yet fully grasped, is that all our experience of the world is 
throughout a tissue of concepts which lead to irreducible contradictions if we attempt to take them in an absolute sense or 
transfer them to pure being, and that they nevertheless found the structure of all our phenomena, of everything which is 
for us.  
(PriP, 18) 
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individual minds’ (Dreyfus, 2000b: 336).59 For Dreyfus, these categories are inadequate to characterize 
the motor intentional engagement in terms of which he defines absorbed coping, which is ‘nonmental’ 
without being simply ‘mechanical’ (Dreyfus, 1991: 68). The reason for this is that traditional philosophy 
has exclusively attended to the intentionality of mental acts, occupying only those ‘upper stories of the 
edifice of knowledge’. This inevitably leads to either ‘empiricist’ ignorance, or ‘intellectualist’ distortion 
of perceptual experience of the kind Merleau-Ponty emphasizes. According to Dreyfus, faced with the 
phenomenology of absorbed coping, ‘[w]e may just have to grit our teeth and countenance body-
intentionality [sc. motor intentionality] and being-in-the-world as a third way of being’ (Dreyfus, 2000b: 
336, my emphasis).60 For Dreyfus, then, the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty calls for a three-way 
distinction between physical objects, minds, and the bodily being-in-the-world of absorbed coping. It is 
then a further question how, in the case of human beings at least, ‘minds grow out of being-in-the-
world’ (Dreyfus, 2005: 19).  
On the Dreyfusian interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s work on perception, ‘a new analysis of the 
understanding’ would be necessary only insofar as we are forced to acknowledge that the rational 
capacities definitive of the understanding are founded upon the kind of non-rational, bodily 
engagement with the world that Dreyfus reads Merleau-Ponty (along with Heidegger) as disclosing. 
This relationship, and the human capacity to shift freely between instances of absorbed coping and 
moments of reflective distancing, would be the subject matter of this new analysis. Whilst Dreyfus 
praises Merleau-Ponty for helping lay the foundation for a better understanding of the relationship 
between mindedness and coping, he laments the fact that it is never directly dealt with by Merleau-
Ponty himself (Dreyfus, 2007a: 364). In this light, intellectualism is cast as ignorant – be it innocently or 
willfully – of the problem Dreyfus takes himself to be addressing by falsely taking intellectual rationality 
to be ubiquitous throughout our engagement with the world, ignoring the phenomenology of 
perception by ‘in effect declaring that human experience is upper stories all the way down’ (Dreyfus, 
2005: 1).  
My concerns regarding the viability of this interpretation feed into a line of criticism of Dreyfus’ 
general philosophical outlook that has started to become familiar in the literature relating to his work.61 
The common objection here is that Dreyfus is committed – perhaps tacitly – to a traditional yet 
questionable conception of rationality and the mind, and it is this commitment that is at one time both 
responsible for and expressed in his sharp distinction between the perceiving body and the thinking 
mind.62 In his reading of Merleau-Ponty, it seems that this commitment is reflected in Dreyfus’ 
understanding of the critique of intellectualism, since he considers the intellectualist’s conception of 
rationality, and the intentional structure of the understanding to have been left in place, with the cause 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In Section 1.4, I referred to these categories, with Merleau-Ponty, as ‘being in itself’ and ‘being for itself’, respectively.  
60 See also (Dreyfus, 2000a: 302). 
61 Most notably, in Dreyfus’ engagement with John McDowell (see (McDowell, 2007) & (McDowell, 2013)), although the critical work of a 
number of other authors focuses in on the same aspects of Dreyfus’ thought (e.g., (Rouse, 2005), (Rouse, 2013), (McManus, 2007), 
(Berendzen, 2010), and (Siewert, 2013)). 
62 As McDowell puts it in articulating his version of this criticism, Dreyfus accepts a ‘mythical’ conception of the mind: ‘The Myth of Mind as 
Detached’ (McDowell, 2013: 41). 
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for concern being its intrusion into the nonrational motor intentional engagement with the world found 
in perception.63 It is in this sense that I spoke above of the critique of intellectualism appearing to be a 
merely partial or regional one. I suggest this appearance cannot be the truth of the matter, however. 
The Dreyfusian interpretation misses the mark in its construal of the philosophical significance of 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of perception. Dreyfus’ reading of the critique of intellectualism, and the 
supposition of being-in-the-world as ‘a third way of being’ are each expressive of a more general 
misrepresentation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. Contra Dreyfus, the significance of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception – at least, as Merleau-Ponty himself conceives it – consists in disclosing 
the manner in which the perceived world is itself rationally structured. In Merleau-Ponty’s own words, 
it is the perceived world that is ‘the homeland of all rationality’ (PhP 454/493). At no point does 
Merleau-Ponty describe perception or motor intentionality as a ‘nonmental’ or ‘nonrational’ 
engagement with the world. Instead, he lauds phenomenology for its capacity to develop its own 
conception of rationality – one that is faithful to experience. It is in doing so that phenomenology will 
be capable of overcoming traditional philosophical antinomies (PhP, lxxxiv). In his own case this new 
conception is intertwined with a phenomenology of perception and the account of perceptual sens 
explored in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 above: 
 
Rationality fits precisely to the experiences in which it is revealed. There is rationality – 
that is, perspectives intersect, perceptions confirm each other, and a sense appears. But 
this sense must not be separated, transformed into an absolute Spirit, or transformed 
into a world in the realist sense.  
(PhP, lxxxiv/20) 
 
This passage demonstrates how, according to Merleau-Ponty, perception is to be understood as 
rationally structured, albeit in a manner traditional forms of philosophical are unable sufficiently to 
recognize and accommodate. Shortly after its publication in 1945, Merleau-Ponty defended the thought 
at work in Phenomenology of Perception in an address to the Société française de philosophie. In this 
address, he is keen to stress that ‘there is … no destruction of the absolute or of rationality here, only 
of the absolute and the rationality separated from experience’ (PriP, 27). A phenomenological reflection 
on perception provides insight into the nature of rationality; it does not disclose a peculiar ‘non-
rational’ order. Of especial importance here, as I have been stressing, is the phenomenological insight 
into the nature of meaning and understanding.  
Seen in this light, a phenomenology of perception would necessitate and make possible ‘a new 
analysis of the understanding’ insofar as the manner in which the subject understands the world and its 
contents in perception cannot be accommodated by the ‘old’ analyses, and must be described on its 
own terms. For Merleau-Ponty, such a revelation has profound repercussions beyond the domain of 
perception itself. This is made clear in the 1945 address:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Hence in his critique of McDowell, who Dreyfus thinks fits the bill of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘intellectualist’, Dreyfus speaks of ‘The Myth of the 
Pervasiveness of the Mental’ (Dreyfus, 2013). 
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What I mean to say is that we find in perception a mode of access to the object which is 
rediscovered at every level … the word “perception” includes the whole experience 
which gives the thing itself.  
(PriP, 34) 
 
This thought is central to Merleau-Ponty’s broader philosophical outlook, especially after the 
publication of Phenomenology of Perception, as he began to give greater attention to language and 
communication. As I shall demonstrate in chapter 4, this ‘middle period’ work on language can be seen 
to bear a deep and vital continuity with the earlier discussions of perception. This continuity should not 
be surprising if the overarching moral that Merleau-Ponty sought to draw from a study of perception is 
that it discloses ‘a mode of access to the object’ that is ‘rediscovered at every level’ or, as before, that it 
makes available ‘a new analysis of the understanding’. The continuity is much harder to appreciate if we 
go along with the Dreyfusian construal of the earlier work, however, since the self-sufficient layer of 
‘absorbed coping’ that Dreyfus takes Merleau-Ponty to be disclosing is cast as fundamentally non-
linguistic (Dreyfus, 2007a: 352), and as untouched by the acquisition of language. Dreyfus’ reading 
identifies what Robert Brandom has labeled a specific kind of ‘layer-cake’ (Brandom, 2002: 324) 
foundationalism in Merleau-Ponty’s approach to meaning and understanding, according to which the 
decidedly ‘mental’ or ‘representational’ activity that language use instantiates takes place against the 
motor intentional background of absorbed coping.  
To be clear, I do not deny the presence of a particular foundationalist line of thought in Phenomenology 
of Perception. However, I suggest that Dreyfus’ reading does not offer an accurate presentation of this 
foundationalism. Furthermore, and unlike Dreyfus, I suggest that the foundationalist strain of Merleau-
Ponty’s thought does not constitute the primary theme of his broader philosophical outlook. In fact, 
the foundationalist line of thought that emerges in Phenomenology of Perception stands in tension with the 
conception of operative intentionality formulated there, and that he continued to develop after 1945. I 
shall leave my own reading of the foundationalism present in Phenomenology of Perception until chapter 3. 
Until then, I want specifically to challenge Dreyfus’ interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
perception and motor intentionality.  
At bottom, Dreyfus’ reading of Merleau-Ponty appears to be at odds with Merleau-Ponty’s own 
assessment of the aims and achievements of his philosophical project. This is not to say that Dreyfus’ 
reading is unsubstantiated or without support, however, and it is incumbent upon us to try to trace the 
path by which Dreyfus arrives at his construal of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. As we have seen, the 
interpretation of motor intentionality and being-in-the-world in terms of Dreyfus’ own notion of a non-
rational and non-mental layer of ‘absorbed coping’ lies at the very heart of his presentation of Merleau-
Ponty. Beyond Merleau-Ponty’s own remarks concerning these concepts, there are seemingly two main 
sources from which Dreyfus feels he is able to draw justification. First, it appears that other areas of 
Merleau-Ponty’s work corroborate Dreyfus’ construal of motor intentionality and being-in-the-world. 
Of particular relevance here are Merleau-Ponty’s critical relationships with certain concepts, such as 
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‘reflection’ and ‘being-for-itself’, and also his use of the Husserlian concept of Fundierung, or founding. 
Secondly, Dreyfus’ engagement with (non-exegetical) issues in the philosophy of mind leads him to 
conclude that the position he finds in Merleau-Ponty is the only tenable one. It is for this reason that he 
feels Merleau-Ponty’s work to be of great importance to contemporary philosophy. When we attend to 
each of these proposed sources of justification, however, we shall see that neither offers unproblematic 
support for Dreyfus’ reading. In fact, what I suggest we find is that each of these avenues ultimately 
lead us away from Dreyfus’ presentation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. I will deal with the textual 
support for Dreyfus’ reading in the next section. Doing so will help clarify some specific ways in which 
Merleau-Ponty’s work does not cohere with Dreyfus’ view. I will then move on to consider Dreyfus’ 
primary non-exegetical argument for his position in Section 2.5 with a view to showing how Merleau-
Ponty’s thought in fact undermines rather than supports this argument. 
 
 
2.4 The Textual Motivation of Dreyfus’ View 
 
i. The Critique of ‘Reflection’ 
 
One aspect of Phenomenology of Perception that Dreyfus appears to lean quite heavily on is Merleau-
Ponty’s critique of ‘reflection’. For Dreyfus, this critique feeds into his own emphasis on the kinds of 
unreflective ‘bodily’ expertise that are exercised in absorbed coping, in contrast to the reflective activity 
of thought which, as we have already seen, is ‘the enemy of expertise’ (Dreyfus, 2007a: 354). We do 
indeed find Merleau-Ponty, throughout Phenomenology of Perception, lamenting the distorting power of 
reflection and stressing the importance of recognizing the ‘prereflective fund of experience’ (PhP, 
252/289). Yet this critique is predominantly advanced at the level of methodology in the study of 
perception, and the task of philosophy more generally. For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology represents 
a new and ‘radical’ form of reflection, in contrast to both what he refers to as the ‘psychological’ 
reflection of the empiricist and the ‘analytical’ or ‘transcendental’ reflection of the intellectualist. 
Fundamentally, the empiricist and intellectualist modes of reflection, each in their own way, manage to 
overlook, and thus distort, the phenomena for which they seek to account. It is the phenomenologist’s 
sensitivity to the data of experience – her awareness of her enterprise as a ‘reflection-upon-an-unreflected’ 
(PhP, 63/90) – that protects her from making the same mistakes. The ‘prereflective fund of experience’ 
is thus not Dreyfus’ self-sufficient layer of unthinking and nonrational ‘coping’, but something far more 
general. For Merleau-Ponty, it is the experience of the world that is necessarily prior to philosophical 
reflection, that philosophical reflection seeks to elucidate and comprehend, but which it all too easily 
and all too often loses contact with. As the following passages express, the phenomenologist’s task is to 
recognize and avoid such mistakes: 
 
Reflection does not withdraw from the world toward the unity of consciousness as the 
foundation of the world; rather, it steps back in order to see transcendences spring forth 
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and it loosens the intentional threads that connect us to the world in order to make them 
appear.  
(PhP, lxxvii/14) 
 
The task of a radical reflection, the kind that aims at self-comprehension, consists, 
paradoxically enough, in recovering the unreflective experience of the world, and 
subsequently reassigning to it the verificatory attitude and reflective operations, and 
displaying reflection as one possibility of my being.  
(PhP, 251/288) 
 
Of course, in pursuing a phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty categorically rejects the 
intellectualist construal of perceptual sens as the outcome of acts of judgement; to Merleau-Ponty, the 
intellectualist’s errors all seem to stem from an attempt to model perception on such ‘reflective 
operations’. Perceptual sens is not the achievement of reflective acts, and is in this sense ‘unreflective’. 
However, we should not let ourselves be misled by this claim. What Merleau-Ponty is rejecting here is 
the attempt, definitive of intellectualism, to unearth the activity of an autonomous and ‘pure’ subject as 
the transcendental condition of the perceived world.64 The phenomenology of perception serves not 
only to reveal the impossibility of such a task, but also to question the very legitimacy of the conception 
of a self-sufficient, ‘pure’, or ‘absolute’ subjectivity that intellectualism invokes; a subjectivity that is at 
once ‘everywhere and nowhere’ (PhP, 63/89). Rejecting such a conception of subjectivity as 
mythological is very different from claiming, as Dreyfus does, that subjectivity is itself founded upon a 
layer of ‘pre-subjective’ coping behaviour. Where Dreyfus to a large extent retains the problematic 
conception of the subject and holds it apart from the motor intentionality of perception, I suggest 
Merleau-Ponty is seeking to dispose of the received categories altogether.  
 
 
ii. Being-in-the-world as a ‘Third Way of Being’ 
 
This of course feeds into Dreyfus’ interpretation of being-in-the-world as ‘a third way of being’, to be 
contrasted with the ‘being-in-itself’ of the objective, natural world and the ‘being-for-itself’ of mind or 
consciousness. As we have seen, for Dreyfus, ‘being-in-the-world’ serves to refer to the wholly motor-
intentional engagement with the world found in absorbed coping; an engagement that is ‘nonmental’ 
without thereby being ‘mindless’ or ‘mechanical’ (Dreyfus, 1991: 68). In appealing to the concept in 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty does indeed directly contrast ‘being-in-the-world’ with the ‘in-
itself’ and the ‘for-itself’, as I noted in Chapter 1. Once again, however, it seems that Dreyfus reads 
Merleau-Ponty’s efforts to displace a certain conception of consciousness or subjectivity as a 
renunciation of subjectivity’s involvement in being-in-the-world altogether. Being-in-the-world only 
takes on the appearance of ‘a third way of being’ if we accept that the two categories with which it is 
being contrasted are themselves both legitimate. It does not seem that Merleau-Ponty takes this to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Merleau-Ponty seems to take this broad claim taken to be true of intellectualism of all stripes, be it Cartesian, Kantian, neo-Kantian, or 
Husserlian.  
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the case, however. Rather than accepting a conception of the mind as being-for-itself, and thereby 
considering the revelation of being-in-the-world as the disclosure of a ‘nonmental’ mode of 
intentionality, Merleau-Ponty deems it necessary to reassess the nature of mind and its relationship to 
the world. The unhappy dichotomy of two mutually exclusive categories of being is not to be overcome 
by the introduction of a third that would stand alongside them and thereby offer us a ‘richer’ means of 
carving up phenomena. Phenomenology does not supplant the dichotomy at the cost of introducing a 
trichotomy. For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenological reflection, by disclosing the myriad ways in which 
‘we are through and through related to the world’ (PhP, lxxvii/13), motivates the conclusion that 
consciousness ‘could not be a pure for itself’ (PhP, 535n18/260n2). Once more, it is the intellectualist’s 
‘absolute’ or ‘pure’ consciousness that Merleau-Ponty is putting out of play – rather than consciousness 
altogether – when he asserts that ‘consciousness always finds itself already at work in the world’ (PhP, 
456/496, my emphasis). 
Perhaps things are not altogether so clear as I am making them out to be, however. At certain places 
in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty does seem to be saying that we should reject the idea that the 
mind or consciousness is on the scene in perception. For instance, in one footnote he explicitly states 
that, when it comes to the subject of perception, we must ‘replace consciousness with existence, that is, 
with being in the world through a body’ (PhP, 548n23/363n2). The context of this claim, however, 
shows that ‘consciousness’ is here conceived within the terms of the dichotomy of ‘for-itself’ and ‘in-
itself’. It refers to a conception of subjectivity from which the perceiving body, itself conceived as a 
wholly mechanical physical system (being-in-itself), is excluded from the outset. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
phenomenology of embodiment subverts both of these conceptions, revealing the subject as an 
impossible ‘junction’ of the two poles (PhP, 391/431). So long as this insight is cashed out against the 
background of the accepted dichotomy, it will appear that a third category, incommensurate to the 
others, is being disclosed. Yet it is this incommensurability that is the very downfall of the 
categorizations of ‘being-for-itself’ and ‘being-in-itself’. Merleau-Ponty considers phenomenology to 
reveal such categories as expressive of the abstractions and misunderstandings of objective thought, 
and if they are appealed to in order to articulate being-in-the-world, this is, as it were, a ladder that, 
once climbed, can be swiftly thrown away.65 This is clear enough in a passage where Merleau-Ponty 
does, like Dreyfus, speak of a ‘third genre of being’: 
 
At the same time that the body withdraws from the objective world and comes to form a 
third genre of being between the pure subject and the object, the subject loses his purity 
and his transparency.  
(PhP, 366/407) 
 
At the very moment when it seems a new category is being called for by the phenomenology of 
perception, our categorizations collapse in on themselves. According to Merleau-Ponty, the ideal of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 This is also how the above passage from (PhP, 248/286) should be understood. Merleau-Ponty’s talk of ‘merging’ here should not be read 
as a coming together of two distinct ways of being – consciousness and body – but rather as an articulation of the manner in which 
consciousness must be understood as inherently ‘bodily’.  
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pure and ‘transparent’ subject – like that of the ‘transparent’ object ‘seen from everywhere’ we 
encountered earlier – is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding, even ignorance, of our perceptual 
experience of the world that it is the task of phenomenology to correct.66 
In all fairness, one can perhaps find something like this more full-blooded subversion of the received 
categories of ‘being’ in Dreyfus’ own rejection of the ‘traditional interpretation of the mental’ as ‘pure’ 
and ‘detached’ (Dreyfus, 1991: 74).  At best, however, it seems that Dreyfus’ presentation is pulling in 
contradictory directions, and the waters are severely muddied by his desire to draw a sharp distinction 
between the ‘nonrational’ motor intentionality of absorbed coping and the reflective ‘stepping back’ by 
which he identifies the rational subject or mind (Dreyfus, 2007a). That such ‘stepping back’ is seen as 
dependent upon the ‘involved’ activity of bodily coping – that ‘minds grow out of being-in-the-world’ 
(Dreyfus, 2005: 19) – should be enough for us to hear Dreyfus’ talk of a ‘third way of being’ as 
sincere.67 
 
 
iii. Fundierung 
 
When discussing the nature of the relationship between perception and thought, or perception and 
the ‘symbolic function’, Merleau-Ponty does appeal to Husserl’s concept of Fundierung, or founding. 
Merleau-Ponty understands the term to refer to a ‘two-way relation’ that he defines in the following 
passage: 
 
The founding term … is primary in the sense that the founded term is presented as a 
determination or a making explicit of the founding term, which prevents the founded 
term from ever fully absorbing the founding term; and yet the founding term is not 
primary in the empirical sense and the founded is not merely derived from it, since it is 
only through the founded that the founding appears.  
(PhP, 414/454) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the relationship of founding is reciprocal, to the point of interdependence.68 For 
the time being, I only wish to emphasize the stark contrast between Merleau-Ponty’s explicit definition 
of founding as an essentially reciprocal relationship, and the one-way dependence that Dreyfus 
describes as holding between the ‘upper stories’ of thought and reflection and the self-sufficient 
‘ground floor’ of absorbed coping. What the above passage seems to demonstrate is that the primacy 
Merleau-Ponty understands the motor intentionality of perception to have in relation to thought is one 
of meaning. Perception is primary insofar as thought involves the development or explicitation of 
perceptual sens. Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty is careful to stress that this development proceeds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 This also allows us to see how the passage from (PhP, 241), cited above on p.47, should be understood as referring us to a traditional and 
erroneous conception of thought and consciousness. This is indicated by Merleau-Ponty’s talk of thought as involving ‘constitution’ in ‘the 
transparency of a consciousness’. For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness (like the perceived thing) is never truly ‘transparent’. 
67 Perhaps, as McManus puts it, saying that subjectivity is not ‘pure’, and that it is instead ‘involved’ with the world through the body should 
not be our final conclusion. Ultimately, ‘we need to recognize that we are operating with confused notions of ‘detachment’ and  ‘involvement’, 
‘purity’ and  ‘impurity’’ (McManus, 2007: 442). 
68 This is a slight, yet notable, divergence from Husserl’s use of the concept. For Husserl, Fundierung can be reciprocal, yet it can also be one-
sided (see (Moran & Cohen, 2012)).  
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dialectically (PhP, 128-129/159-160), and the founding term is not left unaltered by its relationship with 
the founded term, since it ‘is only through the founded that the founding appears’. There is therefore 
not supposed to be any kind self-sufficient layer involved in the relation of Fundierung.  
This line of thought can be traced back to Merleau-Ponty’s first work, The Structure of Behaviour, where 
he distinguishes between three ‘orders’ of behaviour: the physical, the vital, and the human. In 
discussing the relations that hold between these orders, Merleau-Ponty is careful to avoid thinking of 
them as distinct layers, with each new order simply sitting on top of the previous one. The behaviour of 
human beings cannot be neatly divided into those aspects that are common to inanimate physical 
objects, those that are common to living organisms and other animals, and those that are unique to 
humanity. As he puts it, the ‘higher’ structures of behaviour that emerge in a properly human form of 
behaviour ‘eliminate the autonomy of the lower orders and give a new signification to the steps which 
constitute them’ (SB, 180/195). Man is not ‘a new sort of being’, and ‘[t]he appearance of reason and 
mind does not leave intact a sphere of self-enclosed instincts in man’ (SB, 181/195). Rather, man is ‘a 
new form of unity’ (SB, 181/195). It is this kind of relationship of sublimation that Merleau-Ponty’s 
appeal to the concept of Fundierung in Phenomenology of Perception would seem to be articulating. 
As a consequence, it is difficult to see how the concept of Fundierung, at least as Merleau-Ponty 
explicitly defines it in Phenomenology of Perception, is unproblematically amenable to Dreyfus’ 
foundationalism. In the next chapter, I shall problematize the details of the somewhat implicit 
foundationalist line of thought that does in fact emerge in the Phenomenology. This line of thought, 
culminating as it does with the concept of the ‘tacit Cogito’, appears to conflict with Merleau-Ponty’s 
explicit statements regarding the relation of Fundierung. It thereby provides a more plausible motivation 
for the kind of foundationalist reading Dreyfus advocates.69 As I shall argue, however, the source of 
such motivation is ultimately responsible for major internal problems within Merleau-Ponty’s thought, 
and is therefore unsustainable. For now, I will turn to the primary line of argumentation that Dreyfus 
actually offers in favour of his foundationalism. This argument unfolds beyond the bounds of Merleau-
Ponty’s own work and is instead drawn from Dreyfus’ broader engagement in the philosophy of mind.  
 
 
2.5 The Non-Textual Motivation of Dreyfus’ View 
 
A signature characteristic of Dreyfus’ work is that he consistently makes use of figures such as 
Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger against the background of other, non-exegetical concerns in the 
philosophy of mind. Perhaps, then, his presentation of Merleau-Ponty would be wholly legitimate if 
appreciated in the context of its application, and the worries I have been raising so far would amount to 
Dreyfus and myself talking past one another. The non-exegetical problematic in relation to which 
Dreyfus appeals to Merleau-Ponty certainly allows us to make much better sense of the motivation 
behind Dreyfus’ own outlook. This is not enough to legitimate the attribution of this view to Merleau-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Even this much of a concession to Dreyfus is not uncontestable, however, as I will clarify along the way in the next chapter.  
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Ponty, however. On the contrary, I think the account of perception that I unpacked in Sections 2.1 and 
2.2 in fact supports an engagement with Dreyfus’ problematic that is quite different to that favoured by 
Dreyfus himself. Furthermore, this difference brings to a head the worry raised above concerning the 
apparent disconnect between Dreyfus’ and Merleau-Ponty’s respective takes on the philosophical 
significance of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception.  
I will begin by clarifying the central problem in the philosophy of mind to which Dreyfus takes 
himself to be responding, and its apparent origin in Wittgenstein’s ‘rule-following considerations’. I will 
then appeal to one particular reading of the rule-following considerations that directly contradicts the 
use Dreyfus makes of them. Finally, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty’s work can be read as 
commensurate with Wittgenstein, at least on the reading of the rule-following considerations that I 
favour here.  
 
 
i. The Problem of Representationalism 
 
The problem that Dreyfus brings Merleau-Ponty to bear on arises in relation to a position he terms 
‘representationalism’. Representationalism seeks to describe the mind and its engagement with the 
world solely in terms of representational states, by which we mean states possessing a propositionally 
structured content that represents the world as being a particular way. For representationalism, all 
knowledge and understanding of the world is found ‘mirrored in the mind’ by the presence of 
propositionally structured beliefs (Dreyfus, 1997: xvii). Understood in this way, representationalism 
could be thought of as a contemporary equivalent of intellectualism, and this is certainly how Dreyfus 
sees Merleau-Ponty’s work to be relevant. As such, Dreyfus offers a phenomenologically informed 
argument against representationalism by appeal to examples of behaviour in which there would appear 
to be no kinds of representational states involved: the ‘expert’ coping behaviour of the sportsman, the 
chess master, the driver, or even the agent of mundane acts such as door-opening. As we have seen, for 
Dreyfus such cases instantiate the purely motor-intentional engagement with the world by which he 
defines ‘being-in-the-world’. This form of engagement, argues Dreyfus, proceeds by means of the 
attainment and modulation of a bodily grip on the perceptual-practical situation, without the 
interruption of or need for any kind of propositionally structured thinking.70 Indeed, such thinking has 
only a disruptive effect on this kind of behaviour. We therefore have clear and forceful 
counterexamples to the central claims of representationalism. 
The presentation of counterexamples by no means constitutes the entirety of Dreyfus’ argumentation 
against representationalism.71 Dreyfus also argues that the representationalist account of the mind must 
itself assume – whether the representationalist is aware of it or not – a ‘more fundamental’ engagement 
with the world than is found in representational states. The reason for this is that representationalism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Once again, we see our strong overlap here with the concerns of the previous chapter, and how Dreyfus defends a version of the 
interpretation I rejected there in relation to Romdenh-Romluc. 
71 If it were, the representationalist would be able to respond by positing the implicit presence of representational states in such examples. 
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taken in isolation faces a potentially infinite regress of representations. The regress threatens because, in 
order for representational states to have any non-arbitrary and rational efficacy in relation to one 
another, or in relation to the subject’s behaviour, the subject must be in possession of an understanding 
of representations themselves: of the significance of their representational content. If we are to remain 
within representationalism, this understanding would itself have to be accounted for in terms of further 
representational states, which would then require further understanding on the part of the subject… 
and so on, potentially ad infinitum. If such a regress does not surface in reality, this must be due to the 
fact that there is a non-representational foundation or ‘background’ against which representational states 
are made possible, or so Dreyfus argues. For Dreyfus, it is being-in-the-world as instantiated by his 
favoured examples of absorbed coping that is to be understood as providing this foundation (Dreyfus, 
1991: 5). 
The above is a generalized version of an argument Dreyfus most often advances in terms of ‘rules’ 
and ‘rule-following’. In this regard, Dreyfus understands the phenomenology of absorbed coping as 
describing a mode of behaviour in which the agent is not guided by rules at all.72 Echoing the above, he 
argues that such a mode of behaviour serves as a necessary condition or foundation on the basis of 
which instances of actual rule-following behaviour are made possible. As with the ‘representational’ 
engagement with the world more generally, without such a foundation, rule-guided behaviour would be 
made impossible by the requirement for an infinite regress. Dreyfus provides a concise expression of 
his thesis concerning rules in the following passage: 
 
…whenever human behaviour is analyzed in terms of rules, these rules must always 
contain a ceteris paribus condition, i.e., they apply “everything else being equal,” and what 
“everything else” and “equal” means in any specific situation can never be fully spelled 
out without a regress. …the ceteris paribus condition points to a background of practices 
which are the condition of the possibility of all rulelike activity.  
(Dreyfus, 1997: 56-7) 
 
 
 
ii. Wittgenstein’s ‘Rule-following Considerations’ 
 
Dreyfus takes inspiration for this thesis from the celebrated ‘rule-following considerations’ of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations §138-242. Central to these remarks is what appears to be a 
sceptical worry concerning the capacity to understand and be guided by rules, and an important aspect 
of this sceptical worry is the threat of a regress of the kind articulated by Dreyfus. In Wittgenstein’s 
discussion, the problem stems from the fact that understanding the meaning of a rule commits one, 
beyond the present moment, to a potentially infinite set of situation-specific actions. By itself, however, 
a given rule seems insufficient to strictly determine future behaviour, since it is entirely possible for it to 
be misinterpreted. In a heretofore unfamiliar situation, it seems that any course of action I take can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Mark Wrathall, a former student of Dreyfus, makes a similar claim in relation to social rules in (Wrathall, 2007).  
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made out to be in accordance with the given rule under some interpretation of it. Wittgenstein offers 
the example of the student who only applies the rule ‘add 2’ correctly to series of numbers below 1000, 
after which the student continues ‘1004, 1008, 1012, etc.’. Nothing about the rule itself, or the student’s 
successful application of it in previous cases, is capable of determining what should be done in 
subsequent cases, or why his actions in these cases are not in accordance with the rule. The student 
understands the rule differently from his teacher and yet, on his understanding of it, his actions are in 
complete accordance with the rule. Thus, as Wittgenstein’s imagined interlocutor concedes, ‘“Whatever 
I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.”’ (PI, §198). With this thought, it seems as if the 
very idea that we are capable of being guided by rules at all is thrown into serious doubt. Wittgenstein 
famously expresses this doubt in the following way: 
 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything 
can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. 
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.  
(PI, §201) 
 
If a rule is unable to determine which course of action is in accordance with it, it seems impossible 
that any action could be guided by the rule alone. We might then hope that the ability to apply the rule 
correctly can be salvaged by the introduction of a further rule: a rule for applying the original rule, one 
that dictates precisely which course of action is to count as correctly applying the original rule in any 
given situation. Such hope is clearly vain, however, since the same doubts surface once more in relation 
to the supplementary rule. As such, the invocation of rules seems to necessitate an infinite regress of 
rules or, as Dreyfus puts it, if a rule is to be capable of guiding situation-specific actions it must contain 
within itself a condition for its own application that could not be spelled out without invoking the 
regress. It seems, then, that rules alone are incapable of initiating or guiding action since rules ‘must 
always contain a ceteris paribus condition’. 
This sceptical argument, and the threat of regression in which it culminates, thus presents itself as a 
problem for our common sense intuitions about rules and rule-following behaviour, as well as meaning 
and understanding more generally. Wittgenstein’s own response to the argument has been matter for 
extensive debate, at the center of which is the question of whether Wittgenstein actually endorses the 
sceptical worry and the reasoning that gives rise to it.73 For his part, Dreyfus certainly accepts the 
sceptical argument as legitimate, and as thus in need of a solution. Understanding and being guided by 
rules, argues Dreyfus, could only be possible against the background of an engagement with the world 
in which rules are not involved at all – the ‘background of practices’ he mentions above. Only in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Saul Kripke famously interprets Wittgenstein as advocating the sceptical argument, and as offering a ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical 
paradox of PI §201 (Kripke, 1982). On such an interpretation, Wittgenstein is seen as defending an ‘anti-realist’ thesis about meaning. John 
McDowell, amongst others, rejects this reading, arguing instead that Wittgenstein (rightly, on McDowell’s view) seeks to show precisely how 
the sceptical worry is founded in a misunderstanding of our concepts of meaning and understanding (McDowell, 1984). I return to this reading 
below.   
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way could a crippling regress of rules be avoided. Incidentally, this is also the view that Dreyfus 
attributes to Wittgenstein himself.  
In this way, Dreyfus sees the disclosure of absorbed coping, and the ‘being-in-the-world’ that it 
instantiates, as providing the requisite solution to the sceptical problem that we are led to in the 
paradox of PI, §201. In turn, this solution extends to the more general problem facing 
‘representationalism’: in order to avoid an infinite regress of representations, there must be an 
engagement with the world that does not involve representational states. The purely motor or bodily 
intentionality of being-in-the-world therefore serves as the necessary (and ever-present) foundation or 
background upon which representational states are made possible. By drawing his conception of being-
in-the-world and motor intentionality from Merleau-Ponty’s work, Dreyfus sees the significance of this 
work as consisting in the disclosure of the non-representational and non-rule-governed foundation that 
the sceptical argument shows to be necessary. Merleau-Ponty is thereby presented as (rightly, as far as 
Dreyfus is concerned) offering a solution to the problem instantiated by the rule-following paradox of 
PI §201. This reading of Merleau-Ponty is reflected in Dreyfus’ talk of making ‘intentionality’ – by 
which he means the full blown ‘minded’ intentionality of representational states – possible. 
 
 
iii. Rejecting Dreyfus’ Problem: Wittgenstein and the ‘Master Thesis’ 
 
Dreyfus’ invocation of Merleau-Ponty in relation to this problem, and with it his more general 
concern with representationalism, offers a useful means of seeing precisely how his reading 
misrepresents Merleau-Ponty’s thought. Rather than taking Merleau-Ponty to be offering a means of 
directly answering the questions posed by the sceptical argument, I believe we should see his study of 
perception as showing how problems of this order arise from a mistaken way of thinking. The problem 
will therefore cease to have any traction if we disabuse ourselves of this way of thinking, and as such it 
requires no solution.  
On my view then, the properly Merleau-Pontian engagement with the problem Dreyfus raises with 
regard to representationalism bears close parallels with a certain reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following 
considerations themselves. On this reading Wittgenstein does not at any point actually endorse the 
reasoning behind the sceptical worry that culminates in the paradox of PI, §201. Instead, he seeks to 
show how such worries arise only if we allow ourselves to fall into a mistaken way of thinking about 
meaning and understanding. Strong support for reading Wittgenstein along these lines is found in PI, 
§201 itself. Immediately after articulating the threat that the sceptical argument presents in relation to 
rule-following – that there is in fact ‘neither accord nor conflict here’ – Wittgenstein offers the 
following diagnosis: 
 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course 
of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at 
least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews 
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is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited 
in what we call “obeying a rule” and “going against it” in actual cases.  
(PI, §201) 
 
What this passage asserts is that the fact that scepticism about rules and rule-following seems to 
threaten serves only to show that we have fallen prey to a misunderstanding. Once this 
misunderstanding is recognized and corrected, the argument that gave rise to the sceptical doubts about 
rules will no longer have any force, since it is itself founded in the very same misunderstanding. The 
misunderstanding in question consists in the assumption that grasping or understanding a rule is 
constituted by an act of interpretation. For Wittgenstein, this assumption also underlies the misplaced 
hope that the capacity to apply a rule correctly might be salvaged by the introduction of an additional 
rule, one that would determine what course of action would be in accord with the original rule. All this 
amounts to, in Wittgenstein’s words, is the introduction of ‘one interpretation after another’. The new 
rule will itself need to be properly understood and applied by the subject, and so we arrive at the 
regress. Underlying this doomed maneuver is the tacit conviction that understanding the meaning of a 
rule consists in having placed the right interpretation on it. It then remains an open question precisely 
what placing the right interpretation on a rule itself consists in, and it seems as if the only thing that 
could provide an answer would be a further interpretation that serves to guide the first, and thus the 
regress would be the only possible outcome.  
For Wittgenstein, at least on the reading that concerns me here, all that the threatened regress serves 
to show is that the tacit conviction that it originates from must be misguided, and that understanding 
the meaning of a rule is not in fact constituted by an act of interpretation. What is crucial here is the 
manner in which we appear contended, ‘at least for a moment’, with each new interpretation. It is 
precisely this momentary relief that reveals an understanding that is not an interpretation, yet we are 
blind to this fact due to our tacit pre-assumptions about what understanding a rule involves.74 To 
follow a rule ‘does not depend upon the formulation and selection of hypotheses about how the rule is 
to be applied’ (McGinn, 1997: 105). As such, the sceptical paradox that looms at the beginning of PI, 
§201 is illusory insofar as it is founded in a misunderstanding. In this regard, Wittgenstein himself 
emphasizes an essential passivity involved in understanding the meaning of a rule and being guided by it 
when he speaks of obeying a rule ‘blindly’: 
 
When I obey a rule, I do not choose. 
I obey it blindly.  
(PI, §219) 
 
This absence of choice refers us once more to the fact that understanding a rule is not the outcome of 
a voluntary ‘act of understanding’, or of a free interpretation on the part of the subject. To grasp and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 It is therefore this temporary reprieve from the threat of regress that Wittgenstein’s ‘this’ refers to in the final sentence of the above passage 
from PI §201. I thank Bob Clark for helping me to see this point.  
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follow a rule, simply as such, is for one’s behaviour to be normatively shaped by the rule itself and 
nothing else.75,76 
Crucially, for those who defend this reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules and rule-following, its 
conclusion facilitates a rejection of a way of thinking about meaning and understanding more generally. 
John McDowell ‘crystallizes’ this wrongheaded way of thinking in terms of what he calls the ‘master 
thesis’:  
 
[T]he thesis that whatever a person has in her mind, it is only by virtue of being 
interpreted in one of various possible ways that it can impose a sorting of extra-mental 
items into those that accord with it and those that do not.  
(McDowell, 1992: 45)77 
 
At bottom, the ‘master thesis’ amounts to a particular construal of the normative dimension of 
meaning and understanding – as McDowell puts it: the ‘sorting’ of extra-mental items. In the case of 
rules, for instance, the master thesis casts the sorting of possible courses of action into those that 
accord with the rule and those that do not as the outcome of an interpretation of the rule. All the 
sceptical difficulties began here, with the assumption that the rule alone could not achieve this 
normative shaping of the agent’s field of possible actions. The master thesis can also be seen to be at 
work in the ‘representationalist’ position that Dreyfus criticizes. The regress that threatens 
representationalism stems from the tacit assumption that a representation alone is incapable of ‘sorting 
of extra-mental items into those that accord with it and those that do not’. It thus appears as if some 
further element is required in order for a representation to be understood in the full, normative sense of 
the word. As Dreyfus argues, representationalism itself is incapable of answering this requirement 
without falling into a regress, since all it has at its disposal is further representations. As we have seen, it is 
for this reason that Dreyfus cites a non-representational, non-mental ‘background’ as a necessary 
condition of representational states. According to Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor 
intentionality and being-in-the-world can be understood as disclosing precisely this requisite 
background.  
If a large part of the force of Wittgenstein’s own remarks can be taken to consist in exposing 
something like McDowell’s ‘master thesis’ as the source of the sceptical worries surrounding meaning 
and understanding, Dreyfus’ response to such worries comes into question. If the master thesis is 
definitive of a way of thinking that is non-compulsory, then the worries it generates will dissipate as 
soon as we renounce it. A regress of rules, or of representations, only threatens whilst something like 
the master thesis holds sway in our thinking about meaning and understanding. As such, there is no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 It is mportant that we understand this notion of ‘blind’ rule-following as indicating an essential passivity, rather than referring to the wholly 
‘unthinking’ modes of behaviour that Dreyfus claims as the foundation of rule-guided behaviour. Rule-following is not blind in the sense of 
not being consciously aware of what one is doing, but rather in the sense of assenting to the authority of a rule, the meaning of which it 
contains within itself insofar as I am an in a position to understand it. 
76 A crucial aspect of Wittgenstein’s discussion concerns the social dimension of such practices (as emphasized by (Stroud, 2002)). I think this 
social dimension constitutes a vital part of Merleau-Ponty’s thought also, but I will not explore that further in the present context. 
77 A similar appeal to McDowell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein is made by Denis McManus in relation to Dreyfus’ construal of Heidegger 
(see (McManus, 2007)). 
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need to search around, as Dreyfus does, for a solid foundation or background in which the regress 
would eventually bottom out. To do so would be to acknowledge the regress as posing a genuine threat, 
and to remain in some sense committed to the mistaken way of thinking that gave rise to it.  
Dreyfus essentially accepts the representationalist’s conception of representations, and he raises the 
sceptical worries surrounding the regress solely in order to undermine the representationalist’s claims 
regarding the ubiquity of representational states.78 In doing so, it would appear that Dreyfus implicitly 
buys into something like the master thesis, and this explains why he explicitly presents his own view as 
offering a direct answer to the sceptical questions that the threat of regress motivates: namely, “how are 
rules/representations/intentional states/minds possible?” His answer consists in appealing to a mode of 
engagement with the world in which rules/representations/intentional states/minds are simply not 
involved, and which serves as the necessary condition of the possibility of such ‘upper story’ modes of 
engagement. He is thus left with his idiosyncratic foundationalist or ‘layer-cake’ picture of the subject’s 
relationship with the world. By contrast, the insight of Wittgenstein’s remarks, at least on the reading 
that concerns me here, lies in showing how the sceptical questions ‘should simply fall away’ (McDowell, 
1992: 47).  
 
 
iv. Merleau-Ponty and the ‘Master Thesis’ 
 
 On my view, we can better appreciate the significance of Merleau-Ponty’s study of perception by 
seeing it as entirely confluent with the approach found in Wittgenstein. The phenomenology of 
perception ‘necessitates and makes possible a new analysis of the understanding’ insofar as it discloses 
the way in which the perceiving subject’s grasp of perceived things does not depend upon an act of 
judgement or interpretation. Rather than presenting us with an exceptional or remarkable species of 
meaning and understanding, perception offers a vital insight into the nature of meaning and 
understanding far more generally, and in doing so enables us to avoid falling into mistaken ways of 
thinking about these concepts.  
The species of meaning and understanding that Merleau-Ponty articulates in perception need not be 
held in opposition to the notion of representation, or the ‘upper stories’ of consciousness, as Dreyfus 
insists. Rather, it facilitates a critique of a particular conception of representation that is assumed in 
Dreyfus’ work – namely, that representations must involve a subsumption of a given content of 
consciousness under a form in a discursive act of judgement or interpretation. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
fundamentally non-discursive immanence of perceptual sens makes available an alternative conception of 
meaning and understanding at every level.79  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 It is worth noting how this engagement with representationalism thus mirrors Dreyfus’ reading, addressed earlier, of Merleau-Ponty’s 
critique of intellectualism, which would appear to accept the intellectualist’s conception of the intellect, rejecting only its claims to ubiquity. 
79 (Matherne, 2014) frames such a reading of Merleau-Ponty in terms of the pronounced influence exerted by Cassirer’s conception of 
representation, which was developed in Cassirer’s own analysis of pathological cases in the third volume of Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Whilst 
I cannot pursue the relationship between Cassirer and Merleau-Ponty here, Matherne’s interpretation certainly resonates with the reading that 
I advocate, as well as my critique of Dreyfus’ reading. Importantly, it allows us to appreciate how the critical points Merleau-Ponty does make 
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We might, as (McManus, 2012) suggests, think of Dreyfus’ reading as having a kind of transitory 
character, since he fails to properly appreciate or develop the broader significance Merleau-Ponty finds 
in the phenomenology of perception. As a result, Dreyfus never completely jettisons the mistakes such 
a phenomenology exposes, and this is reflected in the sharp, even antagonistic relationship he describes 
between the motor intentional understanding of perceptual sens, and ‘rule-governed’ or representational 
form of intellectual understanding.  
The concept of motor intentionality is distorted when read through the lens of Dreyfus’ idiosyncratic 
kind of foundationalism. Indeed, I want to suggest, rather, that Merleau-Ponty’s deployment of this 
concept allows us to see why such foundationalism is unnecessary. What Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions 
of motor intentionality and the correlate notion of ‘bodily grip’ provide is a direct subversion of the way 
of thinking about meaning and understanding that McDowell hones in on in his discussion of the 
master thesis. Merleau-Ponty offers a description of how the perceiving subject’s grasp of perceptual 
sens is immediately reflected in and developed via a normatively structured engagement with perceptual 
phenomena. The normative dimension of understanding is present in the perceived world without 
being put there by an act of judgement or interpretation. In the case of perceptual sens, this normative 
dimension is a motor one insofar as the organization of perceptual phenomena is synonymous with a 
certain organization of the perceiving subject’s motor possibilities. It is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty 
describes the body as ‘the general instrument of my “understanding”’ (PhP, 244/282) in regards to the 
perceived world.80 On the reading I favour, then, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological disclosure of 
meaning and understanding in perception, by being incommensurate with what he considers to be the 
traditional ways of thinking about these concepts, and about perception itself, allows us to make the 
initial steps towards breaking with such ways of thinking altogether (i.e., the inadequate forms of 
‘reflection’ that Merleau-Ponty critiques).  
The normative dimension of meaning and understanding will undoubtedly vary with the kind of 
meaning involved – i.e., perceptual, linguistic, aesthetic, religious, symbolic, etc. – and as such will not 
necessarily involve the structuring of strictly motor possibilities – in the sense of possibilities for spatially 
extended bodily movements – that Merleau-Ponty sees as synonymous with the grasp of perceptual sens. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be very good reason to suppose that the overtly practical character of this 
normativity – its shaping of the individual’s possibilities – carries over to meaning and understanding 
more generally. These may be possibilities for action, expression, emotion, or even thought, but what is 
continuous between such cases is the teleological or directional structure of meaning that Merleau-
Ponty initially draws out of his phenomenological reflections on perceptual sens, and which has to do 
with what are, in a broad sense, practical possibilities over time.81 Indeed, I consider Merleau-Ponty’s 
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against the concept of representation are continuous with his enthusiasm for Cassirer’s non-traditional account of representational 
consciousness.  
80 I suggest that we understand the scare quotes here as serving to differentiate Merleau-Ponty’s account of understanding in perception from 
the activity of the Kantian faculty of ‘the understanding’, and to avoid casting the instrumentality of the body as equivalent to the body as a 
mere object. 
81 Depending upon how strict we are with our definition of ‘motor’, we may well happily define the first two as species of motor possibilities.  
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exploration of precisely this aspect of linguistic meaning and understanding.82 Of course, a further issue 
– and one that certainly occupied Merleau-Ponty – concerns the relationships that hold between these 
different kinds of meaning. As we saw in the previous chapter, Merleau-Ponty lays great emphasis on a 
description of the sensible world as the setting of the subject’s projects. Perception itself must be 
understood as outstripping the purely ‘motor’, and as incorporating within itself the affective, ethical, 
and intellectual life of the subject.  
The rather constricted phenomenology of object perception outlined in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 is best 
thought of as constituting a specific, regional study within a broader reflection on the nature of 
meaning and understanding. Whilst the case of perception undoubtedly bears its own particularities, it 
makes available philosophical insights that we can see Merleau-Ponty continuing to develop even as he 
turns his attention away from the study of perception per se. As Paul Ricoeur expresses it, in 
Phenomenology of Perception, ‘perception appeared as the model of all human operations, with its play of 
significations that refer one to the other, without ever halting in an object, seen from nowhere and 
thoroughly known’ (Ricoeur, 2009: 19). Merleau-Ponty’s talk of the ‘primacy of perception’ therefore 
has two main senses, the first of which concerns the reciprocal development of meaning that occurs 
between perception and other modes of consciousness, and the second of which is methodological, 
with the study of perception helping to both formulate vital insights and ‘define a method’ (PriP, 25) for 
future investigations. We can hear each of these senses resonating in Merleau-Ponty’s famous assertion 
that ‘all consciousness is perceptual’ (PriP, 13). 
This picture of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking certainly becomes more explicit and, I argue, inescapable, 
after the publication of Phenomenology of Perception. In the next chapter, however, I will consider how the 
more general thesis concerning meaning and understanding that emerges from Merleau-Ponty’s 
analyses of the body and of perception, and which I consider definitive of his conception of operative 
intentionality, stands in tension with certain other aspects of Phenomenology of Perception.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 This is a point that coheres with Joseph Rouse’s work on the fundamentally practical nature of ‘conceptually articulated understanding’, 
which he develops via an engagement with Dreyfus’ view (esp. (Rouse, 2013). It is also confluent with the reading of Merleau-Ponty pursued 
by J.C. Berendzen especially with regards to Merleau-Ponty’s work on speech and language (Berendzen, 2010). I am certainly sympathetic 
with the argument Berendzen offers, although I am a little reticent to retain the Dreyfusian language of ‘coping’ to the extent that he does, 
given what I take to be the ultimately problematic way it is defined by Dreyfus himself. I will discuss Merleau-Ponty’s account of speech and 
language at length in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.  
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3.  
Silence and Speech in Phenomenology of Perception:  
The Problem of the Tacit Cogito 
 
 
In the previous two chapters, I have focused on drawing out what I take to be the broader 
philosophical significance of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of operative intentionality as it is articulated 
in Phenomenology of Perception. In doing so, I have identified a more or less cohesive line of thought about 
meaning and understanding that emerges from Merleau-Ponty’s interdependent analyses of agency and 
perception respectively. Unfortunately, however, Phenomenology of Perception is not a wholly univocal 
piece of work. The line of thought that we have been concerned with so far can be seen to stand in a 
peculiar kind of tension with certain other aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s expansive magnum opus. The 
purpose of the present chapter will be to identify the nature and proper source of this tension. 
Ultimately, I will show that the problem lies with Merleau-Ponty’s underdeveloped thinking about 
speech and expression at this early stage of his career.  
It is perhaps only in Part III of the Phenomenology that the work’s internal problems become fully 
conspicuous. In particular the first chapter of this division, entitled ‘The Cogito’, sees Merleau-Ponty 
articulating a relationship between perception and language that is deeply problematic. The chapter 
culminates in Merleau-Ponty’s assertion of a ‘silent’ or ‘tacit Cogito’ that is directly contrasted with the 
‘spoken Cogito’ we encounter in Descartes: 
 
Beyond the spoken Cogito, the one that is converted into utterances and into essential 
truth, there is clearly a tacit Cogito, an experience of myself by myself. But this indeclinable 
subjectivity has but a fleeting hold upon itself and upon the world.  
(PhP, 426/465) 
 
The tacit Cogito is intended to refer to the form of self-consciousness involved in the ‘non-thetic’ 
engagement with the world that Merleau-Ponty has spent the majority of the preceding two parts of the 
Phenomenology elucidating via a study of the body, and of perception. In other words, it is the self-
consciousness of operative intentionality. The spoken Cogito, on the other hand, captures the explicit 
consciousness of oneself in the mode of the ‘I think’. This kind of self-consciousness operates at the 
level of ‘thetic consciousness’, or ‘act intentionality’ – ‘the intentionality of our judgements and of our 
voluntary decisions’ (PhP, lxxxii//18).  
Crucially, the terms in which Merleau-Ponty formulates the tacit Cogito – in particular the contrast 
between ‘silent’ and ‘spoken’ – shows that he considers the distinction to hinge on the use of language. 
Put simply, thetic consciousness (and the explicit form of self-consciousness it involves) is facilitated by 
the acquisition and utilization of language, whilst the non-thetic mode of self-consciousness that 
constitutes the tacit Cogito is not mediated by linguistic significations. In contrast to the explicit self-
	  88  
consciousness of the ‘I think’, the tacit Cogito refers to a kind of implicit reflexivity that Merleau-Ponty 
believes is revealed by his phenomenology of perception. It is because it involves this tacit kind of self-
relation that the non-thetic engagement with the world in perception has the potential to be expressed 
in terms of the explicit ‘I think’ without itself being the product of such an act. Thetic acts articulate the 
content of non-thetic experiences by making use of the conceptual significations of language. Merleau-
Ponty is thus seeking, in the Cogito chapter, to understand the relationship between operative 
intentionality and act intentionality as profoundly intertwined with the relationship that holds between 
perception and language.  
Indeed, we can see Merleau-Ponty drawing directly from the discussion of speech he had already 
offered in Part I of the book as he goes about articulating the distinction between the tacit and the 
spoken Cogito. This influence is vital, since it is in the Phenomenology’s discussions of speech and 
expression that the seeds of the difficulties surrounding the notion of the tacit Cogito are first sown. 
This is to say that the tension that is present in the work as a whole, and which culminates with the 
formulation of the tacit Cogito, can be traced back to the account of speech. The aim of the present 
chapter is to demonstrate this. In Section 3.1, I will unpack the arguments of the ‘Cogito’ chapter and 
offer an assessment of precisely what the tacit Cogito is supposed to be, before attending to the 
problems this concept raises for Merleau-Ponty’s thought. In Section 3.2, I consider how the assertion 
of the tacit Cogito ultimately emerges from the discussion of speech and expression offered in the first 
part of the Phenomenology. Section 3.3 will then conclude by determining what is problematic in the 
account of speech and expression offered in Phenomenology of Perception.  
Before doing this, however, it is worth noting Merleau-Ponty’s later critique of certain aspects of 
Phenomenology of Perception, since they would appear to coincide with worries I shall be raising in what 
follows. In a working note of January 1959, Merleau-Ponty summarizes the reasoning behind his earlier 
assertion of the tacit Cogito, before resolutely rejecting it as ‘impossible’: 
 
The Cogito of Descartes (reflection) is an operation on significations, a statement of 
relations between them (and the significations themselves sedimented in acts of 
expression). It therefore presupposes a prereflective contact of self with self (non-thetic 
consciousness [of] self, Sartre) or a tacit cogito (being close by oneself) – this is how I 
reasoned in Ph.P.  
 
Is this correct? What I call the tacit cogito is impossible. To have the idea of “thinking” (in 
the sense of “the thought of seeing and of feeling”), to make the “reduction”, to return to 
immanence and the consciousness of… it is necessary to have words. It is by the 
combination of words … that I form the transcendental attitude, that I constitute the 
constitutive consciousness. 
(VI, 171/222-3) 
 
What the second paragraph shows is that it is a concern about the place of language in experience – as 
well as in the very enterprise of phenomenology itself – that forms the ground of Merleau-Ponty’s 
rejection of his earlier account of the tacit Cogito. I shall attend to the positive developments instigated 
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in the late period work in Chapter 5. What I am hoping to demonstrate in this chapter involves the 
other side, as it were, of this self-critique: the role played by the Phenomenology’s approach to language in 
motivating the assertion of the tacit Cogito.  
 
 
3.1 What is the Tacit Cogito? 
 
i. The Critique of the Cartesian Cogito 
 
A great deal of the ‘Cogito’ chapter is confluent with Merleau-Ponty’s concerted critique of what he 
considers a bifurcation of being in traditional philosophy, which we have noted in the preceding 
chapters. From the outset of the chapter, Merleau-Ponty is seeking to ascertain the true significance of 
the Cogito, which he believes has not been properly appreciated, even by Descartes himself. In 
particular, Merleau-Ponty criticizes an interpretation of the Cogito according to which the Cogito reveals 
the self as ‘a being that recognizes itself immediately, because it is nothing other than self-knowledge 
and knowledge of all things’ (PhP, 390/430). On this interpretation – seemingly Descartes’ own, and 
further represented here by the work of the neo-Kantian, Pierre Lachièze-Rey – self-consciousness 
consists in a direct, unmediated, and indubitable coincidence with oneself, for oneself in the activity of 
thought. This coincidence is then taken to be the very essence of consciousness. As a consequence, the 
directedness of consciousness towards its objects – i.e., intentionality – is only possible insofar as it is at 
one and the same time coincidence with oneself, since otherwise it would not be consciousness at all. 
Consciousness thus comes to be thought of as a wholly immanent sphere in which all experience is 
fundamentally constituted by the activity of thought, and the possibility of being directly acquainted 
with any kind of transcendent reality is undermined. Understood in this way, claims Merleau-Ponty, the 
Cogito invariably leads philosophers to a kind of subjective idealism, for which the self is understood as 
an autonomous, ‘constituting consciousness’ that ‘contracts into itself everything that it intends, an “I 
think” that would be an “I am” by itself and without any addition’ (PhP, 390/430, citing Lachièze-Rey).  
For Merleau-Ponty, this interpretation of the Cogito leads to insuperable difficulties, not least the 
impossibility of other selves. If consciousness were nothing other than an absolute coincidence with 
itself in self-consciousness, experience of other consciousnesses would be ruled out, since 
consciousness could only be experienced by itself, for itself. Other bodies could not be grasped as 
incarnating other consciousnesses, since my own consciousness would ultimately bear a merely 
contingent, external relation to my body. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, ‘if I have no outside, then others 
have no inside’ (PhP 391/431). The idealist position motivated by the Cogito is, he argues, fundamentally 
solipsistic, since ‘constituting consciousness is, in principle, singular and universal’ (PhP, 392/432). This 
position rests, in its interpretation of the Cogito, on a basic mistake about self-consciousness that 
phenomenology is equipped to expose and overcome. 
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ii. Self-consciousness in Perception and Affective Life 
 
Merleau-Ponty thus offers a phenomenological account of self-consciousness by which he intends to 
demonstrate the mythological character of a purely immanent or private sphere of consciousness whose 
contents are immediately given and indubitably certain. This demonstration proceeds via a study of the 
place of self-consciousness in three different forms of intentionality: perception, emotion, and ‘pure’ or 
wholly conceptual thought.83 Whilst each of these necessarily involves a reflexive relation to oneself, it 
is not ‘the absolute transparence of a thought that entirely possesses itself’ (PhP, 392/432). Instead, we 
see that consciousness is only related to itself through the mediation of its intentional engagement in 
and with the world. As such, self-consciousness and consciousness of the world are internally related, 
with neither serving as the indubitable ground of the other. Thus, the true insight of the Cogito does not 
consist in the revelation of an ‘inner man’: an absolute immanence at the source of all experience, but 
rather the manner in which consciousness is always already involved or engaged in the world.84 
Grasping the truth of the Cogito involves recognizing ‘the profound movement of transcendence that is 
my very being, the simultaneous contact with my being and with the being of the world’ (PhP, 
396/436). 
There are certainly echoes here of Hume’s skepticism towards the notion of ‘a self’ in the Treatise, 
where Hume is forced to admit, ‘I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perception’ (Treatise, Book 1, Part 4, §6). For Merleau-Ponty, this thought 
comes coupled with a rejection of another that is commonly motivated by the Cogito, namely that one’s 
consciousness of perceiving is of a different epistemic standing to the thing perceived, such that one 
must make a strict distinction between phenomenal appearances (which are entirely immanent to 
consciousness) and real things (which are entirely transcendent of consciousness). This kind of 
separation between the act of perceiving and the thing perceived is impossible, he argues, for one 
cannot speak of ‘perceiving’ in cases where there is no perceived thing to refer to.85 Perception is only 
accomplished in reaching the perceived thing, and anything that falls short of this is therefore 
something other than perception. 86  Merleau-Ponty expresses this claim in terms of an identical 
‘existential modality’ of perception and the perceived: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 In the present discussion, I shall address only the first two of these cases (perception and affective life). Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of 
wholly conceptual or ‘pure’ thinking revolves around the case of geometrical demonstrations. His central claim is that the ambiguity found in 
perception necessarily infects geometrical thought as well, since geometry is ultimately concerned with the world encountered in perception. 
He therefore rejects the notion that geometrical or mathematical thought is ever truly ‘pure’ or capable of delivering apodictic knowledge. 
Whilst this argument does engage with the Cartesian line of thought, it is of more immediate and greater relevance to the philosophy of 
geometry and mathematics than to the issues surrounding self-consciousness, perception, and language.  
84 Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s explicit differentiation of himself, in the ‘Preface’, from St. Augustine: ‘Truth does not merely “dwell” in the “inner 
man”; or rather, there is no “inner man,” man is in and toward the world, and it is in the world that he knows himself’ (PhP, lxxiv/11). A 
further, implicit, target here is surely Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, which concludes with a citation of St. Augustine as an expression of 
Husserl’s own views as to the significance of Phenomenology (Husserl, trans. 1950: 157). 
85 We can appreciate how this claim is continuous with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of perceptual constants, and his refusal there to make a 
thoroughgoing distinction between ‘mere’ appearances and ‘real’ properties within perception. 
86 In this respect at least, Merleau-Ponty’s epistemology would seem to have much in common with contemporary disjunctivist approaches to 
perception. This commonality is explored, particularly with regards to John McDowell’s disjunctivism, in (Berendzen, 2013) and (Jensen, 
2013).  
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Perception and the perceived necessarily have the same existential modality, since 
perception is inseparable from the consciousness that it has or rather that it is of reaching 
the thing seen. If I see an ashtray in the full sense of the word “see,” then there must be an 
ashtray over there, and I cannot repress this affirmation. To see is to see something.  
(PhP, 393/433) 
 
Uncertainty regarding the perceived thing simultaneously bears upon the experience itself, and the 
revelation of an illusory experience forces me to conclude that I did not really perceive at all. There is no 
greater certainty in the ‘thought of’ perceiving than there is in the perceived thing, and Merleau-Ponty 
thus rejects the claim that the thought that one is seeing is indubitable whilst the possibility of error, 
and thus doubt, enters in only with the subject’s interpretation of a perception as the visual acquaintance 
with transcendent object. As far as Merleau-Ponty is concerned, an epistemic distinction between the 
act of perception and the perceived thing is untenable, since the very appearance of ‘thought that one is 
seeing’ must in some way resemble ‘actual’ (i.e., successful) instances of vision, which would acquaint 
one with real, visible things. The thought that one perceives is therefore only certain if actual 
perception is certain, and so the two are indissoluble. Perception thus involves no ‘private sphere of 
consciousness’ (PhP, 395/435), since its very actualization lies in one’s going beyond any supposed 
sphere in grasping perceived things. The self-relation involved in perception cannot, then, be that of an 
immanent sphere of consciousness: 
 
Vision must surely grasp itself – for if it did not, it would not be a vision of anything at all 
– but it must grasp itself in a sort of ambiguity and a sort of obscurity, since it does not 
possess itself and rather escapes itself into the thing seen.  
(PhP, 395-6/435-6) 
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, this ‘ambiguous’ or ‘obscure’ form of self-consciousness should not be 
considered an idiosyncrasy of perception as the presentation of objects that transcend consciousness. 
The notion of self-consciousness as an immediate coincidence with oneself cannot simply be reasserted 
in some other region of our experience. Even the most intimate and personal aspects of our lives, upon 
inspection, evade such a transparent and incorrigible kind of self-knowledge. Instead, we find the same 
kind of ‘ambiguous’ relation to oneself that is present in perception. To illustrate this, Merleau-Ponty 
appeals to an intuitive distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false or illusory’ feelings. What is crucial about this 
distinction is that it is always possible for me to live in a kind of ignorance of the true nature of my own 
feelings. For instance, Merleau-Ponty describes a ‘false’ love that, whilst I am held in its sway, is 
indiscernible from true love, and which I only gradually come to recognize and repudiate. This 
repudiation does not make my feelings illusory; it is the very discovery of them as such. What I discover 
is ‘the place of the feeling in my overall being in the world’ (PhP, 398/438) – the manner in which it 
colours my engagement with the world and others. There is thus an essentially active component of 
affective life that is not transparently given to consciousness due to the fact that it plays itself out in the 
world through my behaviour. That I can discover that I am in love is to say that this love is not a discrete 
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entity or content contained in an immanent and immediately known realm, but a moment of an 
affective situation that is lived through rather than known.87 Affective intentionality thus involves the 
same kind of ‘ambiguous’ relation to oneself that perception exhibits, and it is impossible ‘to place in 
advance at my core a self-knowledge that contains everything that I will later know about myself’ (PhP, 
400/440). 
The true insight of the Cogito – i.e., self-consciousness – does not consist in an immediate coincidence 
with oneself, and self-knowledge is not a transparent and indubitable given. On this basis, Merleau-
Ponty claims to find in the Cogito itself an avowedly non-Cartesian conception of subjectivity as ‘a 
movement in which it transcends itself’; my existence is ‘an act or a doing’ (PhP, 401/441). The kind of 
self-consciousness that Descartes is concerned with, and which I can realize in my own acts of self-
reflection, cannot provide the incorrigible foundation of all knowledge, since it is only a secondary 
phenomenon in which I come to an explicit or discursive awareness of myself as a being situated in and 
engaged with the world. Thus, it is only in this engagement, or ‘the “doing”’ (le “faire”), that the 
existence referred to by the Cogito is actually accomplished, and doubt assuaged: 
 
I can actualize the Cogito and have the assurance of really desiring, loving, or believing, 
given that I first actually desire, love, or believe and given that I accomplish my own 
existence. If I do not do so, an unassailable doubt spreads across the world, and also 
across my own thoughts. I will endlessly wonder if my “tastes,” my “desires,” my 
“wishes,” and my “adventures” are truly my own, and they will always seem artificial, 
unreal, and flawed. … Thus, it is not because I think being that I am certain of existing, but 
rather the certainty that I have of my thoughts derives from their actual existence. 
(PhP, 401-2/441-2) 
 
 
iii. The Tacit Cogito and the Body 
 
It is with this thesis that the impetus lying behind Merleau-Ponty’s assertion of the ‘tacit’ Cogito, 
beyond or beneath the merely ‘spoken’ Cogito of Descartes, emerges. The thought here seems to be that 
the actualization and recognition of the Cartesian Cogito is possible and has a sense for me only insofar 
as it is an expression or explicitation of the relationship I bear to myself in my perceptual, practical, and 
affective engagements with the world. Whilst the sense of Descartes’ Cogito lies in its status as a 
determinate expression of this self-relation, such an expression can never be adequate. As the object of 
an act of linguistic expression, Descartes’ Cogito cannot fully coincide with what it is attempting to 
express: 
 
I would not find any sense in them [Descartes’ words], not even a derived and inauthentic 
one, and I could not even read Descartes’ text, were I not – prior to every speech – in contact 
with my own life and my own thought, nor if the spoken Cogito did not encounter a tacit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 All the same, Merleau-Ponty is careful to avoid positing something like a Freudian ‘unconsciousness’ in order to explain the movement 
from self-ignorance to self-knowledge, asserting that such a notion involves the same ‘retrospective illusion’ as the Cartesian position: 
‘everything that I will later learn about myself is introduced into me as an explicit object’ (PhP, 400/440). 
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Cogito within me. In writing his Méditations, Descartes was aiming at this silent Cogito, which 
animates and directs all of the expressive operations that, by definition, fail to reach their 
goal, since they interpose – between Descartes’s existence and the knowledge that he gains 
of this existence – the entire thickness of cultural acquisitions. 
(PhP, 424/463) 
 
Merleau-Ponty thus believes there to be a vital distance between this ‘silent’ Cogito and the spoken 
Cogito, which consists in the fact that, in having read Descartes’ words, ‘I have only grasped my thought 
and my existence through the medium of language’ (PhP, 422/462). The ‘true’ Cogito (PhP, 311), the one 
Descartes was ‘aiming at’, would appear to be fundamentally non-linguistic.  
This immediately raises the question of how a non-linguistic, ‘silent’ Cogito could be a Cogito – i.e., a 
thinking of oneself – at all. Merleau-Ponty does concede this worry, admitting, somewhat paradoxically, 
that the tacit Cogito ‘is only a Cogito when it has expressed itself’ (PhP, 426/466). He thus concedes to 
expressive acts a vital role in facilitating the subject’s explicit grasp of his own existence in thought. 
Nonetheless, such a grasp is conditioned by an non-thematized kind of self-awareness, and there thus 
remains the silent, ‘primordial I’ (PhP, 427/466), aware of itself beyond, and in spite of, the sedimented 
weight of ‘cultural acquisitions’ such as language.  This partitioning of a ‘primordial’ or original self in 
opposition to the edifice of language echoes Merleau-Ponty’s description, offered earlier in the text, of 
the body as ‘a natural myself (un moi naturel) and, as it were, the subject of perception’ (PhP, 213/249).88 
The body’s perceptual and practical relation with the world certainly seems key to grasping the 
significance of the tacit Cogito. It also appears to bring home precisely why the concept is inherently 
problematic for Merleau-Ponty’s overarching thought in Phenomenology of Perception.  
Perhaps the most straightforward reading of the relation between the tacit Cogito and the body 
involves a simple identification: the tacit Cogito is the perceiving body by another name. More 
specifically, M.C. Dillon takes it to refer to the reflexivity intrinsic to the body as both the subject of 
perception and a possible object of perception. Dillon thus understands the ‘genuine tacit Cogito’ (Dillon, 
1997: 105) to be synonymous with what Merleau-Ponty will subsequently refer to, in The Visible and the 
Invisible, as the ‘reversibility of the flesh’. My feeling is that Dillon here reads the Phenomenology a little 
too much through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s later work. For one thing, reading the later concept of 
‘reversibility’ into the tacit Cogito has the effect of making the changes and self-critique found in 
Merleau-Ponty’s late writings appear to consist in a mere terminological difference, which I think 
masks the development of Merleau-Ponty’s thought between Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible 
and the Invisible. Furthermore, the phenomenon of ‘double touch’ (i.e., the experience of one hand 
touching the other) from which the concept of reversibility receives much of its significance in The 
Visible and the Invisible is mentioned only once in Phenomenology of Perception (PhP, 95/122), and here only 
as one phenomenon amongst many that motivates a rejection of classical psychology. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Indeed, throughout Part II perception itself is variously described as a ‘primordial contact with being’ (PhP, 229/266), as ‘primordial 
experience’ or ‘field’ (PhP, 251-2/289), and as constituting a ‘primordial arrangement in relation to the world’ (PhP, 366-7/408). 
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Nonetheless, Dillon undoubtedly identifies a central aspect of what is meant in the talk of the tacit 
Cogito.89 As Merleau-Ponty brings the ‘Cogito’ chapter to a close, he begins to speak more directly about 
the central place of the body in the ‘experience of myself by myself’ that constitutes the tacit Cogito. It is 
through my body that I ‘inhere’ in the world, not simply as a physical object, but as a ‘knowing-body’ 
(PhP, 431/470) at grips with and open to the world in perception. Of course, it is this embodied 
engagement with the world in perception that Merleau-Ponty has dedicated himself to articulating in 
the first two parts of the Phenomenology. Of particular relevance here is the account of the ‘body schema’ 
and its simultaneous roles as both a pre-reflective awareness of one’s own body and as the means by 
which the subject grasps the sense of perceptual phenomena and engages with the world in perception. 
Crucially, these two roles are internally related: it is precisely insofar as it ‘gears into’ (PhP, 260-3/297-
300) perceptual phenomena that my body is unreflectively grasped as a ‘system open to the world’ (PhP, 
526n115/179n1). Merleau-Ponty describes the philosophical significance of the body schema in the 
following way: ‘not only is the unity of the body described in a new way, but also, through this, the 
unity of the senses and of the object’ (PhP, 244/282). The body schema constitutes an experience of 
myself by myself, yet this tacit or operative self-relation cannot be abstracted from the world, since it is 
mediated by ‘the thickness of the world’ (PhP, 311/351) in perception. Merleau-Ponty expresses this 
reciprocal relationship between self-consciousness and the sensible world in the following way: 
 
The consciousness of the world is not established upon self-consciousness, but they are 
strictly contemporaries: there is a world for me because I am not unaware of myself; I am 
not concealed from myself because I have a world. 
(PhP, 311/351) 
 
It is perception, then, that literally embodies Merleau-Ponty’s tacit Cogito. It is perception that constitutes 
my ‘ultimate subjectivity’90 as a bodily ‘project of the world’ (projet du monde) (PhP, 427/466). It is thus 
perception, properly understood, that provides the ‘silent’ ground upon which the explicit self-
consciousness arrived at in the ‘I think’ is made possible, but with which it cannot coincide. By the very 
end of the chapter Merleau-Ponty begins to make this connection explicit:    
 
My first perception, along with the horizons that surrounded it, is an ever-present event, 
an unforgettable tradition; even as a thinking subject I am still this first perception, I am 
the continuation of the same life that it inaugurated. 
(PhP, 429-30/468-9) 
 
If the subject is in a situation, or even if the subject is nothing other than a possibility of 
situations, this is because he only achieves his ipseity by actually being a body and by 
entering into the world through this body. If I find, while reflecting upon the essence of 
the body, that it is tied to the essence of the world, this is because my existence as 
subjectivity is identical with my existence as a body and with the existence of the world, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Dillon is therefore on stronger grounds than a reading according to which Merleau-Ponty is introducing a full-blown Cartesian subject by 
another name, as Douglas Low appears to do in (Low, 1987). 
90 I.e., a self-conscious existence, rather than the existence of a mere ‘thing’ that would be unaware of itself. 
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and because, ultimately, the subject that I am, understood concretely, is inseparable from 
this particular body and from this particular world.  
(PhP, 431/470) 
 
 
iv. The Problem of the Tacit Cogito 
 
We have already seen that Merleau-Ponty eventually came to criticize the reasoning that lay behind his 
assertion of the tacit Cogito in Phenomenology of Perception. I have also claimed that the assertion of the tacit 
Cogito marks the culmination of a tension that runs through the Phenomenology as a whole. Ultimately, the 
problem of the tacit Cogito stems from the kind of relationship it asserts between perception and 
language, and to see this we need to attend again to the passage on Descartes (PhP, 424/463): 
 
I would not find any sense in them [Descartes’ words], not even a derived and inauthentic 
one, and I could not even read Descartes’ text, were I not – prior to every speech – in contact 
with my own life and my own thought, nor if the spoken Cogito did not encounter a tacit 
Cogito within me. In writing his Méditations, Descartes was aiming at this silent Cogito, which 
animates and directs all of the expressive operations that, by definition, fail to reach their 
goal, since they interpose – between Descartes’s existence and the knowledge that he gains 
of this existence – the entire thickness of cultural acquisitions. 
(PhP, 424/463) 
 
In this passage, Merleau-Ponty clearly asserts the tacit Cogito’s status as a foundational stratum upon 
which the explicit self-consciousness of thetic acts is made possible. Indeed, he describes the tacit Cogito 
as animating and directing all ‘expressive operations’. Now, as I have outlined above, the tacit Cogito is 
arrived at via Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the Cartesian thought, according to which consciousness 
necessarily involves a wholly immanent self-coincidence; a sphere of subjectivity that is held apart from 
a transcendent reality ‘in itself’. With the notion of the tacit Cogito, Merleau-Ponty is referring to a self-
relation that is realized only via the mediation of the world. It becomes clear that it is the perceiving 
body that realizes this self-relation that is simultaneously a transcendence of self. In this way, we can 
understand the above passage to be asserting that it is perception, understood as essentially embodied, 
that ‘animates and directs all of the expressive operations’. In isolation, this assertion is not immediately 
problematic, and Merleau-Ponty certainly seems to maintain something like it until the very end of his 
life, as we shall see in the following chapters. Yet its formulation here, in terms of the tacit or silent 
Cogito, appears to be fundamentally misguided once we attend to its wider ramifications, and the 
internal tension it introduces into his thought.  
Insofar as it subsists ‘prior to every speech’, the tacit Cogito is held apart from language, and from any 
and all expressions of it in words, whilst it is simultaneously identified as animating and directing these 
very acts. Crucially, such expressions are described as interposing ‘the entire thickness of cultural 
acquisitions’, and it is for this reason that such acts ‘fail to reach their goal’ – i.e., the silent life and 
world of the tacit Cogito that they are attempting to signify. What emerges here is a picture according to 
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which the tacit Cogito remains untouched by expression and language, since it subsists prior to any acts of 
speech, and is in some sense beneath or beyond the linguistic significations, or ‘cultural acquisitions’ 
that such acts utilize. This picture becomes clearer as we connect the tacit Cogito up with certain aspects 
of the Phenomenology’s account of the body and its place in perception in the manner I have suggested. 
Most notably, as mentioned in Chapter 2, in several places Merleau-Ponty describes the body as 
leading an ‘anonymous life that underpins my personal life’ (PhP, 168/203); ‘the given, general, and pre-
personal existence in me of my sensory functions’ (PhP, 345/387). In their original contexts, these 
descriptions are intended to emphasize the passivity of perception insofar as it is not a deliberate act of 
an absolute subjectivity or the outcome of a personal choice, without this passivity devolving into the 
causal receptivity of mere mechanism. For the same reason, Merleau-Ponty states that perception ‘is 
always in the impersonal mode of the “One”’ (PhP, 249/287) and that, if we are to ‘express perceptual 
experience with precision’, we ought not say ‘I perceive’, but ‘that one perceives in me’ (PhP, 223/260). 
The tacit Cogito refers to the bodily self-relation that is realized in this ‘pre-personal’ perceptual 
intentionality. It underpins the explicit mode of self-consciousness that is mediated by the use of 
language, and in which ‘personal life’ is led. This claim is difficult to countenance since, as Baldwin puts 
it: 
 
It is one thing to show that our embodied being in the world is a condition of the 
possibility of the thetic intentionality that comes with the use of language. … It is quite 
another to hold that there is a special kind of pre-personal self-consciousness that remains 
active beneath the chatter of our ordinary consciousness and uninformed by it.  
(Baldwin, 2011 ms.) 
 
At issue here is not only the ‘secondary status of language’ (Hung, 2005: 219 citing Taminiaux) in 
relation to the silence of the tacit Cogito, but the secondary status of the ‘personal’ experience of the 
world of which language, and the explicit form of self-consciousness it mediates, are central moments. 
With the tacit Cogito, Merleau-Ponty appears to be maintaining that the pre-personal body, as a ‘natural 
subject’, and the ‘natural’ world of things it finds around itself in perception, are a permanent, 
‘primordial’ fixture beneath the cultural and personal world.91 In my view, such a picture runs counter 
to some of the most important and enduring insights of the Phenomenology itself, including the discussion 
of intersubjectivity and interpersonal relations, and the account of freedom in the final chapter of the 
text, which itself ends with a quotation from Saint-Exupéry’s Pilote de Guerre which emphasizes the 
central place of interpersonal relationships in the life and identity of the individual: ‘man is a knot of 
relations, relations alone count for man’ (PhP, 483/521, citing Saint-Exupéry). From the context, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 At this point, one might think that Dreyfus’ presentation of Merleau-Ponty begins to get some traction. There is certainly an analogous 
structure to the perception-language/natural-cultural relationship that emerges here and the foundationalism that Dreyfus advocates. The 
presence of this line of thought in the Phenomenology is on the whole problematic, however, and should not be taken to be the central thesis of 
the work. Merleau-Ponty’s subsequent self-criticisms offer further support to this claim. As we explore Merleau-Ponty’s thinking on this topic 
in greater detail, and especially its grounding in the Phenomenology’s discussion of speech and expression in Section 3.2, we will also see how it 
is far from being flatly synonymous with Dreyfus’ presentation.  
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clear that the kinds of relations being referred to here outstrip any kind of purely ‘natural’ engagement 
with the world. 
Most importantly, the thought behind the assertion of the tacit Cogito conflicts with the elucidation of 
operative intentionality arrived at via Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the case of Schneider. In attending to 
this discussion, as I did in chapter 1, we see operative intentionality portrayed as encapsulating the 
subject’s situatedness in the world not merely as a ‘natural’ world of things, but as the backdrop of a 
‘human milieu’, and of ‘ideological’ and ‘moral’ situations (PhP, 137/170). The status of the world as the 
setting of my life under these various different descriptions is not the outcome of a personal choice or 
deliberate act, although it will undoubtedly develop as a result of the experiences I have, the people I 
meet, and the various judgements and choices I make on a daily basis. In this sense, my situatedness is 
‘pre-personal’; it is a feature of my facticity, and of my being-in the-world. Yet it is as a decidedly 
human and ‘personal’ subject – a subject of ideology and of morality, for example – that I am engaged 
with the world under such descriptions, and these facets of my life are inescapably intertwined with the 
consciousness I have of myself through language and in reflective or deliberative thought. Thus, 
operative intentionality itself must outstrip the ‘primordial’, non-linguistic self-consciousness that is 
intended by the assertion of the tacit Cogito, and ‘cultural acquisitions’ must be acknowledged as 
inaugurating a transformation or sublimation of not only the subject of experience, but also the world he 
perceives and acts within. This would not be identical to the ‘thetic’ consciousness of oneself as a 
discrete object of thought that the Cartesian Cogito instantiates, but it could not be abstracted from the 
possession of language and the capacity for explicit self-reflection that such an act requires. 
Thinking along these lines, it looks as if the relationship between the anonymous, unreflective life of 
the perceiving body, and the personal life of self-reflective acts that is facilitated by the possession and 
use of language cannot be prized apart from one another, yet the notion of the tacit Cogito seems to 
institute just such a separation. In this way, two distinct lines of thought come to the surface in 
Phenomenology of Perception, pulling the work in contrary directions. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty 
appears to allow for a dialectical relationship between perception and language insofar as the possession 
and development of cultural acquisitions such as language involves a transformation, or sublimation of 
a pre-linguistic engagement with the world and with others.92 Yet on the other hand, he seems to assert 
a kind of constitutive foundationalism, according to which the perceiving subject and the perceived 
world remain uninformed by cultural acquisitions and the acts they facilitate. On this view perception 
‘appears as a distinct layer, correlative to a body that is the subject of behaviour’ (Barbaras, trans. 2004: 
47); a ‘primordial’ stratum upon which the significations of the cultural world are overlaid. The 
assertion of the tacit Cogito offers the clearest formulation of this line of thought, placing it at odds with 
some of the most central, and philosophically fruitful elements of the Phenomenology itself.  
Ultimately, this line of thought supports a foundationalism of meaning, according to which perceptual 
sens is the fundamental and self-sufficient condition of all linguistic significations. Crucially, perceptual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 This would involve the kind of Gestalt or structural transformation of sense we find within perception itself, such as in the introduction of 
the auxiliary lines in Zöllner’s illusion (see p. 43-4, above). The introduction of new relations alters the meaning of every constituent part. 
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intentionality appears to unfold independently of the cultural acquisitions of language, and the silent 
self-relation of the tacit Cogito is unaltered by the ‘expressive operations’ it conditions. Merleau-Ponty 
thus avoids positing the certainty of a Cartesian Cogito as the immutable foundation of all knowledge at 
the cost of positing perceptual intentionality as the self-sufficient foundation of all expression, and of 
all language. With the assertion of the tacit Cogito, then, Merleau-Ponty dissociates a ‘silent’ world of 
perception from the ‘spoken’ world that is constituted by linguistic significations.  
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to demonstrating how this foundationalism in fact 
originates in the Phenomenology’s account of speech, contained in Part I, chapter 6: ‘The Body as 
Expression, and Speech’. From the outset, we can see that this chapter shares a quite specific aim with 
the ‘The Cogito’ chapter insofar as it seeks to renounce the Cartesian conception of thought as the ‘pure’ 
activity of a wholly immanent subjectivity; a subjectivity that could be abstracted from the world and 
from the material instruments by which it relates to it. It is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty introduces 
chapter 6 with the bold assertion that an accurate description of speech will present ‘the opportunity to 
leave behind, once and for all, the classical subject-object dichotomy’ (PhP, 179/213). In attending to 
expression, Merleau-Ponty’s ultimate goal is to disclose the way in which the activity of thought cannot 
be understood as subsisting independently from the performance of expressive acts, and in particular, 
the act of speech. Rather than simply translating and communicating pre-existing or ‘ready-made’ 
thoughts, speech plays a vital role in originally constituting, or ‘accomplishing’ thought, and ‘the 
expressivity of the inner life is already that of language’ (Hung, 2005: 219).  
This thesis remains at the centre of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical outlook for the remainder of his 
life, although the manner in which it is accommodated in his work undergoes a good deal of 
development. In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty attempts to accommodate it in terms of what 
I shall refer to as the ‘gestural account’ of speech. According to the gestural account, the sense of 
speech acts is fundamentally continuous with the sense of silent bodily gestures. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty 
goes so far as to assert that the spoken word itself ‘is a gesture’ (PhP, 190/224, my emphasis). As a form 
of expressive gesture speech is an essentially bodily activity. Since it is through speech that thought is 
originally ‘accomplished’, the gestural account identifies the body and its unreflective engagement with 
the world as the fundamental condition of thought itself, and in doing so categorically renounces the 
possibility of holding the activity of thought apart from the body and from the world. 
Merleau-Ponty thus formulates the gestural account of speech as the means by which he might ‘leave 
behind, once and for all, the classical subject-object dichotomy’. However, it is his initial formulation of 
the gestural account in the Phenomenology that inaugurates the problematic kind of constitutive 
foundationalism that culminates in the assertion of the tacit Cogito. This is ultimately due to the manner 
in which the gestural account motivates a sharp, polarized distinction between, on the one hand, the 
sense of truly expressive or creative acts of speech and, on the other hand, the determinate conceptual 
significations of constituted language. It is this distinction that gives rise to a sharp division between 
perception and language.  
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3.2 The Gestural Account of Speech in Phenomenology of Perception 
 
i. A ‘Return to the Phenomenon of Speech’  
 
As is the case throughout Phenomenology of Perception, ‘The Body as Expression, and Speech’ sees 
Merleau-Ponty attempt to steer a course between the equally undesirable poles of ‘empiricism’ and 
‘intellectualism’. In this instance, Merleau-Ponty’s diagnosis is that the empiricist and the intellectualist 
in fact commit the same fundamental error in their theorizing about linguistic expression and 
understanding: the omission of the speaking subject. As Merleau-Ponty sees it, an empiricist account of 
speech is one that recognizes, rightly, that speech acts arise in the interaction between humans and 
their surroundings, although it seeks to account for this interaction in terms of efficient causation, 
either at the level of physiology or in terms of a causally determinate psychology. The perspective of a 
subject of speech who grasps a meaning in his words and those of others is therefore abstracted out of 
the empiricist picture from the outset, and in attempting to understand speech acts as the outcome of 
physiological or psychological laws, empiricism effectively divorces meaning from speech, since it 
describes speech as taking place ‘in a circuit of third person phenomena’ (PhP, 180/214). Speech is not, 
strictly speaking, any kind of action, since ‘it does not manifest the inner possibilities of the subject’ 
(PhP, 180/214). For empiricism, the utterance of a word is to be understood as ‘merely an articulatory, 
sonorous phenomenon’ (PhP, 182/216). 
Prima facie, the intellectualist approach to speech presents itself as a remedy to the shortcomings of 
empiricism insofar as it seeks to return meaning to our use of words. An intellectualist account of 
speech, as Merleau-Ponty describes it, holds that meaning is bestowed or invested into words by the 
categorial operations of a subject who transcends language. Speech acts are therefore only an external 
and contingent clothing for the operations of a thinking activity that can continue without words or, as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, for the intellectualist ‘[t]hought has a sense and the word remains an empty 
envelope’ (PhP, 182/216). The intellectualist approach, whilst apparently remedying the empiricist’s 
omission of the subject from speech, coincides with empiricism insofar as words are taken to be 
essentially devoid of sense when considered in themselves (i.e., apart from the self-sufficient thinking 
that invests words with sense in acts of speech). For Merleau-Ponty, this is due to the fact that the 
subject invoked by intellectualism is ‘the thinking subject, not the speaking subject’ (PhP, 182/216), 
which is to say that the intellectualist in actual fact repeats the folly of empiricism by omitting the 
proper subject of speech: the speaking subject. The mistake corresponds to the Cartesian 
interpretation of the Cogito in terms of a wholly subjective and self-sufficient sphere of consciousness 
that exists quite apart from the world or the body. In this sense, the ‘thinking subject’ of the 
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intellectualist is mythological as far as Merleau-Ponty is concerned, even as a conception of the agent 
of thought itself. 
In order to demonstrate that the proper subject of speech is overlooked by empiricism and 
intellectualism alike, Merleau-Ponty proposes a ‘return to the phenomenon of speech’ (PhP, 185/218) 
– i.e., a phenomenological account of speech. Such a return will make possible two interdependent 
observations: i. that there is a meaning immanent to words, and ii. that thought is internally related to its 
expression in language. I will unpack each of these in turn. 
The experience of communicating with and understanding the speech of others provides definitive 
support for ‘the simple observation that the word has a sense’ (PhP, 182/216). In acts of linguistic 
expression, others are capable of communicating meaning to me, and vice versa. For both empiricism 
and intellectualism, this experience of understanding others’ words as meaningful would be illusory, 
since they each reject from the outset the idea that words carry any kind of sense or meaning in 
themselves. Empiricism reduces talk of meaning to talk of causally determined processes (effectively 
purging meaning from the experience of speech) whilst intellectualism, despite rejecting such a 
reduction, sees the meaning of words as externally bestowed upon them by the activity of a thinking 
subject. The word ‘is again stripped of any efficacy of its own’ (PhP, 182/216), and as a consequence, 
the intellectualist must maintain that in understanding another’s words I only ever encounter a sense 
installed in them by my own interpretative act of thought. A genuine transmission or communication of 
meaning from one subject to another through words is thus impossible, as ‘consciousness can only 
find in its experience what it had itself put there’ (PhP, 184/218).  Since such communication is a 
phenomenological fact, our account of speech, if it is to be phenomenologically plausible, must begin 
by acknowledging that words carry a sense that is not bestowed upon them from above, but is instead 
woven in and by the use of words in linguistic expression. The other’s words have a sense for me that I did 
not give to them, but which is ‘induced’ by the way in which the other utilizes them in communicating 
with me (PhP, 184/219). 
For Merleau-Ponty, this recognition of a sense that is immanent to words facilitates a further 
observation concerning speech, which is that there is a fundamental interdependence of thought and 
speech, idea and expression. Linguistic expression does not involve, as intellectualism maintains, the 
translation into words of a self-sufficient thinking that transcends language. Instead, we must 
acknowledge how the constitution of an immanent sense in acts of speech is synonymous with the 
activity of thought itself. In the experience of expression, he argues, we find that speech conditions not 
merely the external transmission of thought, but its very constitution: 
 
If speech presupposed thought … then we could not understand why thought tends 
toward expression as if toward its completion, why the most familiar object appears 
indeterminate so long as we have not remembered its name, and why the thinking subject 
himself is in a sort of ignorance of his thoughts so long as he has not formulated them for 
himself, or even spoken or written them down  
(PhP, 182-3/216) 
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It is in bringing it to expression that ‘speech accomplishes thought’ (PhP, 183/217), and my grasping 
of a sense in another’s words enables me to ‘receive’ his thought ‘from the speech itself’ (PhP, 
184/218). The experience of genuine communication is thus legitimated by the phenomenological 
recognition of ‘a thought in the speech of which intellectualism is wholly unaware’ (PhP, 185/219). 
Intellectualism fails to see that thought itself must be counted amongst ‘the phenomena of expression’ 
(PhP, 196/231) – it could not exist without its manifestation in words, just as painting cannot exist 
without colour, nor music without sound. 
 
 
ii. Language and Expression 
 
We can see here how the discussion of speech coincides in a significant way with Merleau-Ponty’s 
rejection of the Cartesian conception of self-consciousness. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty revisits his 
discussion of speech in the ‘The Cogito’ chapter itself in order to definitively reject the idea that one’s 
own thoughts constitute an incorrigible sphere of absolute self-knowledge. Such a view rests upon a 
conception of thought as in a certain sense ‘pure’ – i.e., as subsisting quite apart from its formulation 
and communication in acts of expression. Attending to our actual experience of expression and 
speech, however, we observe that thought is in fact originally realized in the expressive activity of 
speech. This fundamentally creative accomplishment makes my thought explicit as much to myself as to 
others who understand me, allowing Merleau-Ponty to declare once more that self-knowledge is 
achieved only through a kind of self-transcendence: 
 
the act of expression must allow even the subject himself to transcend what he had 
previously thought, and he must find in his own words more than he thought he had put 
there, otherwise we would never see thought, even when isolated, seek out expression 
with such perseverance  
(PhP, 408/449) 
 
speech itself establishes the concordance of myself with myself and of myself with others, 
upon which the attempt was made to ground speech.  
(PhP, 412/452) 
 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, a ‘return to the phenomenon of speech’ makes available a resolute rejection 
of the idea of a ‘transcendent thought behind language’ (PhP, 412/452). Such an idea seems 
philosophically plausible only when we overlook the fundamentally creative dimension of speech as an 
act in which thought is first constituted, rather than merely translated. The failures of empiricist and 
intellectualist accounts of speech each derive from a kind of ignorance or forgetfulness of this creative 
role of speech in favour of its ultimate achievements – the already constituted language, thoughts, and 
ideal objects that make up a linguistic community’s cultural and intellectual heritage: its ‘cultural world’. 
For empiricism, the determination of natural languages as objects of science – the codification of 
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determinate lexicons in dictionaries and formal grammatical rules – helps provide a means of 
explaining speech acts as the output of a law-governed psycho-physiological process. On the other 
hand, intellectualism begins from the already constituted thoughts or ideas, which appear to come 
apart from any particular linguistic instantiations and to retreat into the ‘inner’ realm of the mind. 
Intellectualism thus arrives at the notion of a ‘pure’ ‘thought without speech’ (PhP, 196/231) that is 
responsible for, yet independent of, its external expression and the material instruments by which such 
expression is achieved. The activity of thinking, which is in fact accomplished in acts of expression, is 
overlooked in favour of the thoughts or ideas that were originally constituted by the creative activity of 
speaking subjects, and which subsequently became available as the contents of subsequent reflective or 
recollective acts. Merleau-Ponty highlights this mistake in the following passage: 
 
Thought is nothing “inner,” nor does it exist outside the world and outside of words. 
What tricks us here, what makes us believe in a thought that could exist for itself prior to 
expression, are the already constituted and already expressed thoughts that we can 
silently recall to ourselves and by which we give ourselves the illusion of an inner life. 
But in fact, this supposed silence is buzzing with words – this inner life is an inner 
language.  
(PhP, 188-9/223) 
 
Merleau-Ponty is thus led to draw an important distinction between thought or thinking as a 
fundamentally expressive activity and the ‘constituted’ and ‘expressed’ thoughts or ideas that are the 
ultimate achievement of this activity. This distinction certainly muddies the waters somewhat with 
respect to Dreyfus’ presentation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. We can see how the line of thought that 
culminates with the assertion of the tacit Cogito cannot be equated with the brand of foundationalism in 
the philosophy of mind espoused by Dreyfus. For Dreyfus, the activity of thought is wholly distinct 
from the foundational stratum of ‘coping’, and instead unfolds at the ‘upper stories’ of consciousness. 
In his effort to identify thinking with the expressive activity of speech, Merleau-Ponty refuses to 
identify the distinction that Dreyfus wants to insist upon between nonrational bodily coping and the 
wholly intellectual capacity of thought. As I argued in Chapter 2, what we in fact find here is an 
attempt by Merleau-Ponty to make available a conception of thought and of Dreyfus’ ‘upper stories’ 
that is not provided in the tradition. 
Corresponding to the distinction between thinking and thoughts, Merleau-Ponty differentiates between 
the determinate ‘conceptual significations’ of constituted language, and the ‘existential’ or ‘gestural 
signification’ that is immanent to those acts of linguistic expression in which thought is accomplished. 
In the experience of expression and communication, in which I first formulate my thoughts for myself 
or ‘receive’ those of others, I do not relate to words as mere signs that I must reflectively interpret in 
terms of the determinate significations that they commonly stand for. Instead, I find that ‘the sense of 
words must ultimately be induced by the words themselves, or more precisely their conceptual 
signification must be formed by drawing from a gestural signification, which itself is immanent in speech’ 
(PhP, 184/219). The expressive activity in which thought is originally accomplished unfolds according 
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to a kind of meaning that is other than the determinate significations of constituted language, such as 
one might find them in a dictionary and which appear to stand apart from the particular words 
correlated with them. As Merleau-Ponty describes it: 
 
speech or words carry a primary layer of signification that adheres to them and that gives 
the thought as a style, as an affective value, or as an existential mimicry, rather than as a 
conceptual statement. We discover here, beneath the conceptual signification of words, 
an existential signification that is not simply translated by them, but that inhabits them 
and is inseparable from them.  
(PhP, 188/222) 
 
 
iii. Speech as Gesture 
 
Merleau-Ponty christens this unreflective kind of signification ‘gestural’ because he considers it to be 
continuous with the manner in which silent gestures manage to express a sense that is immanent to a 
movement of the body. In perceiving the silent gestures of bodies like my own, it is not necessary that 
I reflectively constitute or discover a sense ‘behind’ their movements. It is not because I bring to bear, 
in an analogizing act, my own experiences of performing similar gestures, and the intentions that lay 
behind them, that the other’s movement has meaning for me. Instead, I am capable of perceiving the 
sense of their gesture as immediately present before me. For example, the red face, the tensed brow, 
the clenched fist, ‘does not make me think of anger, it is the anger itself’ (PhP, 190/225). Vitally, it is as 
an incarnate being, or body-subject that I am capable of immediately grasping the sense of the other’s 
gestures in this way, without recourse to an act of interpretation. The pre-reflective awareness I have 
of my body as a practical system of possible movements in the body schema is mirrored in the 
experience of another body like my own. My possibilities are reflected back to me by my perception of 
the other’s movements, and in this reflection I grasp the sense in the other’s gesture by ‘taking it up’ in 
my own body. In perceiving another’s gestures, their movement is grasped as a correlate of my own 
body or, to put it another way, their actuality is recognized as my own possibility. This thought is most 
concisely expressed in the following passage: 
 
Communication or the understanding of gestures is achieved through the reciprocity 
between my intentions and the other person’s gestures, and between my gestures and 
the intentions which can be read in the other person’s behaviour. Everything happens 
as if the other person’s intentions inhabited my body, or as if my intentions inhabited 
his body.  
(PhP, 190-1/225) 
 
This bodily grasping of a sense in the comprehension of another’s gestures is clearly continuous with 
the more general account of perceptual sens that was my focus in chapter 2. Merleau-Ponty himself 
acknowledges this continuity by affirming that ‘I understand the other person through my body, just as 
I perceive “things” through my body’ (PhP, 191-2/226). He also notes how the understanding of 
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gestural sense, as with perceptual sens more generally, is not arrived at via a reflective interpretation of 
the spectacle, but in ‘a sort of blind recognition that precedes the definition or intellectual elaboration 
of the sense’ (PhP, 192/227).  
With the assertion of a ‘gestural signification’ that is immanent to speech Merleau-Ponty seeks to 
account for linguistic expression and communication as thoroughly continuous with the 
comprehension of silent gestures. Beyond simply recognizing how speech, like the gesture, ‘sketches 
out its own sense’ (PhP, 192/226), Merleau-Ponty argues that linguistic expression itself is a gesture, and 
that it is therefore an essentially embodied act. It is the body, as a ‘natural power of expression’ (PhP, 
187/221), that either grasps or accomplishes a ‘thought in speech’ by virtue of ‘taking up’ a sense that is 
immanent to words as they are utilized in speech acts. Just as the other’s anger is not ‘behind’ its 
gestural expression, thought is not discovered ‘behind’ its expression in words, and the gestural 
signification grasped in speech is the very ‘presence of this thought in the sensible world’ (PhP, 
187/222). Crucially, this process is presented as taking place ‘beneath’ the conceptual significations of 
constituted language. Indeed, such significations are themselves conditioned by the immanent sense of 
linguistic gestures, since they must be formed by ‘drawing from’ this primary, gestural signification. In 
this way, Merleau-Ponty takes himself to be providing a corrective to the intellectualist’s original error 
by which the significations of language are taken to be abstractable from their material means of 
expression.93 
 
 
iv. Speaking Speech and Spoken Speech 
 
All of this leads Merleau-Ponty to place a strong emphasis on truly creative uses of language in which 
novel thought is originally formulated, in contrast to the repetition or reiteration of ‘already constituted 
and already expressed thoughts’, in which the received conceptual significations of words are given 
priority. By the end of the chapter, he captures this contrast in terms of a fundamental distinction 
between ‘a speaking speech and a spoken speech’ (PhP, 202/238). Speaking speech (parole parlante) is the act 
of an individual who brings an aspect of himself or his world to expression for the first time. It is an 
activity that is truly constitutive of thought. It is this that a return to the phenomenon of speech forces 
us to acknowledge, and to which the gestural account is intended to apply, since it is in speaking speech 
that thought is originally given as a ‘style’ rather than as a conceptual statement. On the other hand, to 
engage in spoken speech (parole parlée) is to stick to the already constituted, conventional significations 
of one’s language. It is therefore not to ‘think for oneself’, as it were, in as much as thought is to be 
identified, for Merleau-Ponty, with the effort of creative linguistic expression. Rather, spoken speech 
evokes the ‘already expressed thoughts’ achieved by past acts of speaking speech. We are, claims 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 We can also appreciate how the gestural account begins to apply the general thesis concerning meaning and understanding that was arrived 
at in the study of perceptual sens in the philosophy of language. There is a meaning and understanding of words that is not the outcome of an 
act of interpretation or judgement. This is the most vital insight of the gestural account of speech, and one that we can see Merleau-Ponty 
seeking to accommodate as he develops his thinking about language and expression after Phenomenology of Perception.  
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Merleau-Ponty, often misled by this ‘already instituted’ speech, and as a result are blind to the original 
condition of its possibility:  
 
We live in a world where speech is already instituted. We possess in ourselves already 
formed significations for all of these banal words. They only give rise in us to second-
order thoughts, which are in turn translated into other words that require no genuine 
effort of expression from us, and that will demand no effort of comprehension from our 
listeners. The linguistic and intersubjective world no longer causes us any wonder, we no 
longer distinguish it from the world itself, and we reflect within a world already spoken 
and speaking.  
(PhP, 189/224) 
 
Merleau-Ponty often illustrates the distinction by way of some favoured examples of speaking 
speech. These include ‘the child who learns to speak’, ‘the writer’ or novelist (PhP, 189/224), ‘the lover 
who discovers his emotion’, ‘“the first man who spoke”’ and ‘the philosopher’ who is described, in a 
particularly Husserlian tone, as awakening ‘a primordial experience beneath traditions’ (PhP, 
530n7/218n1). The essential commonality between these otherwise heterogeneous cases is that they 
each involve the transformation of ‘a certain silence into speech’ (PhP, 189/224), in contrast to 
instances of spoken speech, which simply recycle already instituted acts of speech. On the gestural 
account, then, speaking speech is that bodily gesture – of which philosophers are too often ignorant – 
which brings a previously silent aspect of experience to expression for the first time. For Merleau-
Ponty, the recognition of this expressive activity is vital: 
 
Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we do not return to this origin, so 
long as we do not rediscover the primordial silence beneath the noise of words, and so 
long as we do not describe the gesture that breaks this silence. 
(PhP, 190/224) 
 
We can think, as Baldwin does, of the relationship between speaking speech and spoken speech in 
terms of dependency (Baldwin, 2007). There is an absolute dependency of spoken speech upon the 
creative endeavours of speaking speech. It is successful acts of speaking speech that originally institute 
the significations that are utilized in spoken speech – i.e. the determinate ‘conceptual’ significations of 
constituted language. Merleau-Ponty describes this relationship in terms of the Husserlian notion of 
‘sedimentation’. ‘Authentic’ acts of speech (i.e. speaking speech), in being understood and taken up by 
other members of a linguistic community, gradually come to shape the overarching system of language. 
The cultural edifice of language is thus nothing more than the historically formed and continually 
developing ‘depository’ of acts of speaking speech (PhP, 202/238): 
 
the act of expression constitutes a linguistic and cultural world, it makes that which 
stretched beyond fall back into being. This results in spoken speech, which enjoys the 
use of available significations like that of an acquired fortune. From these acquisitions, 
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other authentic acts of expression – those of the writer, the artist, and the philosopher – 
become possible.  
(PhP, 203/239) 
 
 
3.3 The Silent and the Spoken 
 
i. Speaking Speech and the Tacit Cogito 
 
We are now in a position to connect up the Phenomenology’s account of speech with the assertion of the 
tacit Cogito, and with the difficulties discussed in Section 3.2. Firstly, we can see how the idea of the tacit 
Cogito is continuous with the identification of speaking speech as a bodily gesture. It is the body that 
actualizes every expressive intention, and in doing so accomplishes thought. The body is thus 
responsible for breaking the ‘primordial silence’ of its world and its life by bringing some aspect of it to 
expression for the first time. It is this silence that resurfaces in Merleau-Ponty’s later description of the 
tacit Cogito as a ‘silent Cogito’ or ‘primordial I’; an unreflective ‘contact’ with oneself that holds ‘prior to 
every speech’. In Section 3.1, I concluded that this self-relation is realized in the body’s engagement with 
the world in perception, and we can now see how this coincides with the place Merleau-Ponty accords 
the body in speaking speech, since it is the silent Cogito ‘which animates and directs all of the expressive 
operations’. Indeed, this point is explicitly reiterated in the ‘The Cogito’ chapter itself: 
 
Our body, insofar as it is inseparable from a perspective and is this very perspective 
brought into existence, is the condition of … all of the expressive operations and of all 
of the acquisitions that constitute the cultural world  
(PhP, 408/448) 
 
The concept of speaking speech, and its contrast with spoken speech, also sheds further light upon 
Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the tacit Cogito and the merely ‘spoken’ Cogito he finds in 
Descartes’ Meditations. Merleau-Ponty argues that the thought encountered in reading Descartes is 
‘myself as an idea that is not, strictly speaking, my own’, and this is because ‘I have only grasped my 
existence through the medium of language’ (PhP, 422/462). The Cartesian Cogito is ‘spoken’, then, since 
Descartes articulates it by means of already acquired significations of constituted language. For the 
same reason, it will always ‘fail to reach its goal’ insofar as it is the creative endeavor of speaking speech 
that is truly synonymous with the activity of thinking. Speaking speech is not determined by the 
conceptual significations of language, since it is the original condition of their very possibility. I cannot, 
therefore, by means of these already constituted significations, meet up with myself in the act of 
thinking, because to think is to engage in genuinely creative expression precisely by interrupting or 
destroying the established significations of language. Hence, in leading up to the assertion of the tacit 
Cogito, we find Merleau-Ponty explicitly reiterating his earlier account of a ‘thought in speech’ that is 
accomplished in creative expression: 
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We are called to uncover beneath [the] thought which basks in its acquisitions and 
[which] is merely a stopping point in the indefinite process of expression, a thought that 
attempts to establish itself and that only does so by bending the resources of constituted 
language to a new usage.  
(PhP, 409/450, edited translation) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the contrast between the tacit Cogito and Descartes’ Cogito serves as an invitation 
to ‘pass from the idea to the practice of the Cogito’ (PhP, 423/463) – i.e., from the spoken to the speaking 
Cogito. It is this transition that is prefigured in his earlier emphasis on the activity of speaking speech as 
the ultimate ground of the constituted significations of language. This activity is precisely not that of a 
‘second-order’ thought that is wholly governed by acquired significations. Despite Descartes’ efforts, 
this original activity of thinking ‘cannot be thought and must rather be revealed’ (PhP, 426/466) – i.e., 
thinking cannot be identified with an object of thought. It is just such a revelation that Merleau-Ponty 
sees the phenomenological disclosure of speech and expression as having achieved. With the gestural 
account, Merleau-Ponty establishes that the body serves as a kind of hinge or pivot between the silent, 
‘primordial’ world of perception and the acquired or spoken world reckoned with via constituted 
language, since ‘it is the body that shows, that speaks’ (PhP, 203/239). The body is thus the primary 
condition of thought and of the spoken Cogito, and the ‘contact’ with oneself that defines the tacit Cogito 
is realized in the body’s practical-perceptual engagement with the world. 
 
 
ii. The Proper Problem  
 
We can see, then, how the assertion of the tacit Cogito is the culmination of a line of thought that is 
already operative in the gestural account of speech. Merleau-Ponty’s overarching aim here coincides 
with the Phenomenology as a whole in its effort to liberate philosophy from ‘the classical subject-object 
dichotomy’. The study of speech, expression, and self-consciousness constitutes a particularly 
significant region of this project, however, since it allows Merleau-Ponty to directly renounce the 
intellectualist, Cartesian conception of thought and the thinking subject. By placing the expressive 
dimension of the body at the center of this renunciation, Merleau-Ponty hopes to consolidate his study 
of speech and expression with his more general phenomenological elucidation of operative 
intentionality or ‘being-in-the-world’. This is apparent in the following passage, in which Merleau-
Ponty explicitly describes the subject of the tacit Cogito: 
 
This subjectivity does not constitute the world, it catches a glimpse of the world around 
itself, like a field that it has not given to itself; it does not constitute the word, it speaks 
in the manner that one sings when one is joyful; nor does it constitute the sense of the 
word, for this sense springs forth for subjectivity in its commerce with the world and 
with the others who inhabit it 
(PhP, 426/465) 
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Yet it is with this disclosure of a ‘consciousness that conditions language’ (PhP, 426/465) which, as 
we have seen, originates with the gestural account of speech, that problems arise for Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought. As I outlined in Section 3.1, this becomes most acute with the assertion of the tacit Cogito, 
although we are now in a position to appreciate how the Phenomenology’s account of speech and 
expression is the true source of these problems.  
The crux of the matter here is the relationship Merleau-Ponty takes to hold between speaking speech 
and constituted language, which is constitutive of the already ‘spoken’ thoughts or ideas. One way to 
think of the problem here is offered by Thomas Baldwin. Baldwin suggests that, in claiming that 
language is nothing but the ‘depository’ of acts of speech, it looks as if Merleau-Ponty simply 
reintroduces a ‘new version’ (Baldwin, 2007: 93) of the subject-object dualism that he is explicitly 
attempting to overcome. As Baldwin explains, the dualism arises insofar as the expressive activity of 
the body in speaking speech is cast as the ultimate condition of linguistic significations. Conversely, this 
creative upsurge of speaking speech only appears to depend upon constituted language to the extent 
that it responds to a shortcoming or failure of the existing language to adequately capture some aspect 
of the world or of their life. The ‘spoken’, determinate significations of constituted language are 
presented ‘either as the sediment formed from the transformation of a creative speaking gesture into an 
established rule or as material to be ‘destroyed’ in the course of some new creative transcendence’ 
(Baldwin, 2007: 94). Thus, in one direction – from spoken to speaking – there is a relationship of total 
dependence that is not reciprocated in the other direction, and the contrast devolves into a sharp 
distinction between a wholly subjective act and the product it serves to constitute.  
For reasons outlined in Section 3.1, this dualism bears profound consequences for the outlook of 
Phenomenology of Perception as a whole. The explicit, conceptual representation and understanding of the 
world and of oneself that proceeds via the mediation of constituted language – i.e., the ‘spoken’ world – 
is held at a distance from the perceived world, which originally motivates acts of ‘authentic’ expression 
and thus determines their sense. The latter is a ‘silent’ world insofar as it evades the conceptual 
significations of constituted language. As Renaud Barbaras puts the problem, the spoken world – the 
‘intelligible’ world of ideality and of objective truth – takes on the appearance of ‘a specific world being 
superimposed on the perceptual world’ (Barbaras, trans. 2004: 44). As I noted above, with the gestural 
account, it is the body, as the agent of speaking speech, that is to act as the hinge between these two 
worlds. Yet the immanent, ‘gestural’ signification that Merleau-Ponty emphasizes here, in its continuity 
with silent gestures, is fundamentally of the perceptual order, beneath or beyond the conceptual 
significations of constituted language. Rather than bridging the gap between perception and language, 
speaking speech is effectively subsumed by perception or, as Barbaras puts it, expression is 
‘subordinated’ (Barbaras, trans. 2004: 47) to perception in the Phenomenology.  
The asymmetrical relation that Baldwin observes between the activity of speaking speech and the 
spoken significations of constituted language thus extends to the relationship between two ‘worlds’ or 
orders of meaning: perception and language. The ‘new version’ of dualism that this asymmetry 
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introduces culminates in the assertion of the tacit Cogito. With the tacit Cogito, Merleau-Ponty distances 
and holds apart the self-relation that is realized via the body’s perceptual, practical and expressive 
engagement with the world from the explicit, acquired significations of constituted language. Since it 
necessarily involves the intentional mediation of the world, the tacit Cogito certainly does not inaugurate 
the wholly ‘inner’ life of the Cartesian thinking subject. Yet it seems Merleau-Ponty is left committed to 
a picture of perception, with its silent contact with self, as a self-sufficient layer that, whilst making 
explicit or thetic self-consciousness, and the conceptual significations that mediate it, possible, remains 
unaltered by them. Once they have been established, communication between the two worlds appears 
fundamentally mysterious. We can now see how this picture is already prefigured in the gestural 
account of speech. 
 
 
iii. The Need for Interdependence 
 
The problem faced by the gestural account, at least as it is initially formulated in Phenomenology of 
Perception, is that it appears incapable of properly accounting for the role played by constituted language 
in making novel expression possible. To do so would be to accommodate a full-blooded interdependence 
of speaking and spoken, and to leave behind the problematic asymmetry. Yet the sense of speaking 
speech is above all a ‘bodily meaning’ (Besmer, 2007: 38), with its primary condition being the 
‘signifying function’ of the body, and it is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty sees the gestural 
signification of speaking speech as proceeding beneath the conceptual significations of constituted 
language. Merleau-Ponty does, albeit briefly, acknowledge the place of already available significations in 
facilitating acts of novel expression, and in doing so articulates a vital divergence from the silent 
gesture. Whilst the sense of the silent gesture unfolds and remains rooted in the immediately available 
perceptual scene, the ‘verbal gesture’ is different, since it 
 
intends a mental landscape that is not straightaway given to everyone, and it is precisely 
its function to communicate this landscape. But culture here offers what nature does not 
provide. Available significations, namely, previous acts of expression, establish a 
common world between speaking subjects to which current and new speech refers, just 
as the gesture refers to the sensible world. And the sense of speech is nothing other than 
the manner in which it handles this linguistic world, or in which it modulates upon this 
keyboard of acquired significations. 
(PhP, 192/227) 
 
By intending a mental landscape, beyond the ‘natural’ landscape of perception, speech has a sense 
that transcends its sensible manifestation. In order to achieve this, speech must make use of the 
established concepts, conventions and rules that are shared by others in virtue of their possession of a 
common language. The difficulty with the Phenomenology’s discussion of speech, however, is that it is 
very difficult to see how the utilization of constituted language in this way does not simply fall into the 
class of derivative, ‘second-hand’ activity that defines spoken speech. This is because Merleau-Ponty 
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describes the gestural signification of speaking speech in direct contrast to the significations of 
constituted language. He needs to account for the way in which the sense of speaking speech is 
constituted and grasped by means of acquired significations, rather than in opposition to them. 
The above passage certainly demonstrates that Merleau-Ponty is sensitive to this facet of speech, but 
the gestural account is not sufficiently developed to be able to make good sense of it. We can trace this 
failing back to Merleau-Ponty’s introduction of the ‘primordial’ body as the proper subject of speech. 
Crucially, he identifies constituted language and the ‘already expressed’ thoughts it constitutes as the 
source of the intellectualist’s error, since they mask the original, creative labour of speech. The subject 
of authentic speech is therefore held apart from constituted language, and Merleau-Ponty falls back on 
a description of the body as enjoying a ‘natural’ or ‘primordial’ life entirely beneath cultural traditions. 
Thus, in achieving its primary goal – i.e., to overcome intellectualism and, in so doing, leave behind the 
traditional subject-object dualism – the gestural account of speech has left Merleau-Ponty unable to 
coherently accommodate a vital aspect of all speech, including speaking speech.94 The gestural account, 
at least as it is formulated in Phenomenology of Perception, is insufficiently capable of recognizing how the 
conceptual significations of constituted language introduce a cultural and historical conditioning of the act 
of speech itself. This is the weight of a linguistic and cultural tradition, which outstrips the ‘natural’ or 
‘primordial’ dimension of the lived body that is the primary focus of the gestural account.95  
Indeed, this ‘primordial’, embodied engagement with the world that remains untouched by the 
acquisition of language is called into question by Merleau-Ponty’s recognition of a cultural and 
historical conditioning of speech acts in the passage at PhP, 192, above. If the significative intention 
exercised in speech is itself conditioned by one’s language, then the silence that is ‘transformed’ in a 
new act of expression must itself have been made available by the heretofore ‘acquired’ significations 
and expressive practices of the subject’s language. Hence this silence could not be held apart from the 
‘thickness’ of cultural acquisitions that have been amassed across a continually developing historical 
tradition. A full account of the role of language in facilitating novel expression would therefore take 
Merleau-Ponty beyond the notion of a foundational ‘primordial’ engagement with the world that 
unfolds ‘beneath’ or ‘beyond’ the spoken world of constituted language. The consciousness that 
‘conditions’ language – the ‘silent’ engagement with the world in which the tacit Cogito is realized – 
would not constitute a self-sufficient foundation of expression that subsists outside of constituted 
language, but would instead be involved in a dialectical relationship with it. 
By the time of his death, such a renunciation of his earlier thinking seems to have become explicit in 
Merleau-Ponty’s own work, as the working note cited at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates. In 
a subsequent working note dated February 1959, having criticized the Phenomenology’s account of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Kirk Besmer also recognizes this point, noting that the discussion of speech offered in the Phenomenology ‘is a fruitful way to highlight the 
shortcomings of intellectualist theories of language, but it is less successful as a complete theory of language on its own’ (Besmer, 2007: 46). 
95  I consider the issue here to be a case of the Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about expression, speech, and language requiring further 
consideration and development, rather than it being a categorical failure. This is evidenced by the notable heterogeneity of Merleau-Ponty’s 
favoured examples of speaking speech, especially his interest in the expressive labour of ‘the first man who spoke’, and the anthropological 
origins of language. The fact of the matter is that such an originary act was fundamentally different in kind to a contemporary act of speech, 
which is conditioned by an already constituted system of language that has accumulated over the course an entire history of linguistic 
practices. At the time of Phenomenology of Perception, this kind of difference was inadequately accommodated in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking.  
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tacit Cogito, he notes how ‘the very description of silence rests entirely on the virtues of language’ (VI, 
179/230), and thus that: 
 
There would be needed a silence that envelops the speech anew, after one has come to 
recognize that speech enveloped the alleged silence of the psychological coincidence. 
What will this silence be? … [It] will not be the contrary of language.  
(VI, 179/230)  
 
The remaining two chapters will trace the development of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about speech and 
language after the publication of Phenomenology of Perception in 1945. Ultimately, I seek to understand how 
Merleau-Ponty manages to move away from the line of thought that I have problematized here. 
Chapter 4 will attend to Merleau-Ponty’s ‘middle period’, during which time he worked on the 
manuscript of The Prose of the World. It is during this time, in which Merleau-Ponty made extensive use 
of Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist linguistics, that an interdependence between speaking speech 
and spoken speech is made feasible within his thinking. Chapter 5 will then turn to the final writings in 
order to appreciate how the kind of constitutive foundationalism found to be present in Phenomenology of 
Perception is explicitly renounced, and how Merleau-Ponty was beginning to move beyond this way of 
thinking at the time of his death in 1961.  
	  112  
  
	  113  
4. 
Language as the Body of Thought:  
Merleau-Ponty’s Middle Period 
 
 
Following the publication of Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty sought to continue and develop 
his thinking about ‘the phenomenon of expression’, language, and truth. In a letter to Martial Geuroult 
in 1952, Merleau-Ponty expressed his intention that this investigation was to culminate in the 
production of two volumes: Introduction to the Prose of the World and The Origin of Truth (PriP, 8-9). Sadly, 
Merleau-Ponty was unable to complete either of the proposed works, with the first seemingly set aside 
in the late 1950s in favour of the second, which would eventually mutate into The Visible and the Invisible 
before itself being cut short by Merleau-Ponty’s death at the age of 53 in May 1961 (Lefort, trans. 
1974).  
As its title suggests, the nature of the relationship between perception and thought, along with 
cognate questions such as the relation of mind and body, the experience and understanding of others, 
and the relationship between real and ideal objects, is at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking in The 
Visible and the Invisible. It is in returning to these issues that Merleau-Ponty famously introduces a new 
and intriguing lexicon of ‘the flesh’ (la chair) to his philosophy. It remains difficult, however, to find a 
comprehensive and complete articulation of what Merleau-Ponty takes to be the proper relationship 
between perception, language and thought in these final pages. Indeed, James Edie goes so far as to 
cite this issue as ‘the primary, unresolved problem’ (Edie, 1987: 37) of Merleau-Ponty’s entire 
philosophy.  
One claim that is clearly advocated in The Visible and the Invisible is that the ‘pure ideality’ reckoned 
with in thought (the ‘invisible’) should not be understood as somehow ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the visible, 
sensible world. Instead, Merleau-Ponty seeks to show that thought must be understood as implicated 
in a dialectical development of the perceptual meaning that we grasp through our embodied 
engagement with the world in perception. Crucially, it is language that makes such a development 
possible. Through language, thought continues and develops the disclosure of the world that begins 
with the ‘mute’ perception of the pre-linguistic child. Language, he writes, ‘slips through ways it has 
not traced, transfigures horizons it did not open’ (VI, 152/198). This is possible, claims Merleau-
Ponty, because language shares a common nature with the perceiving body. It is this nature that the 
new concept of ‘flesh’ is intended to signify, and thus we find Merleau-Ponty offering the following, 
tentative statement of his position: 
 
It is as though the visibility that animates the sensible world were to emigrate, not outside 
of every body, but into another less heavy, more transparent body, as though it were to 
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change flesh, abandoning the flesh of the body for that of language, and thereby would 
be emancipated but not freed from every condition.  
(VI, 153/198) 
 
Whilst this claim is certainly provocative, it is frustratingly vague in equal measure, having the 
appearance of a mere metaphor. Unfortunately, this vagueness is hardly alleviated in what was 
completed of The Visible and the Invisible, and the position is little developed beyond a bare statement. 
Nonetheless, I take there to be a great deal of philosophical labour lying behind Merleau-Ponty’s talk 
of language as a species of embodiment, or ‘flesh’, much of which he undertook during his middle 
period work in the philosophy of language. My aim in what follows is to provide an elucidation of this 
work that should allow us both to trace the development of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about language 
after 1945 whilst in turn providing valuable insight into the approach Merleau-Ponty was beginning to 
take to the relationship between perception and thought in his late period work. I shall then turn, in 
the following chapter, to the position Merleau-Ponty was arriving at in his final writings.96 
As I have already noted, the research Merleau-Ponty conducted between 1945 and the late 1950s did 
not culminate in the publication of a single book-length treatise to follow Phenomenology of Perception. For 
this reason, ascertaining the shape of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about language at this time requires the 
pulling together of various different materials from the period, including course outlines and notes 
from Merleau-Ponty’s time at the Sorbonne and the Collège de France, the unfinished manuscript of 
Introduction to the Prose of the World, and several essays on language, expression, and aesthetics from this 
period that saw publication during Merleau-Ponty’s lifetime. Despite requiring such a reconstruction, 
however, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s work during the middle period of his career contains the 
articulation of a cohesive and original position in the philosophy of language; a position that I take to 
be at work as he was developing his later reflections on the relationship between perception and 
thought. In his middle period, Merleau-Ponty develops a philosophy of language that I believe is best 
understood as a continued development of the philosophy of embodiment he famously advanced in 
Phenomenology of Perception. Whilst Phenomenology of Perception sought to disclose the way in which the 
perceiving subject is an embodied subject, the middle period writings seek to disclose the way in which 
‘[t]hought inhabits language and language is its body’ (CAL, 102). This chapter thus attempts to 
elucidate the claim that we can understand one’s own language as a form of embodiment as it is 
developed in Merleau-Ponty’s middle period writings. 
It is important to note how the application of embodiment to language was already initiated in 
Phenomenology of Perception. There is of course the obvious sense in which the gestural account of speech 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 A further quality of such an elucidation is that it supports the thesis that there is a strong continuity to the development of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought throughout his career, in contrast to the view that his final writings constitute any kind of significant break with his earlier work. 
(Schmidt, 1985: 9) briefly catalogues some of those who view Merleau-Ponty’s final writings as constituting such a break with his earlier work. 
In taking what follows to count against such an interpretation, I see it as offering additional support to the readings offered by (Taminaux, 
1972), (Low, 1992), (Low, 2009) and (Dillon, 1997) who cast Merleau-Ponty’s thought as more of an organically developing whole. Whilst 
this issue hangs on more than just Merleau-Ponty’s approach to language, its centrality to his research in the years after the publication of 
Phenomenology of Perception does make it of great significance when deciding on the nature of his philosophical development over the course of 
his career. Indeed, (Barbaras, trans. 2004) and (Lawlor, 2003) each appeal to developments in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about language as a 
crucial source of the ‘rupture’ between his early and late works. 
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introduces a corporeal dimension to linguistic expression by equating speech with bodily gestures, and 
we have seen how the execution of this claim in Phenomenology of Perception was ultimately problematic.  
Something that is much less often acknowledged, however, is that in Phenomenology of Perception’s 
discussion of speech Merleau-Ponty begins to extend his account of perceptual sens to the philosophy 
of language. It is here that we begin to discover a richer sense of embodiment with respect to language. 
The assertion of a dialectical interdependence between meaning and word, thought and expression, 
mirrors Merleau-Ponty’s account of the very same kind of interdependence between perception and 
the phenomenal body. For Merleau-Ponty, thought is born and develops in speech just as perception is 
born and develops in the living mass of the body. The only commentator to have heretofore made this 
connection explicitly is Don Ihde, who on this basis asserts that ‘Merleau-Ponty’s whole theory of 
language is one of embodiment’ (Ihde, 1973: 169). Whilst I certainly concur with Ihde’s reading, I 
believe he fails to explore the true richness of his own interpretative thesis, since he offers it solely with 
respect to the arguments found in Phenomenology of Perception regarding the immanence of meaning to 
speech. As we shall see, in order to disclose the full significance of Ihde’s interpretative thesis, one 
must attend to Merleau-Ponty’s middle period work. 
Section 4.1 begins by unpacking what I take to be the key changes instigated during Merleau-Ponty’s 
middle period work on language. I shall explain how these developments arise in Merleau-Ponty’s 
writing in light of his newfound enthusiasm for, and idiosyncratic appropriation of, Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics. I shall also attend to the ways in which these developments can 
be understood to parallel central features of the account of embodiment offered in Phenomenology of 
Perception. Section 4.2 will then consider how the developments of Section 4.1 facilitate a further 
significant parallel with the earlier account of embodiment as we turn to the place of language in 
intersubjective experience and the understanding of others. Finally, Section 4.3 will consider how the 
developments of the middle period can be understood as making positive advances in relation to the 
difficulties that the Phenomenology’s discussion of speech and expression engendered for the work as a 
whole. In particular, we begin to see how an interdependence of speaking speech and spoken speech is 
accommodated by the Saussurian developments of the middle period. I suggest that it is this 
interdependence that allows Merleau-Ponty to speak of an operative language, in a sense that connects 
immediately with the conception of operative intentionality developed in Phenomenology of Perception.  
 
 
4.1 The Influence of Saussure 
 
i. Merleau-Ponty’s Enthusiasm for Saussure 
 
Whilst the gestural account of speech paves the way for thinking about language in terms of 
embodiment, it is certainly not without its difficulties. For my purposes, I shall focus on a worry with 
the approach to language taken in Phenomenology of Perception that would appear to play a key role in 
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motivating the changes Merleau-Ponty brings about in his work on language after 1945. For the 
gestural account of speech, each and every act of creative or novel linguistic expression (speaking 
speech) is dependent upon a pre- or extra-linguistic gestural stratum. The body is therefore the 
fundamental condition of linguistic meaning or, as Besmer phrases it, ‘the meaning that is developed in 
all speech … is primarily a bodily meaning’ (Besmer, 2007: 38). We have already seen how this aspect 
of the gestural account puts it in tension with some of the claims Merleau-Ponty is understandably 
drawn to make concerning the cultural and historical conditioning of creative expression and the 
constitution of novel thought.97 We can see one such claim already figuring in the description offered 
of the relationship that holds between speaking and spoken speech at PhP, 203, quoted in Chapter 3, 
above. Merleau-Ponty here proposes an interdependence of speaking and spoken speech: the creative 
act of speaking speech ‘results’ in spoken speech insofar as it is taken up as an acquisition, which in 
turn comes to make possible further instances of speaking speech. It is difficult to see how the gestural 
account of speech is able to accommodate such interdependence, however, due to the manner in 
which it sees speaking speech as fundamentally conditioned by the body. With the gestural account, 
the overriding picture is of speaking speech as the bringing to expression of a ‘primordial experience 
beneath traditions’ (PhP, 530n7/218n1) – i.e., the linguistic expression of a sub- or pre-linguistic meaning. 
This makes it difficult to conceive of a true interdependence between speaking and spoken speech, 
since speaking speech would seem to be dependent upon spoken speech only insofar as spoken speech 
is unable to capture our pre-linguistic or ‘primordial’ experience, or at least some aspect of it, and as 
such must be supplanted by a new act of expression. The root of this worry would appear to be the 
manner in which the gestural account effectively equates linguistic meaning with bodily meaning by 
attempting to understand speech as thoroughly continuous with silent bodily gestures. Thus, Merleau-
Ponty effectively denies himself the proper resources with which to account for the cultural and 
historical conditioning of language and linguistic expression. I think we can see an attempt to deal with 
this difficulty as a main driving force behind the changes Merleau-Ponty makes in his thinking about 
language after Phenomenology of Perception.   
The most significant difference in Merleau-Ponty’s work on language after 1945 is the emergence of 
a resolute (albeit idiosyncratic) enthusiasm for Saussurian linguistics, which itself then serves as the 
catalyst for other developments. Whilst the famous Saussurian distinction between ‘language’ (la langue 
– i.e., a rule-governed objective system of signs) and ‘speech’ (la parole – i.e., the concrete instances of 
language-use by individual speech acts) is alluded to in Phenomenology of Perception, it is only afterwards 
that it comes to exert a pronounced influence on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of language.98 The 
earliest published expression of a deep enthusiasm for Saussure’s work comes in a paper entitled ‘The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 It is also, as Besmer notes, at odds with claims Merleau-Ponty wants to make that would seem to ascribe language a privileged status, such 
as his assertion that ‘speech installs in us the idea of truth as the presumptive limit of its effort’ (PhP, 196/231).  
98Merleau-Ponty’s idiosyncratic understanding of Saussure’s work is present even in this passing allusion (PhP, 202/238). Merleau-Ponty talks 
of a distinction between ‘language’ (langage) and ‘speech’ (parole). Saussure’s own distinction is between la langue and la parole. For Saussure, 
langage is the overarching term for all aspects of language and linguistic communication, of which langue and parole are two distinct aspects. A 
more detailed discussion of the accuracy of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Saussure is pursued by (Schmidt, 1985), and (Hass, 2008). 
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Metaphysical in Man’, which was first published in the 1948 collection Sense and Non-sense. Here, he 
states that 
 
…Saussure’s linguistics legitimates, in the study of language – beyond the perspective 
of causal explanation which links each fact with a previous fact and thus spreads 
language out before the linguist like a natural object – the perspective of the speaking 
subject who lives in his language (and who may in some cases change it). From the 
first point of view, language is a mosaic of facts with no “interior”; from the second, 
in contrast, it is a totality.  
(SNS, 87/152)99 
 
What is clear from this passage is that Merleau-Ponty considers Saussurian linguistics to be offering a 
theoretical framework that his own thinking about language can exploit. As we have seen, it was 
precisely the absence of ‘the perspective of the speaking subject’ that Merleau-Ponty diagnosed as the 
basic error of both empiricist and intellectualist approaches in Phenomenology of Perception. It was in 
seeking to correct this error that he arrived at the gestural account of speech. He now sees Saussure’s 
linguistics as legitimating, and indeed facilitating, the effort to account for the speaking subject’s 
perspective.100  
Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Saussurian principles is far from straightforward, however. Indeed, 
it is far from clear that Saussure would recognize such a legitimation in his own work. This is not least 
because Saussure introduces the distinction between language and speech in order to define the proper 
object of linguistics as languages – i.e., impersonal semiological systems. For Saussure, the utilization of 
such a system in individual speech acts is to be omitted from the investigations of the linguist, who 
defers a study of speech to the sciences proper to it: phonology, anatomy, and physiology (CGL, 18). 
How is it, then, that Merleau-Ponty views Saussure’s work in such a positive light that he seeks to 
appropriate it in his own concern with the perspective of the speaking subject? In answering this 
question, I emphasize the two features of Saussurian linguistics that most clearly inform the 
development of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of language: i) its account of language as a holistic system, 
and ii) its conception of this system as in a certain sense dynamic. I shall also detail why Merleau-
Ponty’s appropriation of each of these features in his philosophy of language constitutes a significant 
parallel, within his thought, between one’s own language and one’s own body.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Shortly after the publication of Sense and Non-sense, Merleau-Ponty delivered a series of lecture courses on child psychology at the Sorbonne. 
These courses – especially those on language acquisition and communication – further exhibit Merleau-Ponty’s enthusiasm for Saussurian 
linguistics at this point in his career. For reasons of space, I cannot discuss Merleau-Ponty’s work on child psychology here, although 
(Silverman, 1979) and (Welsh, 2013) provide detailed discussions of the content of the Sorbonne lecture courses. 
100 An undoubted influence on Merleau-Ponty’s appeal to the speaking subject that I do not discuss in the present chapter is Husserl. In 
‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’ (PriP, 43-95), Merleau-Ponty claims that Husserl moved away from his pursuit, first offered in the 
Logical Investigations, of a universal grammar or ‘eidetic of language’, as he began to acknowledge the importance of the individual speaking 
subject’s experience of language. It is also in Husserl that we find a notion of a ‘linguistic living body [Sprachleib]’ of psychic structures (OG, 
358). Chapter 5 offers a more thematic discussion of certain aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s continued engagement with Husserl after 
Phenomenology of Perception. 
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ii. Language as a Holistic System 
Saussurian linguistics pursues an analysis of language as a differential or diacritical system of signs. 
Saussure arrives at this by beginning with a conception of the linguistic sign as a unity of a signified 
(concept) and a signifier (sound image). The multiplicity of different languages leads Saussure to assert 
that the relationship between signified and signifier must be an entirely arbitrary one, since any number 
of distinct signifiers can be used, across a range of languages, to signify the same concept. Since the 
sign is nothing other than the signifying relationship, Saussure concludes that ‘the linguistic sign is 
arbitrary’ (CGL, 67), which is to say that the constitution of signs is entirely a result of the conventions 
that a given linguistic community tacitly accepts.  
Without further qualification, however, a definition of the sign as a unity of concept and sound-image 
is incomplete and, states Saussure, ‘grossly misleading’ (CGL, 113). Such a definition isolates the sign 
from the wider system of the language. This gets things backwards, since ‘it is from the interdependent 
whole that one must start and through analysis obtain its elements’ (CGL, 113). For Saussure, the value 
a given sign has for a linguistic community must be understood as implicated in the relations it holds 
with all the other terms of the language. As such, we cannot adequately analyze a sign in isolation from 
the wider system of language, since it would be impossible to ascertain its value. A well-known example 
Saussure himself offers is that the French word ‘mouton’ and the English word ‘sheep’, when 
considered in isolation from their respective systems of language, can each signify the same concept. 
The two words do not hold the same value in the respective languages, however, since ‘mouton’ 
continues to be used in French to speak of the kind of meat that in English is referred to by the word 
‘mutton’. For Saussure this difference in value between ‘mouton’ and ‘sheep’ is due to the different 
relations the two words hold with the other parts of their respective languages – i.e., ‘the fact that sheep 
has beside it a second term while the French word does not’ (CGL, 116). Saussure generalizes from 
such cases to the thesis that the value of all signs in a given language is derived from their oppositive 
relations with other signs. As Saussure puts it, ‘whatever distinguishes one sign from the others 
constitutes it’ (CGL, 121). A given language is therefore nothing but a systematic totality of such 
relations.  
In ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’ (first published in 1952), Merleau-Ponty is 
unequivocal in his endorsement of this aspect of Saussure’s analysis: 
 
What we have learned from Saussure is that, taken singly, signs do not signify anything, and 
that each one of them does not so much express a meaning as mark a divergence of 
meaning between itself and other signs. Since the same can be said for all other signs, we 
may conclude that language is made of differences without terms; or more exactly, that the 
terms of language are engendered only by the differences which appear among them.  
(S, 39/49)101 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’ is a revised version of the third chapter of The Prose of the World. Whilst, as (Dillon, 1997) 
shows, there are some noteworthy differences between the two versions, the fact that Merleau-Ponty did see parts of The Prose of the World 
published lends support to its veracity as a reflection of his thought at this time.  
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This appropriation of Saussure’s analysis of language as a holistic system of differential relations now 
allows Merleau-Ponty to develop one of the basic tenets of the Phenomenology’s gestural account of 
speech – i.e., ‘the simple observation that the word has a sense’ (PhP, 182/216). For Saussure, words carry 
a meaning insofar as they are implicated in a wealth of meaningful relations with other signs. Thus, 
whilst it is the case that ‘taken singly, signs do not signify anything’, this is not because their meaning 
depends upon an association with pre-existing thoughts or ideas, but because individual signs are to be 
understood first and foremost as moments within the wider whole of the systematic structure of 
language and linguistic practice.  
It is surely of little surprise to find Merleau-Ponty expressing enthusiasm for the idea that language 
instantiates an ‘immanence of the whole in the parts’ (S, 41/51). As we saw in Chapter 2, throughout 
his earlier work on perception, Merleau-Ponty is profoundly influenced by Gestalt psychology’s 
emphasis on the manner in which perceptual phenomena involve structured wholes that are not simply 
the sum of their parts, but which in fact give the parts their sense for the perceiving subject. It is the 
Gestaltist principle that ‘the whole is other than the sum of its parts’ (Koffka, 1935: 176) that plays a 
central role in the phenomenological account of perceptual meaning or sens offered in Phenomenology of 
Perception. In Saussure, Merleau-Ponty now sees how this principle can also be applied in the study of 
language. The meaning of words is now ‘entirely involved in language’ (S, 42/53), and linguistic 
meaning comes to fruition in the systematic use that speaking subjects make of their language. Insofar 
as this use exemplifies the immanence of meaning in acts of linguistic expression, the analogy between 
speech and gesture remains intact (and Merleau-Ponty continues to draw the comparison in this way). 
Crucially, however, the appeal to Saussure’s analysis allows Merleau-Ponty to effectively jettison the 
idea that linguistic meaning is to be flatly equated with the meaning of silent bodily gestures.  
The analysis of language as a unified system also offers a means with which to more fully articulate 
the speaking subject’s relationship with his language. Whilst Saussure concerns himself solely with the 
objective study of language as an impersonal structure, for Merleau-Ponty this study calls for a 
corresponding investigation into the ‘other side’, as it were, of language. This is the ‘interior’ of 
language as it is lived through and utilized by individuals, and insofar as it ‘must surround each speaking 
subject, like an instrument with its own inertia, its own demands, constraints, and internal logic’ (SNS, 
87/153). Whilst he is keen to credit the inauguration of this ‘linguistics of speech’ (PW, 23/33) to 
Saussure, one could certainly read Merleau-Ponty to in fact be offering a critical rejoinder to the 
objective study of language Saussure proposes. Saussure deliberately excludes the perspective of 
individual language users from this study as part of the process of defining the proper object of the 
science of linguistics. As Paul Ricoeur puts it (playing with one of Saussure’s own analogies), the 
Saussurian study of language is equivalent to an account of ‘the rules of chess, without the moves, the 
game and the players’ (Ricoeur, 1967: 18). Crediting Saussure with the inauguration – in spite of himself – 
of the study of the ‘interior’ of language might thus be read as an overly deferential means of 
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expressing what Merleau-Ponty perceives to be absent from, and yet necessitated by, Saussure’s own 
work.102 
For Merleau-Ponty, Saussure’s objective linguistics offers vital insights that a phenomenological 
disclosure of the speaking subject’s perspective can utilize. Crucially, the implementation of signs in an 
expressive act does not require the reflective retrieval of words or phrases from a storehouse of 
memory. Merleau-Ponty takes Saussure to have demonstrated how the signification of signs considered 
in isolation is dependent upon their constitution as moments of the systematic whole of one’s 
language. Each sign ‘expresses only by reference to a certain mental equipment, to a certain 
arrangement of our cultural implements’ (S, 88/110). It is thus as a whole – as a diacritical system – 
that my language must be present to me and available to be utilized in speech acts. It is in offering an 
articulation of this presence that Merleau-Ponty explicitly parallels language with his earlier account of 
embodiment.  
We have already seen how, in Phenomenology of Perception, the relation to one’s own body was explored 
in terms of the body schema. The body schema serves to refer to the manner in which one’s own body 
is given not as an object or a set of objective facts, but as ‘an open system of an infinity of equivalent 
positions in different orientations’ (PhP, 102/129). Crucially, the body schema is not any kind of 
mental object or item,103 or a product of associations. It is instead to be understood as the very 
condition or ‘law’ that underpins and makes such associations possible. It is this experience of the 
body schema that is central to the subject’s pre-reflective experience of her own bodily agency. For 
instance, in raising my arm, I need not represent to myself my arm’s current position, nor the 
movement required of it if the action is to be executed, nor any of the positions lying between my 
current situation and my goal. I move my arm in the same fashion that I know it – i.e., directly, with no 
mediators lying between the decision to move and the movement. Indeed, the body schema is defined 
by the manner in which one’s own body is given as the seat of motor possibilities. As Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, ‘my body appears to me as a posture toward a certain task, actual or possible’ (PhP, 102/129). 
In sum, it is the body schema through which the body is experienced as first and foremost a systematic 
medium of praxis, rather than as a mere object.  
In his effort to appropriate Saussure’s analyses into a phenomenological account of the speaking 
subject, it is clear that Merleau-Ponty seeks to trade on his earlier account of the body schema. We 
have already seen that Merleau-Ponty considers Saussure to have effectively demonstrated that 
linguistic signs must be present to the subject as part of a holistic system if they are to be utilizable in 
expressive acts. In this respect, the experience of language parallels that of the body schema, since they 
are both given to the subject holistically. Moreover, the phenomenology of speech mirrors that of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that Merleau-Ponty simply misinterpreted Saussure. This is certainly how James Schmidt 
sees things. Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Saussure, argues Schmidt, ‘was so idiosyncratic that it makes his notoriously loose readings of Husserl 
look like models of hermeneutic chastity’ (Schmidt, 1985: 105). How deliberately or cynically Merleau-Ponty bent Saussure’s work to his will 
perhaps forever remain an open question. Either way, it is in his deviations from the letter of Saussure’s thought that Merleau-Ponty hits 
upon what he clearly considers to be essential aspects of a phenomenological study of language. 
103 As (Matherne, 2014) clarifies, it is in this sense that the subject’s awareness of his body does not involve any ‘representations’ for Merleau-
Ponty. It remains confluent with a conception of representation that avoids positing representations as mental contents or objects (i.e., that 
avoids something like McDowell’s ‘master thesis’, discussed in Chapter 2, above).  
	  121  
bodily motricity and agency insofar as the organized system of linguistic signs is neither constituted nor 
maintained by an activity or faculty of judgement, but is pre-reflectively available to be called upon in 
the expression – or indeed, the accomplishment – of thought in speech. When I ‘recall’ words in 
speaking, there is no conscious act that is necessary to mediate between my significative intention and 
the speech act. Language, like the body, is given to the speaking subject in the mode of the “I am able 
to”, rather than of the “I think” (PhP, 139/171, S, 88/111) – i.e. it is not primarily an object of 
thought, but the systematic medium of an expressive praxis.  
It is in terms of this parallel that we can begin to appreciate what Merleau-Ponty speaks of as a ‘quasi-
corporeality of the signifying’ (S, 88/110). In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty elaborated the 
way in which the experience of one’s own body is itself a vital aspect of perception. At its core, 
perception involves what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the body’s ‘gearing into’ (PhP, 260-3/297-301) the 
sensible world as the setting of actual and possible behaviour. The perceived thing is not explicitly 
posited in an act of thinking or judging, but instead appears as ‘a structure available for inspection by 
the body’ (PhP, 334/376). The disclosure of the manner in which ‘external perception and perception 
of one’s own body vary together because they are two sides of a single act’ (PhP, 211/247) constitutes 
perhaps the defining feature of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, and his conception of 
operative intentionality such as it is applied there. In speaking of a ‘quasi-corporeality of the signifying’, 
Merleau-Ponty is proposing that the signifying relations involved in uses of language (both one’s own 
and those of others) are grasped in a manner that mirrors perceptual understanding. It is the immediate 
givenness of the holistic system of the subject’s body that at one and the same time puts her in touch 
with a sensible world that transcends her in perception. In the same manner, it is the immediate 
givenness of the holistic system of her language that at one and the same time puts her in touch with 
significations that transcend her in speech (both her own and that of others). We can see Merleau-
Ponty explicitly drawing this comparison in the following passage: 
 
On the condition that I do not reflect expressly upon it, my consciousness of my body 
immediately signifies a certain landscape about me, that of my fingers a certain fibrous 
or grainy style of the object. It is in the same fashion that the spoken word (the one I 
utter or the one I hear) is pregnant with a meaning which can be read in the very texture 
of the linguistic gesture  
(S, 89/110) 
 
iii. Language as a Dynamic System 
 
We have seen how Saussure’s linguistics offers Merleau-Ponty a means of understanding language as 
a systematic whole. This insight proves to be pivotal in the middle period work insofar as it allows 
Merleau-Ponty to apply some of the central features of his prior study of embodiment and perception 
to a phenomenological account of language. Saussure’s influence does not stop here, however. In 
Saussure’s work, Merleau-Ponty also discovers a means of appreciating the way in which language is a 
fundamentally dynamic system – i.e., a system that is susceptible to an active development through its use 
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by speaking subjects. As Merleau-Ponty develops this thought in his own, phenomenological account 
of language, I believe we can see him drawing still further from his earlier study of embodiment.  
Saussure himself explicitly acknowledges the mutability of languages over time, observing that 
‘[l]anguage is radically powerless to defend itself against the forces which from one moment to the 
next are shifting the relationship between the signified and the signifier’ (CGL, 75). In order to 
overcome the complications that this might have for linguistics as an objective science, Saussure 
distinguishes two perspectives from which the linguist can pursue his investigations: the diachronic and 
the synchronic. From the diachronic perspective, the linguist is able to map out the changes a linguistic 
system has undergone between given synchronic language states, which are longitudinal ‘slices’ in the 
history of the system. Whilst Merleau-Ponty enthusiastically appropriates this distinction from 
Saussure, it is not without qualification. What intrigues Merleau-Ponty most is not the flat 
juxtaposition of the two perspectives that Saussure offers, but the question of their relationship. If it is 
possible to observe changes in the structure of a given language between particular synchronic 
moments in its history, then it must be the case, argues Merleau-Ponty, that there is never a fully fixed 
and determinate structure, or Gestalt, of language. Like the body, it is never ‘completely constituted’ 
(PhP, 94/121, citing Husserl). Instead, language is revealed as a ‘Gestalt in movement’ (CAL, 100). 
What the viability of Saussure’s two perspectives teaches us is that the synchronic system codified by 
the linguist ‘never exists wholly in act but always involves latent or incubating changes’ (S, 87/109). 
In applying this revelation to a phenomenology of language, Merleau-Ponty argues that the speaking 
subject, through the expressive and communicative uses he makes of language, is able to actualize 
changes in the system of his language and thereby develop it.104 In advancing this line of thought, 
Merleau-Ponty rearticulates the distinction between speaking speech and spoken speech. Changes in 
the speaking subject’s system of language are instigated when the expression is successfully given to a 
novel or original thought – i.e., by speaking speech, be it his own or that of others.105 The new 
signification that the act of speaking speech embodies will then undergo a process of ‘sedimentation’, 
becoming available to the speaking subject insofar as it informs his future uses of language – i.e., it 
becomes spoken speech. This new signification is ‘acquired’ because it has instituted a change, however 
slight, in the diacritical relations that constitute the structure of the subject’s language. The speaking 
subject inherits a language whose structure he is not responsible for, but through the use he makes, 
both in expressing himself and understanding others, he is able to develop this system as his own.106 
Merleau-Ponty offers a concise expression of this thought in the following passage: 
 
I say that a signification is acquired and henceforth available when I have succeeded in 
making it dwell in a speech apparatus which was not originally destined for it. Of course 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104This claim appears to be in direct contradiction with Saussure himself. Saussure insists that, so far as the individual is concerned, the 
inherited linguistic system is fixed, and as such ‘the masses have no voice in the matter’ (CGL, 71). 
105 It is of course not only in such uses that the language might undergo changes. It remains susceptible to the kinds of impersonal or 
contingent historical alterations that arise out of wars, invasions, migrations, and the like.  
106It is this aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with structuralist linguistics that has earned him the title of ‘post-structuralist’. We should 
be clear what this means, however. As Hass points out, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of language does not reject structuralism, but instead 
‘“interrupts” the structure from within’ (Hass, 2008: 192).  
	  123  
the elements of this expressive apparatus did not really contain it – the French language 
did not, from the moment it was established, contain French literature; I had to throw 
them off center and recenter them in order to make them signify what I intended.  
(S, 91/114) 
 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, language is susceptible to a process of development that is instigated by the 
activity of the subject in utilizing her language. This thought, and Merleau-Ponty’s description of the 
process involved, provides another conspicuous parallel with his earlier account of embodiment. In 
particular, it evokes the discussion of bodily habits and skills offered in Phenomenology of Perception. In 
accounting for bodily habits and skills, Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the mutability of the individual’s 
body schema, describing the process of habit acquisition as ‘the reworking and renewal of the body 
schema’ (PhP, 143/177). If we are to be faithful to the nature of this process, maintains Merleau-Ponty, 
we must avoid accounting for it in terms of a faculty of ‘the understanding’ or as the achievement of 
an activity of ‘pure’ thinking. Instead, he argues that habit acquisition is a development of one’s own 
body through the very use one makes of it in practice. It is a more or less gradual appropriation of new 
motor possibilities: ‘the motor grasping of a motor signification’ (PhP, 144/178). 
For instance, through the acquisition of particular habits or skills, the apprentice rockclimber 
becomes aware of possibilities for action that were not previously available to her. The parts of her 
body have not altered, but her lived body – her body as a system of actual and possible actions – is 
being actively developed and more richly articulated via being put to new uses. Each of us develops 
our own bodily style through the various skills and habits that we acquire (or indeed lose) throughout 
our lives. Merleau-Ponty can now be seen to be applying this thought to language. In both cases, he is 
claiming that the individual is capable of instigating a development in the system without having to 
add, remove or alter any parts of it.107 Instead, the acquisition of new motor or linguistic significations 
can be achieved through the development of the relations that constitute the system. Crucially, this is 
not achieved by the activity of a ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental’ subjectivity that would be distinct from the 
body or language, but rather by the very utilization of the body and of language as media of motor and 
linguistic praxis.  
It is perhaps unsurprising that we find appeals throughout the middle period to the experience of the 
novelist, for whom creative linguistic expression is a perennial task. The novelist pursues his craft 
within a language that he shares with the rest of his linguistic community. Yet through his idiosyncratic 
use of this language, the writer is able to give new life to its words. Appropriating a phrase from André 
Malraux’s theory of painting, Merleau-Ponty describes the novelist as instigating a ‘coherent 
deformation’ (S, 78/97) of ordinary language insofar as he, perhaps only ever so slightly, alters the 
Gestalt of the system of his language, and in doing so deviates from the inherited meaning of words.108 
The novelist develops his style through his works by way of employing various literary devices, genres, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 The subject could, of course, add completely new words to her vocabulary or coin new words herself, but this is not a necessary condition 
of any development of her system of language.  
108 An insightful discussion (perhaps the only one in English) of Merleau-Ponty’s critical relationship with Malraux’s work can be found in 
(Johnson, 1993).  
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themes, character tropes, and narrative structures. Through this ‘apprenticeship to speech’ (TfL, 
17/28), he finds himself able to do new things with his language as new possibilities for linguistic 
expression gradually become available to him on the basis of his past successes. Through his 
expressive labour, the writer makes an impersonal language his own:  
 
If you wish, he destroys ordinary language, but by realizing it. The given language … is 
entirely ready to convert everything new he stands for as a writer into an acquisition. It is 
as if it had been made for him, and he for it; as if the task of speaking to which he has 
been devoted in learning the language were more deservedly he than his heart beat; and 
as if the established language called into existence, along with him, one of his 
possibilities.  
(S, 79/99) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the novelist’s use of language, and his mastery of its expressive power, does not 
involve anything that is fundamentally alien to the case of any other speaking subject. To have a 
language at all is to acquire an already constituted and impersonal system of signs by way of utilizing it 
oneself in acts of speech. Through the expressive effort of speaking speech, any individual speaking 
subject is capable of instigating developments in the system of her language, and thus acquiring new 
significations. As such, the insight that Merleau-Ponty (perhaps subversively) finds in Saussure – that 
language is a dynamic system – is intended to apply to any and all speaking subjects.  
 
 
4.2 Language and Intersubjectivity 
 
One might think that a rather serious worry emerges with Merleau-Ponty’s description of language as 
a dynamic system. If the speaking subject is capable of developing his language through the use he 
makes of it, does this not present an obstacle in the way of interpersonal understanding – i.e., 
communication? As a rule-governed social practice, conveying meaning through language requires that the 
individual abide by linguistic rules and conventions that are common to all members of her linguistic 
community. This fact would seem to be in tension with Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the individual is 
capable of instigating idiosyncratic developments in her language. How is it that these developments 
are communicable to others and not merely attenuations of a private language?  
In order to placate such a worry, it is necessary to appreciate Merleau-Ponty’s account of the role 
played by language in relating the individual to others, and his conception of linguistic communication. 
In doing so, I will elucidate a final connection between Merleau-Ponty’s middle period writings on 
language and his earlier account of embodiment as it relates to properly intersubjective experience. This 
will then allow us, in Section 4.3, to appreciate the positive advances his thinking about language has 
made since Phenomenology of Perception.  
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i. Perceiving Others 
 
Merleau-Ponty first wrestles with the traditional sceptical problem of experiencing others in 
Phenomenology of Perception. He begins here by applying what he understands his phenomenological study 
of embodied perception to have revealed. As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, Merleau-Ponty contends that 
the phenomenology of perception shows how the experience of one’s own body in the body schema is 
itself ‘one side’ of perceptual experience. The body is to be understood as a ‘system open to the world’ 
(PhP, 526n115/179n1) insofar as perceptual experience involves the perceiving subject’s ‘gearing into’ 
(PhP, 260-3/298-301) the sensible world as the setting of sensorimotor exploration. This account of 
the perceiving subject as an essentially incarnate being provides the material from which Merleau-Ponty 
is able to account for the possibility of perceptual experience of others. The subject of perception is no 
longer to be thought of as somehow hidden ‘behind’ or ‘within’ a mass of organs, beyond the reach of 
another’s perception. Instead, the subject is himself present in the sensible world insofar as, to 
paraphrase Merleau-Ponty’s own words, he is his body (PhP, 205/240). The perceiving subject is thus 
himself caught up in the sensible, rather than transcendent of it, and as such he is available to another 
in perception. 
It is in the perceptual experience of the other’s body, then, that I am placed in direct relation to 
another subject like myself. I grasp this presence of another subject in the appearance of a living body 
that is structured like my own – i.e., a sensorimotor system engaging with the sensible world. Another 
subject is given as ‘a certain handling of things … taking place over there’ (PhP, 369-70), and what 
appears is neither a ‘pure’, transcendent subject, nor a ‘pure’ object or physical thing, but rather another 
embodied orientation towards a common world. I thus grasp the other in terms of a carnal relation with 
the world that is common to each of us as perceiving subjects, which Merleau-Ponty describes in the 
following passage: 
 
[I]t is precisely my body that perceives the other’s body and finds there something of a 
miraculous extension of its own intentions, a familiar manner of handling the world. 
Henceforth, just as the parts of my body together form a system, the other’s body and 
my own are a single whole, two sides of a single phenomenon, and the anonymous 
existence, of which my body is continuously the trace, henceforth inhabits these two 
bodies simultaneously.  
(PhP, 370/411) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, we undercut the traditional sceptical worries surrounding our experience of 
others when we recognize the incarnate existence of the perceiving subject, which serves as a 
commonality that cuts across the individuality of subjects – that ‘pre-personal’ or ‘anonymous’ aspect 
of the subject that is expressive of their bodily facticity. Of course, our experience of others is much 
richer than the perception of a living and perceiving body, and Merleau-Ponty is quick to acknowledge 
that this bodily generality can only establish ‘another living being, and not yet another man’ (PhP, 
370/411). In order for my experience to present me with another human being, the other who appears 
	  126  
before me must engage in decidedly human forms of behaviour, chief amongst which will be language. 
In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty does not spend a great deal of time detailing the way in 
which language serves as a medium for experiencing others, although it is clear that it is the gestural 
account of speech offered earlier in the text that is intended to fill this gap. It is only in his middle 
period work, however, that we can gain a determinate idea of the way in which Merleau-Ponty 
understands the bare acquisition of a system of language to profoundly enrich the subject’s relations 
with others. This is due to the way in which, as Section 4.1 examined, Merleau-Ponty manages to apply 
central insights from his study of embodiment to his middle period reflections on language and 
expression. 
The developments instigated in the middle period provide the means with which Merleau-Ponty is 
able to parallel the functioning of language in facilitating intersubjective experience with that of the 
body. The system of language that the subject acquires is, of course, not one that she constituted 
herself; it is inherited from and shared with a community of other speaking subjects. The acquired 
system of language is thus both individual and impersonal; subjective and intersubjective. It is a 
common dimension of being between the members of a linguistic community. When I hear the other 
who appears before me speaking a common language, I am placed in an immediate relation with him 
that strongly echoes that found at the level of our common bodily being. The other’s language and my 
own are a single whole, ‘two sides of a single phenomenon’: an anonymous language that inhabits us 
both. 
Of course, this kind of default relation to others through a common language does not provide an 
answer to the worry raised at the outset of the present section. The language that the subject inherits is 
an already constituted and publically available institution. Its significations have been determined by 
the shared practice of the members of the given linguistic community. The implicit rules that guide this 
shared practice are available to be made explicit in syntactical and semantic codification by the linguist. 
It is not these objectively available and determinately rule-guided structures of a shared language that 
motivate the worry concerning the understanding of others through language. The worry arises 
because of the strong emphasis Merleau-Ponty places on a form of linguistic expression through which 
the system of language is ‘altered’, ‘varied’, ‘transfigured’ (PW, 13/20), or ‘deformed’ (S, 78/97) by the 
speaking subject – i.e., speaking speech. It remains unclear how speech acts that transcend established 
rules can be comprehensible to other members of the linguistic community.  
It is important to note that such a worry never arises in Merleau-Ponty’s own writings. It is clear that 
he considers speaking speech to present no obstacle to the subject’s relations with others. In fact, he 
argues quite the opposite insofar as he casts speaking speech as playing an absolutely fundamental role 
in making individual persons present to one another. What is common between speaking subjects – 
their shared language – yields, for each of them, ‘another only in general … a notion rather than a 
presence’ (PW, 140/195). Whilst the experience of common language goes beyond or sublimates a 
merely bodily generality, establishing a properly ‘human’ or cultural connection with the other, this 
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connection alone does not put me in touch with the other as an individual. The other’s individuality – 
his personality – is made present to me only in his speaking speech, rather than in the impersonal and 
conventional use he might make of the established significations of our common language (i.e., spoken 
speech). I truly reach the other by hearing him speak ‘in his own voice’, as it were, and it is only when I 
grasp the meaning of speaking speech that language functions ‘like a magic machine for transporting 
the “I” into the other person’s perspective’ (PW, 19/29). Merleau-Ponty accounts for such experiences 
by describing an ambiguous kind of reciprocity that unfolds, via the medium of language, between 
myself and the other whom I encounter. What his account attempts to do is to blur the distinction, 
normally assumed to straightforwardly hold, between speaking and listening, expression and 
understanding, activity and passivity. The descriptions offered of this reciprocity are crucial because 
they serve to disclose the manner in which the comprehension of speaking speech by others is in fact a 
condition of its success. For this reason, I shall attend to two of Merleau-Ponty’s favoured cases: the 
experience of the novel, and the experience of dialogue.  
 
 
ii. The Novel 
 
When I begin to read a novel for the first time, I bring to the table the entire sedimented weight of 
my system of language. This has been acquired through my learning of a publically available system of 
language and, if I have engaged with others in instances of speaking speech, further cultivated via the 
use I have put it to. As I begin to read, the author’s words are grasped according to the significations 
that I have become habituated to giving them. Initially, the language of the novel is my own insofar as 
I understand its words in the manner to which I have become accustomed. To begin with, then, the 
author’s words are my own, and it is he who ‘has come to dwell [installé] in my world’ (PW, 11/18). 
Over the course of my time with the novel, however, the use to which I have put these words until 
now begins to be subverted. The novel utilizes my familiar language in an unfamiliar way, instituting an 
ever so slight, yet systematic, shift in their meaning. Through this shift, I eventually come to dwell in the 
author’s language and grasp the meaning of his words from within through the consistent uses he puts 
them to. For instance, Merleau-Ponty offers the following description of reading Stendhal’s The 
Charterhouse of Parma:  
 
Before I read Stendhal, I know what a rogue is. Thus I can understand what he means 
when he says Rossi the revenue man is a rogue. But when Rossi the rogue begins to 
live, it is no longer he who is a rogue: it is a rogue who is the revenue man Rossi. I have 
access to Stendhal’s outlook through the commonplace words he uses. But in his hands, 
these words are given a new twist. The cross references multiply. More and more 
arrows point in the direction of a thought I have never encountered before and perhaps 
never would have met without Stendhal. At the same time, the contexts in which 
Stendhal uses common words reveal even more majestically the new meaning with 
which he endows them. I get closer and closer to him, until in the end I read his words 
with the very same intention that he gave to them.  
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(PW, 12/19) 
 
In reading the novel, I experience the imposition of a ‘coherent deformation’of my language as the 
author’s speech exploits the already present significations of my sedimented language in order to make 
them ‘yield strange sounds’ (PW, 13/21). It is in this way that a new thought comes to fruition in my 
language, and becomes an acquisition for me insofar as the ‘infernal machine called the book’ (PW, 
12/20) has ‘transformed me’ (PW, 13/20). The author’s talent lies in his ability to make me understand 
significations that were not ‘already there’ in my sedimented language. I understand the author because 
the novel presents me with his systematic use of signs, and thus ‘brings me to dwell within him’ (PW, 
12/20). Crucially, the realization of this relationship with the author in grasping his expressive 
intentions proceeds in and by means of his use of a common, sedimented language (i.e., spoken speech), 
and would be impossible without it.  
 
The novel as a report of events and an announcement of ideas, theses, or conclusions – as 
manifest or prosaic signification [spoken speech] – and the novel as an expression of style 
– as oblique and latent signification [speaking speech] – are in a simple relation of 
homonymy.  
(S, 77/96) 
 
In its turn, what is new in the novel, ‘once it has been understood and added to the cultural heritage’ 
(PW, 13/20), will be appropriated into the wider use of language by the members of a linguistic 
community, and in doing so it will become a part of the sedimented system of language that they share.  
 
 
iii. Dialogue 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of the experience of literary uses of language provides an important 
insight concerning speaking speech more generally. The understanding of speaking speech is possible 
because of the manner in which my acquired language is never absolutely fixed, and because I am never 
strictly constrained by its sedimented structure. My sedimented language is susceptible to the 
expressive activity of others just as much as my own, and I ‘accommodate to the other person through 
my language’ (PW, 18/27) in communicating with him. Merleau-Ponty considers the experience of 
dialogue as offering a paradigmatic demonstration of this claim.109  
Whilst the background of a shared language constitutes a bare ‘community of being’ (PW, 140/195), 
the reciprocal engagement of the interlocutors in a dialogue establishes a shared activity – ‘a 
community of doing’ (PW, 140/195) – from which the thoughts of each are drawn. In the dialogue, I 
find my own speech is ‘intersected laterally by the other’s speech’ (PW, 142/197) and this makes 
available new expressive possibilities that neither of us could have arrived at alone. The dialogue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 It should be noted that Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of dialogue is concerned with cases in which individuals engage in an effort to express 
themselves or their situation to one another. These are interlocutors attempting to relate to one another through speaking speech, rather than 
exchanging the ready-made and impersonal significations of spoken speech, although, as we shall see in Section 4.3, this distinction comes to 
be somewhat blurred in comparison to its initial statement in Phenomenology of Perception.  
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involves a kind of ‘depersonalization’ (PW, 19/29) insofar as it brings subjects into one another’s 
presence by constituting an immediate reciprocity that Merleau-Ponty likens to ‘a struggle between two 
athletes in a tug-of-war’ (PW, 19/28-9). The movements of the dialogue depend upon and feed off of 
one another in an active ‘coproduction’ (TfL, 119/166) of thought that blurs the distinction between 
activity and passivity: 
 
Between myself as speech and the other as speech, or more generally myself as 
expression and the other as expression, there is no longer that alternation which makes 
a rivalry of the relations between minds. I am not active only when speaking; rather, I 
precede my thought in the listener. I am not passive while I am listening; rather, I speak 
according to … what the other is saying. Speaking is not just my own initiative, listening 
is not submitting to the initiative of the other, because as speaking subjects we are 
continuing, we are resuming a common effort more ancient than we, upon which we are 
grafted to one another  
(PW, 143-4/200) 
 
I understand the other’s speech insofar as I am capable of developing the thought it expresses as my 
own, and my passivity is equally an activity. The other’s speech is taken up into my own repertoire, and 
it becomes an acquisition for me just as much as it does for him. Thus, my own expressive activity 
equally involves my passivity inasmuch as my speech is a development of the other’s, and I think 
‘according to’ him (PhP, 184/218). This understanding is reciprocated in the other’s responses to my own 
speech, and the dialogue continues its movement.110 What we see here is a consolidation of my 
expressive effort in the response of the other, and vice versa, in an ambiguous ‘development of meaning 
[devenir du sens]’ (PW, 127/178). In this way, the understanding of one another in dialogue is a condition 
of the success of our expressive efforts; it secures them as common acquisitions from which further 
expressive acts are made possible. The ‘accomplishment’ of thought in speaking speech, along with the 
development this inaugurates in one’s language, is an inescapably intersubjective procedure. The worry 
raised at the outset of this section is thus neutralized by the fact that language, even as I strive to utilize 
it in new ways, is nothing other than ‘the reverberation of my relations with myself and others’ (PW, 
20/30). The individual’s novel acts of expression are dependent upon others, and upon the common 
system of language they share: 
 
In the act of speaking, the subject, in his tone and in his style, bears witness to his 
autonomy, since nothing is more proper to him, and yet at the same moment, and 
without contradiction, he is turned towards the linguistic community and is dependent on 
his language. The will to speak is one and the same as the will to be understood. 
(IPP, 54-5) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 One recognizes the very same erosion of the distinction between activity and passivity is articulated in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
perception insofar as the experience of one’s own body and the perceived world vary together. Cf. ‘Every external perception is immediately 
synonymous with a certain perception of my body, just as every perception of my body is made explicit in the language of external perception.’ 
(PhP, 212/248-9) 
	  130  
The system of my language is an open one, susceptible equally to the expressive efforts of others as it 
is to my own. It is in this sense that men ‘borrow from one another so constantly’ to the extent that ‘it 
is impossible to have any more than a rough idea of what is due to each individual man’ (S, 74/93). 
Of course, failure to understand someone else’s speech is always a possibility, and Merleau-Ponty is 
both willing and able to account for this. The ‘presentation’ of speaking subjects to one another that 
Merleau-Ponty describes is only possible if there is a suitable background of common or shared 
significations. One obvious extreme in which I will fail to understand another’s speech is if they utilize 
a language that is foreign to me. In this case, it will be impossible for either of us to reach one another 
through speech since we lack even an ‘anonymous’ language as a common background against which 
our individuality might stand out. Yet even when I engage with someone with whom I share a 
common language, failure of understanding is possible. Although we might utilize the same signs, it is 
possible that there is an aspect of the other’s use that escapes me. I cannot make sense of the other’s 
speech because I fail to grasp it as a coherent utilization of our common signs. This happens when, for 
a variety of possible reasons, we have each developed systems of language that, in certain contexts, 
cannot find in one another a continuation of their own efforts. I might not, at a young age, take 
anything away from my experience of reading a certain novel; it literally does not speak to me. Perhaps 
if I return to it in later years, I will find that the author is now capable of reaching me and of making 
me ‘come to dwell in him’ through his use of language. This will be because, in the intervening years, 
my use of language has developed in such a way that the thought expressed by the novel has become a 
possibility for me (although I may have never actualized it of my own accord). The author’s language is 
now capable of taking me beyond my acquired significations. I must be able to ‘accommodate’ to the 
author if I am to understand him and, indeed, this may never happen.  
For the same reasons, I might fail to understand another individual in a dialogue (and here the 
dialogue itself may be forced to come to an end). I can only understand those who, despite presenting 
me with an unfamiliar use of my familiar signs, offer me a coherent development or ‘deformation’ of my 
system of language in doing so. The novelty of another’s speech is therefore only graspable because we 
are already so close to one another through the acquired uses of language that we share. This proximity 
between individuals will be more or less great depending on the degree to which they have participated 
in common developments of their language through their efforts to make themselves be understood 
by one another. 
Before considering how the middle period offers a way out of the problems that arose from the early 
discussion of speech and expression, it is worth noting a striking circularity within Merleau-Ponty’s 
writing. As we saw in Chapter 2, throughout his discussions of perception Merleau-Ponty repeatedly 
appeals to the notion of communication as a suitable description of the subject’s relationship with the 
perceived world and its contents. Prior to other people, claims Merleau-Ponty, it is in our experience 
of the perceptual thing that we encounter the ‘miracle of expression’, and nature is ‘our interlocutor in a 
sort of dialogue’ (PhP, 334/376). In perceptual exploration, I enter into a discourse with the world 
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through my corporeality. Through the systematic arrangement of my body, I understand and respond 
to the solicitations of perceptual appearances and the world is revealed to me. The description of 
perception as a communion or dialogue can thus be seen to foreshadow and inform Merleau-Ponty’s 
subsequent turn to language and communication as the main focus of his study, and helps establish an 
overarching motif throughout his work. 
 
 
4.3 Operative Language 
 
We’re now in a position to appreciate how Merleau-Ponty’s middle period work begins to address the 
problems that ultimately emerged from the gestural account of speech offered in Phenomenology of 
Perception. I will now briefly unpack this before turning, in the next chapter, to consider Merleau-
Ponty’s broader understanding of the relationship between perception and language in his final 
writings.  
 
i. Accommodating an Interdependence of Speaking Speech and Spoken Speech 
 
The descriptions of intersubjective experience and communication that Merleau-Ponty offers in his 
middle period writings allow us to appreciate precisely how his thinking has progressed since 
Phenomenology of Perception. What we discover is that Merleau-Ponty has now begun to place a much 
greater emphasis on the intersubjective and historical conditioning of acts of linguistic expression than 
was present in the Phenomenology. This emphasis calls for a renewed conception of the relationship 
between speaking speech and spoken speech. The asymmetrical relationship that emerges in the 
Phenomenology, and which was problematized in Chapter 3, is now replaced with a new appreciation of 
the interdependence that holds between the two sides of Merleau-Ponty’s distinction. The middle 
period appropriation of Saussurian linguistics provides the proper conceptual tools with which to 
accommodate this interdependence.  
The individual’s use of his language is constantly influenced and developed in cooperation with other 
speaking subjects, since it is in speech that he attempts to make himself understood by others. 
Through this cooperative development the system of diacritical relations between signs is gradually 
altered or ‘deformed’. As a result, the conventions and rules of language are constantly renewed and 
developed by the communicative efforts of speaking subjects. Conversely, we see how the expressive 
activity of speaking speech is always conditioned by the extant system of language that a linguistic 
community shares. Speaking speech brings a meaning that was previously unavailable to expression, 
yet this involves an actualization of possibilities that were latent within the already established system 
of language. It is only as an immanent, ‘coherent’ deformation of the established meanings that 
speaking speech is possible, since it is a condition of its success as an expressive act that others are 
capable of grasping and appropriating its novel signification. It is as others understand, appropriate, 
and develop this meaning that it becomes established as part of a shared linguistic culture; it becomes 
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spoken speech. In its turn, this successful expressive act will make available further possibilities for 
future creative acts. It is in this continual process of renewal and sedimentation that a linguistic and 
cultural tradition comes to be constituted over time.  
Crucially, the movement of a linguistic tradition involves a fully reciprocal relationship between 
speaking speech and spoken speech. These two poles are now properly understood as two moments of 
a continuous, diachronic ‘development of meaning’ (PW, 127). In the previous chapter, we saw that 
Merleau-Ponty was clearly sensitive to the requirement of such a reciprocity or interdependence at the 
time of Phenomenology of Perception. Yet this interdependence was undermined by his formulation of the 
gestural account of speech at that time, according to which speaking speech, as a bodily gesture, was 
not reliant upon the established significations of constituted language. Instead, speaking speech was 
presented as emerging from the ‘primordial’ and ‘silent’ domain of embodied perception that lies 
‘beneath traditions’ (PhP, 530n7/218n1). As a consequence, the relationship between speaking speech 
and spoken speech appeared almost antagonistic, with speaking speech serving to invalidate and 
overthrow the established significations deployed in spoken speech.  
This antagonism is to be contrasted with the language Merleau-Ponty now employs in the middle 
period writings. He now clearly emphasizes the sense in which there is a vital preservation involved in 
new acts of expression: 
 
Our present expressive operations, instead of driving the preceding ones away – simply 
succeeding and annulling them – salvage, preserve, and (insofar as they contain some truth) 
take them up again; and the same phenomenon is produced in respect to others’ expressive 
operations, whether they be past or contemporary. Our present keeps the promises of our 
past; we keep each others’ promises. Each act of philosophical or literary expression 
contributes to fulfilling the vow to retrieve the world taken with the first appearance of a 
language, that is, with the first appearance of a finite system of signs which claimed to be 
capable in principle of winning by a sort of ruse any being which might present itself. Each 
act of expression realizes for its own part a portion of this project, and by opening a new 
field of truths, further extends the contract which has just expired.  
(S, 95) 
 
This preservation of the past in the present is captured by the use Merleau-Ponty now makes of the 
Husserlian term Stiftung, which is commonly translated as ‘institution’. For Merleau-Ponty, in the 
philosophy of language, the concept of institution refers to ‘that fecundity of the products of a culture 
which continue to have value after their appearance and which open a field of investigations in which 
they perpetually come to life again’ (PW, 59).111 This is the fecundity of successful acts of expression, 
which come to be appropriated by a linguistic community and thereby make available new expressive 
possibilities in the shared system of language. By bringing this concept to the fore, the distinction 
between speaking speech and spoken speech is effectively reined in due to the manner in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 In a series of lectures on the concept, delivered at the Collège de France in 1954, Merleau-Ponty elaborates on the application of 
institution in contexts other than language and culture. One such example involves the maturation of the body in puberty. In puberty, one’s 
body comes to acquire a new sense, and new possibilities become available. The concept of institution serves to capture this bringing to birth 
of a future by a present event. A detailed discussion of the ‘Institution’ course can be found in (Vallier, 2005).  
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speaking speech is now presented as emerging out of the established significations of constituted 
language. There are thus no ‘pure’ instances of speaking speech. Conversely, there is ultimately no 
‘pure’ spoken speech either, since the acquired system of language always harbors latent, incubating 
changes and is thus susceptible to an historical development of meaning as it is taken up and utilized 
by speaking subjects.112 
At bottom, it is the middle period appropriation of Saussure’s structuralist linguistics that facilitates 
this interdependence of speaking speech and spoken speech. This is due to the fact that in Saussure 
Merleau-Ponty discovers a way of accounting for the immanence of meaning in words that diverges 
from the letter, if not the spirit, of the gestural account of speech offered in Phenomenology of Perception. 
With the conception of language as a diacritical system of signs the immanent meaning of linguistic 
expression no longer needs to be subordinated to a ‘natural’ order of embodied perception as it is in 
the Phenomenology. Instead, there is a meaning immanent to linguistic acts insofar as they draw upon the 
already acquired system of relations constitutive of the speaking subject’s language.  
  
 
ii. Operative Language 
 
The movement towards a proper interdependence relation between speaking speech and spoken 
speech bears wider ramifications for the shape of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. In particular, we can begin 
to see how the developments of the middle period work on language and expression pulls Merleau-
Ponty away from the constitutive foundationalism whose presence in Phenomenology of Perception 
culminated with the assertion of the tacit Cogito. It is not until Merleau-Ponty’s later work that this 
important departure from the Phenomenology begins to become fully explicit in his own writing. Before 
attending to the shape of Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the late period, however, it is worth flagging a 
final concept that emerges in the middle period work that most clearly encapsulates the shift between 
the early and middle period works. At this time, Merleau-Ponty begins to speak of an ‘operative 
language’, offering a direct connection with the conception of operative intentionality advanced in 
Phenomenology of Perception.  
Merleau-Ponty defines the goal of the middle period study of language as the revelation of ‘an 
operant or speaking language whose words live a little-known life’ (S, 75).113 This operative language is 
to be contrasted with ‘spoken’ language, but we should be careful not to read this distinction in 
precisely the same manner as the speaking/spoken distinction is defined in Phenomenology of Perception. It 
is clear that by ‘spoken language’ Merleau-Ponty means language such as it becomes a circumscribed 
object of thought. This conception of language as an object is in play not only in the linguistic sciences, 
but also in traditional philosophical reflection on language. The shortcomings of traditional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 This claim is elucidated in the chapter of The Prose of the World entitled ‘The Algorithm and the Mystery of Language’. Here, Merleau-Ponty 
attends to the case of mathematical uses of language, which restrict themselves to ‘designating nothing but what language has already 
possessed’ (PW, 118). He argues that it is impossible for even this kind of practice to be immune to the diachronic development of meaning 
that is definitive of linguistic tradition. 
113 Merleau-Ponty refers to the concept again in his introduction to Signs (S, 18), published in 1960, as well as in several working notes from 
this time. This demonstrates that the concept continues to figure in his ‘late period’ thought.  
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philosophical reflection on language all stem from the failure to recognize that ‘there always remains, 
behind our talk about language, more living language than can ever be taken in by our view of it’ (PW, 
117). Operative language – language as it is lived through by the speaking subject – involves ‘a peculiar 
signification which is the more evident the more we surrender ourselves to it’, and which ‘resists any 
direct seizure’ (PW, 116). 
This critique of traditional philosophical reflection finds its roots in Merleau-Ponty’s earlier 
discussions of speech and expression. The ‘peculiar signification’ of operative or living language was 
precisely what the gestural account of speech was intended to make sense of. The gestural account 
encountered intractable problems, however, since it effectively established, with the dichotomy of 
speaking speech and spoken speech, a dichotomy of perception and language. The idea of an operative 
language was ultimately unavailable to Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception. It is with the 
recognition of an interdependence of speaking speech and spoken speech, facilitated by the 
appropriation of Saussure, that Merleau-Ponty begins to properly appreciate the place of language in 
our operative intentional engagement with, or situatedness in the world. The concept of operative 
language effectively encapsulates all of the middle period developments outlined above.  
Operative language is the vehicle of the speaking subject’s relations with the world and with others. It 
establishes an open situation around the subject that is susceptible to development through his ongoing 
expressive and communicative efforts. Language is now employed in a closely similar role to that of 
the body in Phenomenology of Perception’s conception of operative intentionality. It is the mediator of the 
subject’s situatedness in a world that outstrips any purely ‘natural’ order of meaning. Operative 
language opens upon an intelligible, cultural world. We now see that phenomenological philosophy 
does not disclose a world beyond or beneath language itself, as Merleau-Ponty seemed to have 
suggested at certain points of the Phenomenology. As with the phenomenology of the body, the proper 
goal of the phenomenology of language is to set aside the ‘objectivist’ conception of its subject in 
order to disclose the ‘intentional threads that unite it to its surroundings’ (PhP, 74). As I noted above, it 
is only in his final writings that Merleau-Ponty begins to bring the broader significance of this shift to 
the fore of his thinking. The nature of the relationship between the sensible world of perception and 
the ‘intelligible’ world of ideality, and with it the relationship between the body and language, is at the 
very heart of the late writings. It is to this topic that I shall now turn.  
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5. 
Flesh, Reversibility, and Ideality:  
The Place of Language in Merleau-Ponty’s Late 
Period 
 
By 1959, Merleau-Ponty had begun to shift his attention away from the thematic focus on expression 
and language that had occupied him since 1945. Leaving the manuscript of The Prose of the World 
unfinished, he began working in earnest on the project he had initially envisioned in 1952 as The Origin 
of Truth (PriP, 8), and which eventually became the manuscript for The Visible and the Invisible. In its 
turn, The Visible and the Invisible was interrupted by Merleau-Ponty’s death in May 1961 at the age of just 
52. Only four chapters were drafted of what was clearly a major undertaking, intended to culminate in 
a work of huge scope and ambition. Merleau-Ponty’s death silenced a thought that was still only on the 
way to fruition, and which was yet to crystallize into a definitive expression. It hardly needs to be said 
that this brings with it significant interpretative difficulties. One cannot presume to offer a categorical 
presentation of what is essentially an incomplete thought.  
Nonetheless, one can trace a clear direction of movement to Merleau-Ponty’s work in the final years 
of his life. The aims, concepts, and arguments found in the posthumously published manuscript for 
The Visible and the Invisible are corroborated and illuminated by essays, lecture courses, and working 
notes Merleau-Ponty composed during this time. Furthermore, and despite the new philosophical 
lexicon Merleau-Ponty feels obliged to introduce in the final writings, one recognizes a continuity with 
the work produced in his early and middle periods such that the developments of the late writings are 
not wholly unanticipated. Whilst he certainly subjects his earlier work to critical scrutiny (as Chapter 3 
noted, specifically with regard to the tacit Cogito) Merleau-Ponty explicitly envisioned The Visible and the 
Invisible as a return to the themes and ‘results’ of Phenomenology of Perception in order to bring them, as he 
puts it, ‘to ontological explicitation’ (VI, 183/234). The middle period developments considered in 
Chapter 4 play no small part in motivating and informing this endeavour, especially with regard to the 
place of language, which comprises the guiding concern of what follows in this chapter.114  
More specifically, we are pursuing what Merleau-Ponty himself concedes is ‘the most difficult point’ 
(VI, 149/193): the relationship between the sensible order of perception and the ‘intelligible’ order of 
ideas or thought. This issue is undoubtedly central to the thought being developed in The Visible and the 
Invisible. Indeed, the very title of the manuscript encapsulates Merleau-Ponty’s concern with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 The important role of the middle period writings in motivating Merleau-Ponty’s final period is inadequately reflected in much of the 
secondary literature. To my mind, only (Besmer, 2007) lays sufficient emphasis on the significance of the middle period work on language. 
Much of the other literature, where it does discuss the middle period, presents it as either making little or no progress beyond the 
Phenomenology’s discussion of speech (e.g. (Dillon, 1997) & (Baldwin, 2007)) or as marking a foray into structuralism that, whilst intriguing, was 
subsequently abandoned in Merleau-Ponty’s later work (e.g. (Edie, 1987)). Because of this, each of these readings makes Merleau-Ponty’s 
already esoteric later writings much harder to understand.  
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relationship between real and ideal, fact and essence, perception and thought. Chapter 3, above, 
explored the way in which Merleau-Ponty’s handling of the relationship between language and 
perception in the Phenomenology raised difficulties for the overall shape of his thought. In the previous 
chapter, we enumerated the ways in which Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about language developed after 
1945. As I have suggested, the changes instigated during the middle period can be seen informing 
Merleau-Ponty’s project in his final writings. It is in the late period that we find Merleau-Ponty 
explicitly attempting to leave behind once and for all the kind of constitutive foundationalism with 
regard to the relationship between the perceived world and language whose presence in Phenomenology of 
Perception we found to be problematic in Chapter 3. The goal of the present chapter, therefore, will be 
to elucidate and explore a thesis emerging at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s late work: that, in the words 
of Claude Lefort, ‘there is no frontier between language and the world’ (Lefort, trans. 1968: xxx). 
Only the germ of this thesis is to be found explicitly stated within what was completed of The Visible 
and the Invisible. The key to a more complete articulation is provided, however. As we noted at the 
outset of Chapter 4, Merleau-Ponty proposes that his new philosophical lexicon of ‘the flesh’ (la chair), 
which he initially defines in relation to the perceiving body and the sensible world, is equally applicable 
to language and to the ‘intelligible world’ of ideas. Section 5.2, below, will unpack this talk of a flesh of 
language. Section 5.3 will then explore how this relates to Merleau-Ponty’s important critical 
engagement with Husserl’s late text ‘The Origin of Geometry’, developed in a lecture course at the 
Collège de France in 1960 and later published as Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology. In this lecture 
course, we can find some of the clearest statements of Merleau-Ponty’s late thinking about language 
and its relationship with the sensible world. These elements of the course can in turn be used to 
elucidate some of the more obscure claims made in The Visible and the Invisible. However, we must first 
begin by clarifying the new lexicon of ‘the flesh’ and ‘reversibility’ that is so characteristic of the late 
period work. 
 
 
5.1 The Body as Flesh and the Flesh of the Sensible World 
 
i. The New Lexicon  
 
In The Visible and the Invisible itself, it is only in the last of the four completed chapters that Merleau-
Ponty begins formally to introduce and determine his philosophical vocabulary of ‘the flesh’.115 By the 
time we reach ‘The Intertwining – The Chiasm’ Merleau-Ponty takes himself to have established the 
shortcomings of the philosophical methodologies of ‘reflection’, ‘dialectic’, and ‘intuition’.116 In light of 
this critical work, he begins the fourth chapter with the proposal that philosophy ‘must recommence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 He did live to see the publication of one essay, 1961’s ‘Eye and Mind’, in which several of the new concepts were helpfully explored via 
the philosophy of painting. 
116 These methodologies can be understood as representative of specific targets. ‘Reflection’ = Descartes and Kant, ‘Dialectic’ = Sartre, 
‘Intuition’ = Husserl and Bergson. I cannot pursue these critical dimensions of The Visible and the Invisible here, although they are certainly not 
entirely unfamiliar to the reader of Phenomenology of Perception.  
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everything’ (VI, 130/170) in order that it might avoid the errors of the established concepts and 
procedures of the tradition. Such recommencement is certainly not unfamiliar in the context of 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought, however. He claims that philosophy will be renewed if it ‘installs itself’ in 
‘experiences that have not yet been “worked over,” that offer us all at once, pell-mell, both “subject” 
and “object,” both existence and essence, and hence give philosophy the resources to redefine them’ 
(VI, 130/170). He immediately cites three examples of the requisite kind: seeing, speaking and, to the 
extent that it can be distinguished from speech, thinking117  – those same ‘irrecusable and enigmatic’ 
(VI, 130/170) experiences that his own work consistently gravitated around throughout his career. 
Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty now seeks a renewed engagement with these modes of experience, and 
considers it necessary to formulate ‘new instruments’ (VI, 130/170) with which to handle them. The 
notion of the flesh (la chair) is foremost amongst these. Indeed, in a working note of June, 1960, 
Merleau-Ponty describes the flesh as the ‘essential notion’ for his philosophy (VI, 259/307). He there 
proceeds to offer a definition of the flesh as ‘the sensible in the twofold sense of what one senses and 
what senses’ (VI, 259/307), which he elaborates in the following way: 
 
What one senses = the sensible thing, the sensible world = the correlate of my active 
body, what “responds” to it – – What senses = I cannot posit one sole sensible without 
positing it as torn from my flesh, lifted off my flesh, and my flesh itself is one of the 
sensibles in which an inscription of all the others is made, the sensible pivot in which all 
the others participate, the sensible-key, the dimensional sensible.  
(VI, 259-60/307-8) 
 
In this definition, we can already recognize how the notion of the flesh is firmly grounded in 
Phenomenology of Perception’s study of the body’s place in perceptual experience. The description of the 
sensible world as the ‘correlate’ of the active body refers to a thought that the Phenomenology had already 
explored at length in terms of the body schema and its role in the grasping and unfolding of perceptual 
sens. We have already explored, in chapter 2, Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of the manner in which 
‘external perception and perception of one’s own body vary together because they are two sides of a 
single act’ (PhP, 211/247). Yet Merleau-Ponty now appears to be pushing this line of thought further, 
since the notion of the flesh is not simply synonymous with the lived or phenomenal body (le corps 
propre) of Phenomenology of Perception. The flesh is ‘the sensible’ in toto; it captures both the subject (‘what 
senses’) and object (‘what one senses’) poles of perceptual experience. In more Merleau-Pontian terms, 
the flesh encapsulates both moments of the perceptual dialogue: the sensing body and the sensible 
world. Merleau-Ponty thus speaks in turn of the flesh of the body and of a ‘flesh of the world’ (VI, 
250/298) or ‘of things’ (VI, 133/173).  Crucially, this commonality is not to be thought of as resulting 
from a unidirectional possession or determination of one by the other; Merleau-Ponty is keen to avoid 
the attribution of a primacy here. Thus, whilst every sensible thing is ‘torn from my flesh’, my own flesh 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 For the kinds of reasons we have already discussed in chapters 3 and 4, he is reticent to strongly distinguish between speech and thought. 
In this context, it is fairly clear that ‘Thinking’ also offers an implicit reference to Heidegger’s work, which exerted a growing influence in 
Merleau-Ponty’s later years. 
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is itself of the sensible world – it ‘is one of the sensibles’ – and its engagement with the things thus 
unfolds from within the flesh of the world. In this way, the notion of the flesh places a much heavier 
emphasis than was present in the Phenomenology on the body’s place among ‘the order of the things’ (VI, 
137/179). 
Insofar as it offers an ‘ontological explicitation’ of the Phenomenology, the primary impetus of the 
notion of the flesh is to underscore the inadequacy of an ontological dualism. As the Phenomenology 
sought to demonstrate, the received categories of ‘subject’ and ‘object’, or ‘being-for-itself’ and ‘being-
in-itself’ are problematized by the body-world relationship in perception, since the body is at one and 
the same time both seer and seen, sensing and sensible. These dual aspects or ‘dimensions’ of the 
body’s being cannot be disentangled from one another, claims Merleau-Ponty, and for this reason the 
being that sees, touches, and hears cannot be of a wholly different ontological kind from the world of 
things it opens upon. Whilst Merleau-Ponty remains sensitive to the manifest grounds of a distinction 
between sensing and sensible, he seeks to avoid radicalizing, and thus distorting, this differentiation by 
defining it in terms of two distinct categories of being. This aim is articulated at the outset of ‘The 
Intertwining – The Chiasm’ in the following passage: 
 
It is as though our vision were formed in the heart of the visible, or as though there were 
between it and us an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand. And yet it is not 
possible that we blend into it, nor that it passes into us, for then the vision would vanish 
at the moment of formation, by disappearance of the seer or of the visible. What there is 
then are not things first identical with themselves, which would then offer themselves to 
the seer, nor is there a seer who is first empty and who, afterward, would open himself to 
them – but something to which we could not be closer than by palpating it with our look, 
things we could not dream of seeing “all naked” because the gaze itself envelops them, 
clothes them with its own flesh.118  
(VI, 130-1/171) 
 
Merleau-Ponty considers the notion of the flesh to be essential insofar as it provides a means of 
avoiding a distortion of the phenomena at the level of ontology, since it cuts across the received 
ontological categories. 119  Central here is the emphasis Merleau-Ponty now places on the dual 
dimensions of the body as both sensing120 and sensible, and its quasi-paradoxical status as ‘a sensible for 
itself’ (VI, 135/176). It is in exploring the relationship between the two dimensions or aspects of the 
body’s being that Merleau-Ponty introduces and develops the concept of ‘reversibility’ (réversibilité). It is 
reversibility that emerges as the defining characteristic of the flesh.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 The ‘“all naked”’ here is a reference to Descartes’ Second Meditation, where Descartes speaks of the ‘naked’ wax beneath the ‘garments’ of 
its sensible properties (Descartes, trans. 1968: 111). 
119 The concept thus reinforces the argument given in Section 3.4 against Dreyfus’ talk of being-in-the-world as ‘a third way of being’. As we 
shall see, the flesh is a unitary category in which Merleau-Ponty intends to capture every facet of experience and of the world, from 
perception to thought and ideality.  
120 The French word in the text is sentant, which Lingis misleadingly translates as ‘sentient’ (VI, 136). Sentant is better caught by ‘sensing’ or 
‘feeling’. 
	  139  
ii. The Reversibility of the Flesh 
 
The principal motif of reversibility is the image of one hand touching the other, in which the sense of 
touch is applied to the touching body itself as a tangible object. In the touching of the hand, we 
encounter a ‘crisscrossing’ (recroisement) of the touching and the tangible; an application of the body’s 
two dimensions upon one another (VI, 133/174). This ‘veritable touching of the touch’ (VI, 133/174), 
which he later clarifies is ‘always imminent and never realized in fact’ (VI, 147/191),121 is to be 
understood as emblematic of the reversible relations that hold more generally between the two 
dimensions or ‘leaves’ of the body. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty maintains that this reversibility of the 
body is the crux of all perception. It is therefore worth unpacking precisely how it figures there. 
This centrality of reversibility to perception is initially approached in terms of the correlation of active 
body and sensible thing in the case of touch. What we must acknowledge here, insists Merleau-Ponty, is 
a ‘kinship’ between the two poles that makes possible their reciprocal exchange. Their internal 
articulations are amenable to one another, such that the direction, cadence, and structure of the 
movements of my hand find their counterpart and reflection in the shifting horizon of the tangible 
thing, and its shape, size, and texture are thus disclosed to me. Such a disclosure is only possible 
because my touching hand is simultaneously ‘accessible from without’ (VI, 133/174) as a tangible 
object. Thus, the active movements of my hand ‘incorporate themselves into the universe they 
interrogate’ (VI, 133/174); my hand figures in the same landscape as the tangible things and is itself one 
of them. There is an essential inherence of touch in the tangible world insofar as to touch something is 
simultaneously to be touched by it. There is here ‘a passive sentiment of the body’ (VI, 133/174) that is 
internally related to its active tactile exploration and it is in this reciprocity of the active and the passive 
that the reversibility of the body’s two sides as both touching and tangible is disclosed.   
That the touching body must itself be tangible seems intuitively right, since the modality of touch 
always requires some kind of direct contact between the touching and the touched. Yet Merleau-Ponty 
asserts that the same principle is applicable across all sense modalities, and this claim might seem more 
difficult to countenance. The case of vision, for instance, which he now describes as a ‘palpation of the 
eye’; a ‘remarkable variant’ of tactile palpation (VI, 133/173) manifestly does not involve a direct 
physical contact between the eye and the visible thing. Indeed, there is a necessary distance between 
seer and seen that is wholly absent in the case of touch. Furthermore, a reversibility of vision and the 
visible would not appear to have the same immediacy as the reversibility of touching and tangible it is 
supposed to mirror. Unlike the touching and tangible hand, I am not so readily able to turn my vision 
upon itself and to look upon my own eyes unaided, and the visibility of my eyes does not appear to be 
so intimately related to vision itself as does the tangibility of my hands in the case of touch.  
In turning to the reversibility involved in vision, Merleau-Ponty does appear to shift his emphasis 
slightly. ‘It is a marvel too little noticed’, he declares, ‘that every movement of my eyes – even more, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 In other words, there is never a total coincidence of the touching with the touched. Instead, one finds that one hand will always pass into 
the rank of touched as an object for the other, touching, hand.  
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every displacement of my body – has its place in the same visible universe that I itemize and explore 
with them’ (VI, 134/174). This suggests that it is in the correlation of bodily movement and the visible 
spectacle, already established in Phenomenology of Perception, that the reversibility of vision is instantiated. 
As in touch, the body’s movement ‘has its place’ in the visible world it explores such that it is in 
principle included amongst the visible things. Yet Merleau-Ponty seems determined to push the analogy 
with touch to its fullest extent, claiming that all vision is necessarily ‘doubled with a complementary 
vision or with another vision: myself seen from without, such as another would see me, installed in the 
midst of the visible, occupied in considering it from a certain spot’ (VI, 134/175). And elsewhere, in 
‘Eye and Mind’, he enthusiastically appeals to André Marchland and Paul Klee’s experience, when 
painting, of feeling ‘that things look at them’ (PriP, 167, my emphasis). Merleau-Ponty insists on the literal 
status of such descriptions, asserting that ‘it becomes impossible to distinguish between what sees and 
what is seen’ (PriP, 167). Despite such insistence, however, one might worry that it remains difficult to 
entertain a full analogy between touch and vision here. The sense in which I find myself looked at by 
the visible things is surely at least in part metaphorical, since things cannot see, whereas in the case of 
touch I very much am touched by the things I touch. The worry is perhaps alleviated once we 
acknowledge that to speak of ‘being touched’ by a tangible object does not introduce any kind of 
troubling ascription of agency or experience to tangible things, there is no reason to think that Merleau-
Ponty’s talk of ‘being seen’ by things should involve the ascription of sight or perceptual consciousness 
to visible things. Rather, as David Morris puts it, the seer ‘is inherently seen, in something like the way 
that a front inherently has a back’ (Morris, 2010: 143). 
Despite the potential ambiguity here, it does seem that a general principle of reversibility emerges 
from Merleau-Ponty’s late discussion of perception. It is of the essence of all perception – as the 
dialogical unfolding of perceptual sens – that the perceiver is not foreign to the world he perceives, but 
rather ‘is of it’ (VI, 135/175). The body’s openness to the sensible world is effectively the reverse side of 
its own inherence within the world as a sensible thing, and the body’s flesh constitutes an ‘overlapping’ 
or ‘intertwining’ (entrelacs) of sensing and sensible. The locus of this intertwining is to be found in the 
knitting together of the active body’s motor horizon and the tactile, visual, auditory, etc. horizons of 
things and of the world, and this is certainly where Merleau-Ponty’s desire to analogize the different 
sense modalities is on the firmest ground. That my movements find their response and reflection in the 
shifting appearances of the sensible things is a symptom of my own inherence in the sensible world. My 
movements take place within the sensible space, and it is this inherence that brings with it the imminent 
possibility of a reversal through which I am myself available as a tangible, visible, and audible thing.  
It certainly appears to be in this sense that Merleau-Ponty goes on to emphasize what he calls a 
‘fundamental narcissism of all vision’ (VI, 139/181). The body finds itself ‘contained within the full 
spectacle’ (VI, 138/180) it enjoys, and the narcissism thus consists in the fact that the sensible world is 
only reached through its intertwining with the active body. The self-experience involved here is 
fundamentally not of the body as a mere object. One does not see reflected, in the visible things, ‘the 
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contour of a body one inhabits’ (VI, 139/181). The narcissism is grounded in the body’s sensible being, 
yet, unlike the case of one hand touching another, it is not an experience of its qualities as a mere 
sensible thing. The experience of being ‘seen by the outside’ (VI, 139/181) is not, then, an 
objectification by an alien gaze of inanimate objects that would compete with my own. Rather, it is a 
symptom of the fact that the system of the active body is itself mediated by and inheres within the 
sensible world it opens upon, whether this is in vision or any other sense modality. The indistinction 
between seer and seen that Merleau-Ponty insists on is therefore to be understood as an articulation of 
the fact that sensing cannot take place apart from its correlation and intertwining with the sensed, but 
must instead ‘exist within it’ (VI, 139/181). It is this existential belonging to the sensible world that 
ensures that I too am available as a sensible thing for others. 
It is in this respect that Merleau-Ponty says of the flesh that it is ‘a mirror phenomenon and the mirror is 
an extension of my relation with my body’ (VI, 255/303). We have already seen how a closely similar 
thought was explored in Phenomenology of Perception, and with the notion of reversibility, Merleau-Ponty 
appears to be offering a new formulation of the kind of pre-reflective or ‘silent’ reflexivity that he had 
previously addressed in terms of the tacit Cogito. In ‘Eye and Mind’, Merleau-Ponty describes the 
sensing body as ‘a self’, albeit ‘through confusion, narcissism, through inherence of the one who sees in 
that which he sees, and through inherence of sensing in the sensed’ (PriP, 163). As before, Merleau-
Ponty describes this bodily self as fundamentally ‘anonymous’. For instance, in a working note of 
September, 1959, the perceiving subject is ‘the anonymous one [l’anonyme] buried in the world’ (VI, 
201/251).  
An important shift from the discussion that led to the assertion the tacit Cogito in the Phenomenology, 
however, lies in the emphasis Merleau-Ponty now places on the body’s status as a sensible being, 
amongst the things it explores. The self-relation that is realized in vision, for instance, is equally ‘a 
relation of the visible with itself that traverses me and constitutes me as a seer’ (VI, 140/183). What is 
discovered here is less a pre-reflective form of self-consciousness than a pre-reflective continuity or 
proximity that holds between the body’s being and that of the sensible things, which the body discovers 
as ‘an annex or prolongation of itself; they are incrusted into its flesh, they are a part of its full 
definition; the world is made of the same stuff as my body’ (PriP, 163).  
As we shall see, this solidarity between perceiver and the world in the reversibility of the flesh extends 
beyond strictly perceptual experience in order to include language and the intelligible or ‘ideal’ world it 
opens upon. It is in this way that Merleau-Ponty seeks to avoid the mistakes of Phenomenology of Perception 
of which the concept of the tacit Cogito is emblematic. Before turning to this, however, it remains for us 
to examine more closely Merleau-Ponty’s application of ‘flesh’ to the world of sensible things. 
 
 
iii. The Flesh of the World 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s talk of a ‘flesh of things’ or of the world should not to be read as a reduction of the 
perceiver to the perceived, or vice versa. What we might call Merleau-Ponty’s ‘monism of the flesh’ is 
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intended as neither a materialist nor idealist doctrine. This is because the flesh is a category that cannot 
be accommodated by traditional ontological systems. Merleau-Ponty asserts that the flesh ‘is not matter, 
is not mind, is not substance’, but should instead be thought of as ‘a general thing, midway between the 
spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being 
wherever there is a fragment of being’ (VI, 139/181). This ‘style of being’ is exhibited in the flesh of 
the body insofar as it is neither an ossified fragment of an objective being-in-itself nor a determinate 
‘content’ of a delimited sphere of consciousness. The sensing body is a system of possibilities in the 
mode of the ‘I can’; it is given ‘in relief’, as it were. Likewise, sensible things do not have the flattened 
out, spatiotemporal identity of circumscribed objects or matters of fact, but are always given within 
‘horizon structures’ (VI, 153/198). A sensible thing or quality is not only grasped within spatial and 
temporal horizons; it simultaneously has its place within other ‘dimensions’ (VI, 224/273), or horizons 
of sense. To illustrate this, Merleau-Ponty appeals to the familiar case of colours, whose sense is always 
‘bound up’ in various Gestalt structures. A given colour is always grasped through its participation in the 
Gestalt structures of its perceptual surroundings – the lighting-coloured things relationship; the overall 
‘constellation’ of colours within the scene; the relations that hold between colours and other qualities 
such as textures – and its sense is seen to be altered should changes occur within these structures. It is 
not given as a fully determinate or positive entity of the order of qualia, since it is only grasped as one 
moment of a wider perceptual configuration. A given colour is ‘a concretion of visibility, it is not an 
atom’ (VI, 132/172).  
Yet the sensible world also incorporates dimensions that transcend the immediate perceptual scene, 
and a given colour is implicated in relationships that are not themselves strictly or at least immediately 
visible. In virtue of its colour, a red dress bears relationships with all kinds of other ‘red things’ (e.g., 
‘the tiles of roof tops, the flags of gatekeepers and of the Revolution, certain terrains near Aix or 
Madagascar’ (VI, 132/172)), and with other ‘red garments’ (e.g., ‘robes of professors, bishops, and 
advocate generals’ (VI, 132/172)). The differential relationships the coloured thing bears within fields 
such as these alter the sense of the colour itself, such that the red of a dress has a different meaning from 
the red of Saint George’s Cross, or of the papal slippers. In this way, the eminently visible quality of 
colour is bound up in ‘a fabric of invisible being’ (VI, 132/172), in virtue of which it is much more than 
a self-sufficient perceptual datum. It is ‘a certain differentiation, an ephemeral modulation of this world 
– less a colour or a thing, therefore, than a difference between things or colours, a momentary 
crystallization of coloured being or of visibility’ (VI, 132/173).  
The overtly Saussurian language Merleau-Ponty employs here will be significant when we come to 
consider the relationship between the sensible world and language. For the moment however, we are 
seeking to understand the concept of the flesh, and with the above articulation of an essential 
‘dimensionality’ (VI, 227/276) of the sensible world, we reach the heart of the matter. Merleau-Ponty 
takes himself to be disclosing ‘the tissue that lines’ the sensible world and the things encountered within 
it: ‘a possibility, a latency, and a flesh of things’ (VI, 132-3/173). The flesh of the sensible world is 
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constituted by the mass of differential relationships that its members bear with one another. It is thus 
of the same order as Gestalt organization, which Merleau-Ponty now describes as ‘a diacritical, 
oppositional, relative system’ (VI, 206/256). It is in this diacritical system of relations that the sense or 
meaning of the sensible world is realized, and with the concept of the flesh Merleau-Ponty is proposing 
an ontological category in which there is an original and integral cohesion of sense and sensible; of the 
visible things and their ‘invisible’ meaning: 
 
Meaning is invisible, but the invisible is not the contradictory of the visible: the visible itself 
has an invisible inner framework (membrure),122 and the in-visible is the secret counterpart 
of the visible, it appears only within it 
(VI, 215/265) 
 
It might seem that this application of the concept of flesh to the sensible world is at a remove from 
our initial explication of the flesh in relation to the active and sensing body and its ‘reversible’ roles as 
both sensing and sensible. Crucially, the things of the sensible world are not sensitive as is my body, 
and are thus unable to enact the kind of ‘self-sensing’ (se sentir) that is definitive of the reversibility of 
the sensing and sensible dimensions of the body. This difference is acknowledged by Merleau-Ponty in 
a working note of May 1960, where he reiterates that to speak of ‘the flesh of the world’ is to describe 
the world as ‘a pregnancy of possibles’ (VI, 250/298) and finally to renounce the representation of the 
world as a fully determinate and surveyable object. The ‘pregnant’ dimensionality of the sensible world 
does not stand apart from the horizons of the active and sensing body, since there is an intertwining 
and correlation of each with the other. The body is open to the world only through its inherence within 
it as a ‘sensible for itself’ (VI, 135/176), and it is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty spoke above of the 
sensible thing as ‘torn from my flesh’.  
With the lexicon of the flesh, Merleau-Ponty reinterprets the main themes of his earlier study of the 
body and perception. The body is neither a ‘pure’ thing nor a ‘pure’ idea, neither matter nor mind. The 
things it encounters in sense experience are neither contents of an immanent mental sphere nor ‘mere 
things’, fixed and determinate elements of a being-in-itself. Such categories capture only abstract 
moments of ‘one sole and massive adhesion to Being which is the flesh’ (VI, 270/318). Our task now is 
to understand how the new lexicon of the flesh is applied to language. 
 
 
5.2 The Flesh of Language 
 
i. Ideality and the Sensible 
 
It is with the discussion of the meaning of the sensible world – a meaning that is literally in-visible, as 
he puts it – that we can perhaps already begin to see how Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the flesh 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 It is perhaps no coincidence, given the role Merleau-Ponty ascribes to the body in the unfolding of perceptual sens, that membrure can also 
mean ‘limb’ (in sense of arm, leg). 
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opens out into a discussion of ideality, and of the relationship between the sensible and the intelligible. 
The dimensionality of the sensible world is what provides its inner articulations such that each moment 
of sensible experience is caught up within diacritical horizon structures of the kind sketched above. In 
this way, Merleau-Ponty describes the visibility of individual things and their qualities as intractably 
coupled with ‘a second visibility, that of the lines of force and dimensions’ (VI, 148/192). It is here that 
he enthusiastically cites the work of Marcel Proust as offering the most extensive descriptions of this 
kind of ideality ‘that is not the contrary of the sensible, that is its lining and its depth’ (VI, 149/193). As 
an example of Proust’s insight, Merleau-Ponty refers to the rich description of the ‘little phrase’ of five 
notes from the fictitious composer Vinteuil’s sonata that becomes, for Swann, the ‘national anthem’ of 
his love for Odette (Proust, trans. 1989: 238). In this example, the individual notes of the phrase each 
receive their sense from the relations they bear with one another as moments of a temporally unfolding 
Gestalt whole. This auditory Gestalt also takes its place within cultural, musical and auditory horizons, 
and even participates in the affective horizon of Swann’s life, manifesting as it does for him ‘the essence 
of love’ (VI, 149/193). All of these participations, and the relationships that traverse the five notes of 
the musical phrase, are not themselves strictly audible phenomena, yet it is in terms of them all that the 
phrase has its identity and its sense.  
Since we can recognize the very same musical phrase throughout a potentially infinite number of 
occurrences, we see that the phrase transcends any particular sensible manifestation, and it is in this 
regard that the phrase takes on a kind of ideal existence. Nonetheless, this idea cannot be divorced 
from the sensible world; it remains inescapably bound to the ‘sonorous being’ of the world, and we 
could not grasp it outside of an encounter with its sensible manifestation. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
such ideas ‘could not be given to us as ideas except in a carnal experience’ (VI, 150/194): 
 
It is not only that we would find in that carnal experience the occasion to think them; it is 
that they owe their authority, their fascinating, indestructible power, precisely to the fact 
that they are in transparency behind the sensible, or in its heart.  
(VI, 150/194) 
 
Now, this kind of ideality – if, indeed, we can speak of ideality here as Merleau-Ponty insists – 
certainly appears to be of a quite different order to the ideal objects we reckon with in our reflective 
understanding and our propositionally structured knowledge of the world, or as Merleau-Ponty refers to 
it, “pure” ideality. For instance, we generally consider mathematical objects as subsisting quite apart 
from the sensible appearances via which we initially became acquainted with them and in relation to 
which we continue to make use of them. Unlike the musical phrase, the number 5 is not tied to the 
sensible appearances through which we become acquainted with it. Yet Merleau-Ponty is wary that we 
are invariably misled by such this kind of distinction. He warns against the temptation of a Platonist 
reification of these ‘ideas of the intelligence’, which would seek to erect them into ‘a second positivity’ 
(VI, 149/194) above or outside of the sensible world. In a manner similar to Phenomenology of Perception’s 
references to a ‘pure consciousness’, the notion of purity that Merleau-Ponty utilizes here is 
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representative of a mistaken way of thinking. A ‘pure’ ideality would be a meaning freed from the 
horizon structures of the sensible world, which Merleau-Ponty treats as a philosopher’s chimera, 
involving the same errors of ‘objective thought’ that he has been explicitly seeking to eschew 
throughout his career. There is no rarefied ideal ‘realm’ that would be set apart from the world we see 
and touch and about which we speak; the ideal objects we formulate and utilize are not of a wholly 
different order to those sensible ideas ‘veiled in shadow’ that we grasp in our embodied engagement 
with the world qua flesh. As Jessica Wiskus notes, in his course notes on Proust at this time Merleau-
Ponty explicitly asks whether we don’t in fact find in Proust’s writing ‘a general conception of ideas’ 
(cited in Wiskus, 2013: 92, Wiskus’ trans.). That Merleau-Ponty seeks to develop an affirmative answer 
to this question is demonstrated by the following passage, in which he proposes a thorough continuity 
between the sensible and the ‘pure’ ideality: 
 
however we finally have to understand it, the “pure” ideality already streams forth along 
the articulations of the aesthesiological body, along the contours of the sensible things, 
and, however new it is, it slips through ways it has not traced, transfigures horizons it did 
not open, it derives from the fundamental mystery of those notions “without equivalent,” 
as Proust calls them, that lead their shadowy life in the night of the mind only because 
they have been divined at the junctures of the visible world. … Let us only say that the 
pure ideality is itself not without flesh nor freed from horizon structures: it lives of them, 
though they be another flesh and other horizons. 
(VI, 152-3/197-8) 
 
As we saw at the outset of the previous chapter the ‘other flesh’ that Merleau-Ponty is referring to 
here is that of language, that ‘less heavy, more transparent body’ into which the visibility of the sensible 
world ‘emigrates’ (VI, 153/198). We have already traced the manner in which Merleau-Ponty’s study of 
language in the period preceding his turn to The Visible and the Invisible mirrored his phenomenological 
account of the lived body and its place in perception. We must now consider how the body-language 
analogy translates into the new language of the flesh that emerges in the late period. 
 
 
ii. Language and Reversibility 
 
Since it is reversibility that Merleau-Ponty considers definitive of the category of flesh, the 
identification of language as a species or mode of flesh obviously implies that here too one can discover 
reversible relations. In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty expressly notes that it is ‘too soon now 
to clarify’ the ‘pure’ ideality and the flesh that is proper to it (VI, 153/198). Yet we can find some 
suggestive, albeit underdeveloped, articulations of the reversible relations that traverse language and 
expression in these final pages, each of which can be seen to develop from his earlier work on speech 
and language.123  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 We may have to resign ourselves to the fact that a determinate, univocal definition of reversibility, one that will consolidate and clarify its 
multifarious applications, will not be forthcoming in Merleau-Ponty’s late writings. This is certainly how Dillon sees things. He goes so far as 
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First, we find Merleau-Ponty once more revisiting the thought with which the Phenomenology’s gestural 
account of speech began: speech is an inescapably embodied activity, conditioned such as it is by ‘those 
strange movements of the throat and mouth that form the cry and the voice’ (VI, 144/187). This 
corporeal character means that speech is caught up in a reversibility that traverses the body as a 
‘sonorous being’, specifically one that holds between the voice and hearing. The vibrations of the vocal 
chords from which the voice issues are themselves heard ‘from within’ by the speaking subject; there is 
‘a reflexivity of the movements of phonation and of hearing; they have their sonorous inscription, the 
vociferations have in me their motor echo’ (VI, 144/188). The voice and audition are the obverse and 
reverse sides of one another, and there is here a blurring of the active and the passive dimensions of the 
body of the kind that Merleau-Ponty considers essential to all perception. It is this that lies behind 
Merleau-Ponty’s insistence that ‘there is much more than a parallel or an analogy’ between the body and 
language, but rather ‘solidarity or intertwining’ (VI, 118/156). In the corporeal rootedness of speech to 
the sensible world, the flesh of language is interwoven with that of the body, and Merleau-Ponty thus 
says of speech that it ‘prolongs into the invisible, extends unto the semantic operations, the 
belongingness of the body to being’ (VI, 118/156). 
The acquisition of language constitutes a development and enrichening – phonologically, semantically, 
and syntactically – of the body as a sonorous being. Speech is much more than a mere vociferation; it is 
articulate insofar as it is the utilization of a signifying power that emerges in tandem with the systematic 
whole of a language. In speech, as in ‘mute’ or non-linguistic perception, we are able to grasp an 
‘invisible’ – a meaning – that is the other side of a sensible, ‘visible’, phenomenon. For the speaking 
subject, ‘sense and sound are in the same relationship as the “little phrase” and the five notes found in 
it afterwards’ (VI, 153/198). For this reason, the flesh of language does not stand apart from the flesh 
of the sensing-sensible body and of the sensible world. Whilst Saussure is no longer explicitly appealed 
to, his continued influence is apparent in Merleau-Ponty’s description of the meaning of the verbal 
phrase as ‘the totality of what is said, the integral of all the differentiations of the verbal chain’ (VI, 
155/201). The meaning ‘is given with the words for those who have ears to hear’ (VI, 155/201) and 
what emerges from the reversibility of the voice and audition is a reversibility of speaking and 
understanding in the communicative life of speaking subjects. It is this reversibility that is prefigured in 
Merleau-Ponty’s middle period descriptions of a blurring of the active and passive poles in linguistic 
communication and expression, which we explored in Section 4.2. The reversibility of speaking and 
understanding is effectively synonymous with a full-blooded openness to others that is enacted and 
unfolds in linguistic communication; the flesh of language is fundamentally intersubjective.  
The intersubjective dimension of language once again demonstrates a solidarity and continuity with 
the sensing and sensible flesh of the body. The same reciprocity of active and passive that is operative 
in the experience of the sensible world is constitutive of the body’s openness to others like itself. We 
have already seen, in the previous chapter, how this line of thought was articulated in Phenomenology of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s deployment of the concept of reversibility ‘is deliberately … ambiguous’ (Dillon, 1997: 222), and that the 
function of this ambiguity lies in highlighting the relationships that hold between the various dyads to which the concept is applied.  
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Perception, and Merleau-Ponty now formulates it in terms of an ‘intercorporeal being’ that opens before 
the sensing body, in which is founded ‘a transitivity from one body to another’ (VI, 143/186). The 
reversibility of the body in touch and vision – the ‘adherence’ of the sensing to the sensed and vice 
versa – allows it to find its own openness to the sensible things reiterated in other bodies that its sees 
and touches. I experience a concordance between my own body and another that I encounter in the 
sensible world, to the effect that ‘what I see passes into him, this individual green of the meadow under 
my eyes invades his vision without quitting my own’ (VI, 142/185). There is here an immediate 
recognition of a shared experience and a common world. The full-blooded intersubjective experience 
afforded by language is foreshadowed by this intercorporeal openness of the flesh, and in the closing 
passages of the manuscript the continuity between language and the sensing-sensible flesh of the body 
is explicitly asserted by Merleau-Ponty in the following way: 
 
In a sense, if we were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the human body, 
its ontological framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see that the 
structure of its mute world is such that all the possibilities of language are already given in 
it.  
(VI, 155/200) 
 
Returning once more to the acquisition of language, and the transition from the ‘mute’ world of the 
pre-linguistic infant to the articulated, ‘speaking’ world of the mature language user, we can recognize 
the emergence of another type of reversibility that traverses the flesh of language and which Merleau-
Ponty lays great stress upon. An integral aspect in the teaching and learning of language is the capacity 
to point out and correct errors in the student’s efforts, and to introduce them, however informally, to 
the acontextual rules and norms that govern the signifying practices of the linguistic community. What 
manifests here is a kind of reflexivity of language, such that it is possible for speech acts, along with the 
system of language they utilize, to become the objects of further linguistic acts. In turn, it is this 
availability of language itself to be spoken about that would appear to ground the linguist’s codification of 
language as an objective ‘system of explicit relations between signs and signified, sounds and meaning’ 
(VI, 153/198). Pushing his established body-language parallel into the new language of the late work, 
Merleau-Ponty now claims that the relationship between the two ‘sides’ of language – which we might 
describe respectively as language qua signifying and language qua signified124 – is of the same kind as 
that which holds between the sensing and sensible moments of the body’s flesh. There is a reversibility 
between language as a system of expressive praxis – as it is contextually utilized in acts of speech – and 
language such as it becomes an object for itself. Language is itself intelligible or ‘thinkable’, just as the 
body is included amongst the sensible things it discloses.125  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 In the terms of the middle period work, this would constitute a reversibility of ‘operative’ or ‘speaking’ language and ‘spoken’ language. We 
might, following Baldwin’s suggestion, think of this as a reversibility of the language and the meta-language (Baldwin, 2014). 
125 This is something that Husserl notes in ‘The Origin of Geometry’; from a certain perspective we see that language is itself ‘thoroughly made 
up of ideal objects; for example, the word Löwe occurs only once in the German language’ (OG, 357). 
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Extending the body-langage parallel to its full extent, Merleau-Ponty asserts that the reversibility of 
language is necessarily operative in its disclosure and expression of the intelligible world, just as the 
unfolding of perceptual sens is dependent upon the body’s inherence in the sensible world. The 
signifying power of speech is ‘sustained by the thousands of ideal relations’ (VI, 118/155) that the 
objectifying or second-order perspective upon the language is explicitly directed towards. These 
relations are therefore reflected back to the speaking subject in her use and understanding of language, 
just as her bodily situation in the visible and tangible world is found reflected in vision and touch.126 
Merleau-Ponty thus writes that ‘as the visible takes hold of the look which has unveiled it and which 
forms a part of it, the signification rebounds upon its own means, it annexes to itself the speech that 
becomes an object of science’ (VI, 154/200). In this way, the reversibility that holds between the two 
sides of language involves, at one and the same time, ‘a reversibility of speech and what it signifies’ (VI, 
154) that echoes the ‘narcissistic’ reversibility of the body and the sensible world in perception: 
 
Like the flesh of the visible, speech is a total part of the significations, like it, speech is a 
relation to Being through a being, and, like it, it is narcissistic, eroticized, endowed with a 
natural magic that attracts the other significations into its web, as the body feels the world 
in feeling itself. 
(VI, 118/155) 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s application of the concept of the flesh to language is undoubtedly expressive of the 
various interrelated kinds of reversible relations he believes to be involved in our possession, use, and 
understanding of language. Laying these various relations out as we have done makes clear the manner 
in which the ‘other flesh’ of language, and the intelligible world it makes available, cannot be held apart 
or divorced from that of the body and the sensible world. Involved here is an overarching effort to 
domesticate, as it were, the ‘pure’ ideality of the intelligible world by describing it as embedded in and 
embodied by linguistic practices which are themselves continuous with the sensing-sensible flesh of the 
body. Such an effort is certainly continuous with the spirit of the approach to the philosophy of 
language that Merleau-Ponty initiated with the Phenomenology’s gestural account of speech. However, it 
appears that Merleau-Ponty now seeks definitively to leave behind the problematic foundationalist 
conception of the relationship between perception and language that emerges in the Phenomenology. What 
Merleau-Ponty arrives at is an appreciation of an essential reciprocity between perceptual sens and the 
significations of language, such that they are each conditioned by one another within an overarching 
configuration or Gestalt that the category of flesh is intended to encompass. We can think of this 
development as an affirmation of James Edie’s tentative suggestion, offered in response to the 
Phenomenology, that ‘it may be that we have the articulated world of perception that we have precisely 
because of the potentialities that the linguistic expression of meaning introduces into experience’ (Edie, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 The continued influence of Saussure is apparent here, as the kind of relations Merleau-Ponty has in mind are those oppositive, diacritical 
relations identified by Saussure. It is only in the oppositive relations between signs that our uses of language go beyond themselves in order to 
signify the world. M.C. Dillon reiterates this thought in terms of a reversibility of extra- and infra-referentiality: ‘the infra-referentiality of a 
chain of signifiers endows it with the power of extra-referentiality, the power to refer beyond itself’ (Dillon, 1997: 217-8). 
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1987: 48). In this sense, language is to be understood as an essential dimension of our operative 
intentional engagement with or situatedness in the world of perception. 
 This key development of the late period is made perspicuous once we attend Merleau-Ponty’s 
renewed engagement with Husserl’s late works, and in particular the 1961 lecture course notes on ‘The 
Origin of Geometry’. It is this engagement with Husserl that enables Merleau-Ponty to consider once 
again the role played by language in the genesis and development of thought and of ideal objects, and as 
such it is in turning to the course notes that language’s status as the flesh of ideas can be further 
elucidated. Furthermore, it is here in Merleau-Ponty’s often subtle, yet critical reading of the late 
Husserl that we find the clearest evidence of the definitive shift away from those features of his earlier 
thought that we found to be problematic back in Chapter 3.127 
 
 
5.3 Language, Ideality, and the ‘True Husserlian Thought’ 
 
i. Language and Ideality in ‘The Origin of Geometry’ (1936) 
 
Husserl’s primary concern in ‘The Origin of Geometry’ is a general problem of the origins of ideal 
objectivity, and in particular the origins of an ideal science such as geometry. Each moment of such a 
science – each new ideal acquisition or discovery – begins its life in the ‘mental space’ of the individual 
inventor, and so Husserl’s problem is one of understanding how it is that ‘geometrical ideality (just like 
that of all sciences) proceeds from its primary intrapersonal origin … to its ideal objectivity’ (OG, 357-
8). Immediately, Husserl acknowledges, ‘we see that it occurs by means of language’ (OG, 358). It is 
language that facilitates the expression, understanding, and subsequent sedimentation of ideas. This line 
of thought is of course already familiar to us insofar as it is taken up by Merleau-Ponty in his own 
thinking on speech and language.128  
For Husserl, language facilitates the passage to ideal objectivity in two distinct ways, or stages. First, it 
is in acts of linguistic communication that an idea is capable of being transmitted from the mind of its 
progenitor and of being ‘actively understood by others’ (OG, 360), such that it comes to be a common 
object of multiple consciousnesses. Yet such instances of actual communication between individual 
subjects, however numerous, are not sufficient for the constitution of an ideal objectivity, argues Husserl. 
Whilst actual communication facilitates the transmission of a common idea into the minds of multiple 
individuals, it cannot bring about ‘the persisting existence of the “ideal objects”’ (OG, 360), such that they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 The course on ‘The Origin of Language’ is certainly not the only point in the late period that we find Husserl exerting an influence on 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought. As is the case throughout his career, Merleau-Ponty’s later work consistently utilizes and engages with Husserl, even 
if this is not always made explicit. As Dermot Moran argues, even the new lexicon of the flesh can be seen to have its roots in the Husserlian 
texts with which Merleau-Ponty was familiar (Moran, 2014).  
128 Albeit, for Merleau-Ponty, expression plays a constitutive or ontogenetic role in relation to ideal objects. This does not appear to be the 
case for Husserl. Husserl retains a sharp distinction between speech and its signification, word and idea, and as such considers the primary 
role of linguistic expression to be the transmission of ideal structures, rather than the means by which they are first ‘accomplished’. We have 
seen how Merleau-Ponty, since Phenomenology of Perception, gives linguistic expression a fundamental ontogenetic role. The distinction that 
Husserl makes between speech and its signification is precisely what the ‘reversibility’ of the two terms is supposed to leave behind. Like 
Merleau-Ponty, Husserl does recognize the need for an original, creative act on the part of an inventor in the origin of ideal objects. Yet this act 
of creation is not itself essentially intertwined with linguistic expression, on Husserl’s account.  
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transcend the activity of individuals, or any actual communication. ‘What is lacking’, he writes, ‘is their 
continuing-to-be even when no one has realized them in self-evidence’ (OG, 360), and it is here that 
language must be involved in a second respect. It is written language that is constitutive of the persisting 
existence of ideal objects, since writing is ‘communication become virtual’ (OG, 361) – i.e., without the 
need of further concrete communicative acts by individuals. The documentation of ideal structures 
gives them an existence independently of whether they are actually entertained or expressed by a 
particular individual or individuals, and their mode of expression here becomes wholly impersonal and 
a-contextual. As Merleau-Ponty puts it in his lecture course, this ‘virtual’ communication of meaning 
‘belongs in principle to everyone’ (TfL, 119/166), and it is because of this that written language is the 
guarantor of ideal objectivity. Merleau-Ponty describes the shift to written expression as constituting a 
modification of the ‘ontic mode’ of the expressed sense. It is no longer (‘even for the “I” who expresses 
it’ (HLP, 25/29)) given as an original production (Erzeugung) – i.e., as the thematic object of a creative 
activity – but is instead ‘available … for other productions’ (HLP, 25/29), which is precisely what is 
meant by the Husserlian notion of institution. The written word takes on an objective existence and a 
permanence in the manner of physical things, and it is in this permanence that written expressions 
‘convey their sense as an activity which has fallen into obscurity but which is reawakened and which can 
again be transformed into activity’ (HLP, 25/29). 
Together, these two moments of Husserl’s view on the role of language disclose the manner in which 
ideal objects are inescapably tied to their communication, understanding, and documentation via 
language, and Merleau-Ponty clearly takes much influence from this line of thought in his own work. 
An aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s view that is brought out more explicitly in the course notes on Husserl is 
the manner in which language profoundly implicates the ‘intelligible world’ of ideas in an intersubjective 
dimension of experience. Since it is language that facilitates the passage to ideal objectivity, ideality is 
caught up within the intersubjective world, or as Husserl refers to it, the ‘horizon of humanity’ 
(Mitmenscheit) – i.e., the horizon of my relationships with other humans, both actual and possible, 
particular and general. For Merleau-Ponty, this relationship does not provide an explanation of ideality in 
terms of intersubjectivity (or vice versa); neither is to be understood as the cause of the other. Instead, it 
is the simultaneity of ideality and intersubjectivity that he regards Husserl’s late discussion of language to 
be disclosing; ideality and intersubjectivity are each revealed as the ‘reverse side’ of the other: 
 
Ideality is at the hinge of the connection between me and others. It functions in this 
connection; it is operative, effective there. It is realized in and through this connection. 
That means: in the connection, there is not two positive terms, ideality and relation with 
others, for then it would have to be the case that the one explained the other. If you like, 
there is a positivity of the relation with others which is like a relief, and an ideality which is 
its reverse side, which oozes “at the edge of words,” – or there is a positivity of the 
ideality and a relation with others which is its reverse side, which transforms the other into 
an alter ego, into a subject of the Erzeugung like me. These two versions of the phenomena 
are only one, for neither of the two terms is the positive or the negative of the other.  
(HLP, 24/27-8) 
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This articulation of Husserl’s view is continuous with Merleau-Ponty’s own account of the place of 
language in intersubjective experience that was discussed above, and also in the previous chapter. The 
language that is common to members of a linguistic community is constitutive of a common 
intelligible world of ideas. This common world then serves as the background against which new ideas 
are capable of being formulated, expressed, and understood via the kind of ‘coherent deformations’ 
discussed in the previous chapter. New ideas subsequently achieve permanence via the process of 
sedimentation that is afforded by written language. Merleau-Ponty thus follows Husserl in, as he puts 
it, ‘placing openness to others and openness to ideality into the law of the praxical-perceptive’ (HLP, 
24/28) via a study of language.  
With Husserl, Merleau-Ponty considers the three terms involved here – language, intersubjectivity, 
and the ‘intelligible’ order of ideal objects – to be inescapably intertwined with one another. As he puts 
it, ‘[l]anguage is borne by our relation to the world and to others, and language also bears and makes 
our relation to the world and to others’ (TfL, 117-8/164). Thus, the ‘flesh’ of language cannot be 
abstracted from the world and the intersubjective horizon that it opens upon for the speaking subject. 
This thought is continuous with the concept of ‘operative language’ that emerged in Merleau-Ponty’s 
middle period writings. We will now see how, through an often implicit critique, Merleau-Ponty 
distances himself from the details of Husserl’s account of ideality. This critique provides an invaluable 
insight into the shape of Merleau-Ponty’s own thought at the end of his life.  
 
 
ii. The Question of Reactivation 
 
The vast majority of Merleau-Ponty’s course notes on Husserl centres on the place of language in 
‘The Origin of Geometry’. Yet within Merleau-Ponty’s explicit enthusiasm for the essay, there emerges 
a quite distinct and significant critical engagement with the letter, if not the spirit, of Husserl’s late 
reflections. A crucial element of Merleau-Ponty’s professed methodology in his approach to Husserl 
here is to seek out what Heidegger had named the ‘unthought’ (ungedachte) within a philosopher’s work: 
‘that which emerges in and through this work as having not yet been thought’ (Heidegger, 1991: 71). 
For Merleau-Ponty, what this means is to draw out a ‘latent articulation between things said’ (HLP, 
14/15), and as such he does not feel himself to be constrained by the presupposition of a single, 
‘objectively correct’ interpretation of Husserl’s writing. Instead, what he seeks to do is to see how 
Husserl’s extant discussion might open out and develop in heretofore unanticipated directions, 
directions which might not necessarily sit comfortably with Husserl’s own stated vision of his 
philosophical project. This results in certain aspects of Husserl’s discussion being stressed at the 
expense of others, and in certain concepts being subjected to a kind of immanent critique. I suggest 
that it is in this working through Husserl that Merleau-Ponty definitively takes himself beyond his own 
earlier outlook.  
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The concept that is most explicitly and consistently problematized in the course notes is that of 
‘reactivation’ (wiedererinnerung). For Husserl, we (necessarily) have the capacity to ‘reactivate’ our ideal 
acquisitions; a capacity to see them in the light of the original self-evidence they held in the productive 
activity of their inventors.129 Reactivation is therefore sharply distinguished from the wholly passive 
understanding that is effected by the sedimentation of an ideal structure in language. Immediately after 
having drawn this distinction, Husserl warns of the dangers of the kind of activity that is grounded in 
the merely passive reception of sedimented meanings, and which proceeds without any reactivation of 
original self-evidences: 
 
There is a distinction, then, between passively understanding the expression and making it 
self-evident by reactivating its meaning. But there also exist possibilities of a kind of 
activity, a thinking in terms of things that have been taken up merely receptively, passively, 
which deals with significations only passively understood and taken over, without any of 
the self-evidence of original activity. … What often happens here is that a meaning arises 
which is apparently possible as a unity – i.e., can apparently be made self-evidence (sic) 
through a possible reactivation – whereas the attempt at actual reactivation can reactivate 
only the individual members of the combination, while the intention to unify them into a 
whole, instead of being fulfilled, comes to nothing 
(OG, 361) 
 
Husserl does not offer any concrete examples, from the history of geometry or otherwise, to illustrate 
the kind of failure that he thinks this activity often ends in. What is crucial, however, is that this activity 
proceeds via the passive understanding of sedimented meanings made possible by language. And it is 
this ‘seduction of language’ (OG, 362) that comes to serve as the antagonist of Husserl’s essay as a whole, 
since the tendency of our thinking to proceed ‘without any of the self-evidence of the original activity’ 
invariably undermines our certainty in its validity, and thus threatens the rationality of subsequent ideal 
acquisitions:  
 
It is easy to see that even in human life, and first of all in every individual life from 
childhood to maturity, the originally intuitive life which creates its originally self-evident 
structures through activities on the basis of sense-experience very quickly and in 
increasing measure falls victim to the seduction of language. Greater and greater segments of 
this life lapse into a kind of talking and reading that is dominated purely by association; 
and often enough, in respect to the validities arrived at in this way, it is disappointed by 
subsequent experience. 
(OG, 362) 
 
Our tendency to be ‘seduced’ by the sedimented meanings of language risks what Husserl describes as 
the ‘emptying of sense’ (sinnentleerung) of a tradition such as geometry. Husserl considers the 
fundamental malady of ‘the whole modern age’ (OG, 366) to consist in a succumbing to this seduction 
of language; a taking for granted of the ideal acquisitions that have come to constitute our scientific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 As (Baldwin, 2014) notes, the concept of reactivation appears to be modeled on Platonic ‘recollection’ (anamnesis). 
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traditions. The capacity for reactivation has been jeopardized, and we have left ourselves vulnerable to 
making missteps in our thinking since the meaning of our ideal structures and traditions can no longer 
be ‘“cashed in”’ (OG, 366) as genuine by grounding them in the original self-evidences of the pre-
scientific ‘originally intuitive life’. Husserl therefore understands modern man to be suffering from a 
profound epistemological crisis. 
The solution Husserl offers to this crisis lies in the pursuit of a particular kind of ‘regressive inquiry’ 
(Rückfrage) by which we might trace the ideal edifice of a science like geometry ‘back to the primal 
materials of the first formation of meaning, the primal premises, so to speak, which lie in the 
prescientific cultural world’ (OG, 369). He is thus proposing a transcendental philosophical project, the 
ultimate aim of which is the disclosure of the a priori conditions of the possibility of a deductive science 
such as geometry. He is seeking to disclose the provenance of our ideal acquisitions by way of an 
historical inquiry into the origins of scientific traditions, but not one that would issue in an empirical 
history – a catalogue of the names, dates, and places to which what we now know as geometry owes its 
beginnings as a matter of fact. Husserl’s investigations ‘are historical in an unusual sense’, since they 
concern themselves with ‘depth-problems quite unknown to ordinary history’ (OG, 354). He is 
proposing a transcendental or ‘internal’ history, one that will lay the foundations for a total reactivation 
of the immense chains of ideal acquisitions that have amassed through the historical formation of our 
scientific traditions. At bottom, what this calls for is a phenomenological disclosure of the original 
intuitive life, or the Lebenswelt, which is the ultimate soil from which our ideal objects inherit their 
genuine meaning (if indeed they have such a meaning). As Besmer puts it, Husserl’s historical turn in 
his late writings ‘is intended to establish the necessity and urgency of transcendental phenomenology 
itself’ (Besmer, 2007: 115). 
The project Husserl envisions is thus entirely dependent upon the in principle possibility of a total 
reactivation of our ideal acquisitions. In his course notes Merleau-Ponty repeatedly challenges this 
notion. The manner in which Merleau-Ponty handles this line of thought in the lecture course is 
arguably foreshadowed in a working note from November 1959. In this note, he complains that 
philosophy ‘has never spoken – I do not say of passivity: we are not effects – but I would say of the 
passivity of our activity’ (VI, 221/270). Now, whilst it is quite clear that Merleau-Ponty considers 
Husserl to have gone further than anyone else in elucidating this ‘passivity of our activity’, the 
implication here is that Merleau-Ponty’s prospective work will seek to bring it to the fore not as the 
source of a nadir of modernity, as it is for Husserl, but as an essential feature of the human situation, 
and a necessary condition of the sense of our scientific, cultural, and linguistic practices and traditions. 
In the course notes, this view manifests itself in the sentiment that a total reactivation of original self-
evidences is not only unnecessary but also, and for the same reasons, impossible.  
Merleau-Ponty’s skepticism stems from Husserl’s own comments concerning the accomplishment of 
a total reactivation of a deductive science such as geometry. A total reactivation would proceed 
according to the following ‘fundamental law’: the entire edifice of a science such as geometry has 
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developed via a linear sequence of logical (i.e., deductive) inferences from first premises. As such, the 
ideal structures of geometry receive their meaning insofar as they can trace their provenance back 
through a chain of such logical inferences to the most original self-evidences. Husserl cashes this out in 
the following way: 
 
if the premises can actually be reactivated back to the most original self-evidence, then 
their self-evident consequences can be also. Accordingly it appears that, beginning with 
the primal self-evidences, the original genuineness must propagate itself through the chain 
of logical inference, no matter how long it is. 
(OG, 365) 
 
Husserl immediately acknowledges that the task of a total reactivation would be prohibited by ‘the 
obvious finitude of the individual and even the social capacity to transform the logical chains of 
centuries, truly in the unity of one accomplishment, into originally genuine chains of self-evidence’ (OG, 
365). In other words, a total reactivation would simply require an immense amount of time and 
superhuman levels of concentration. Nonetheless, Husserl is sure that such a reactivation must be in 
principle possible, albeit that to entertain such a possibility requires the hypothetical ‘removal of limits 
from our capacity’ (OG, 365). For Husserl, it is only the possibility of total reactivation that will 
guarantee the rationality of the entire geometrical tradition, and therein lies the motivation of the 
transcendental phenomenological enterprise. 
In the following passage, Merleau-Ponty runs through Husserl’s reasoning here before expressing his 
own reservations: 
 
the question that needs to be clarified: the crisis of European science is due to 
Sinnentleerung [emptying of sense]. The immediate remedy is historical Besinnung [reflection] 
in order to reawaken the Urstiftung [original institution/original ground] and all of its 
horizons. To unveil the Lebenswelt [life-world], the being of the horizon. To take up 
contact with what in us understands the Urstiftung, with the interior of history which bears 
the ideality – but can we still do this? Isn’t total reactivation in principle impossible? 
(HLP, 32/37-8, my emphasis) 
 
This is just one juncture at which Merleau-Ponty directly challenges Husserl’s stated position 
concerning reactivation. Later on, he affirms that a total reactivation is indeed impossible, not only due 
to the ‘lack of time’, which Husserl acknowledges as a factual limit, but because ‘there is a clarity which 
is proper to the acquired’, a ‘cohesion’ of the sedimented meanings upon which new thinking relies 
(HLP, 58/70). Merleau-Ponty rejects the suggestion that we can expect, even in principle, to be capable 
of digging down beneath the entire sedimented weight of acquisitions in order to reactivate the ‘primal 
self-evidences’ upon which our traditions were originally instituted. This is due to the fact that such a 
process could only ever be pursued beginning from our present situatedness within these very 
traditions; our only means of access to the primal self-evidences is through the sedimentations that have 
been preserved in our linguistic practice (Besmer, 2007). As far as Merleau-Ponty is concerned, Husserl 
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fails fully to acknowledge the extent to which the propagation and development of a tradition over time 
by means of language instigates irreversible shifts in meaning that will inevitably colour, and hence 
undermine, any attempt at a total reactivation. Contra Husserl, there is not a direct transmission of sense 
through a chain of deductive inferences, but rather a diachronic development of sense. 
This point in the lecture notes correlates with much of the discussion found in chapter 3 of The 
Visible and the Invisible, where Merleau-Ponty questions the capacity of philosophy – phenomenological 
or otherwise – to issue in a coincidence with its objects. As he puts it: 
 
If coincidence is lost, this is no accident; if Being is hidden, this is itself a characteristic of 
Being, and no disclosure will make us comprehend it. A lost immediate, arduous to 
restore, will, if we do restore it, bear within itself the sediment of the critical procedures through which 
we have found it anew; it will therefore not be the immediate.  
(VI, 122/160, my emphasis) 
 
Through the historical institution and propagation of our scientific and cultural traditions, language 
itself is inextricably caught up in a diachronic development.130 As such, there is no sense to the thought 
that we might – through the transcendental phenomenologist’s own use of language – trace this 
development back to its origins in the ‘originally intuitive life’ that unfolds beneath or beyond the ideal 
acquisitions made available through language.  
For Merleau-Ponty, the fact that total reactivation is in principle impossible should not be a cause for 
concern or the source of an epistemological crisis. He understands it to be a straightforward 
consequence of the manner in which intellectual traditions are inherited, sustained and developed over 
time. It is the thinking ‘which deals with significations only passively understood and taken over’ that is 
decisive here. As far as Merleau-Ponty is concerned, the passivity involved here, about which Husserl is 
so concerned, is an entirely necessary and even virtuous aspect of our living and developing intellectual 
traditions. This is the passivity involved in operative intentionality, and in particular in operative language 
and the process of institution (Stiftung), through which new expressive possibilities are opened up as the 
past activity, in successfully instituting a development of sense, recedes into the background. This 
thought is evidenced by the following passage, placed in square brackets following a reiteration of 
Husserl’s worries about passivity. Merleau-Ponty deems it necessary to show, pace Husserl: 
 
that language must supplant the originally intuitive life, that otherwise thought would 
remain a captive – that at “higher” structures, thought does not go from the [originally 
intuitive life]… that there are shortcuts, that the universe of thought, like that of 
perception, is lacunary and baroque in itself, that there is a lateral evidence, between the 
acts, and not only a progressive and frontal evidence, and all of this follows because to 
think is not having but not having.  
(HLP, 26/30) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 As we have seen, this thought comprises part of Merleau-Ponty’s talk, in The Visible and the Invisible, of language as the flesh of ideality, 
since there is here a reversibility of language and the ideal structures that constitute our scientific and cultural traditions. Husserl’s distinction 
between speech and idea (noted above in footnote 125) is decisive here, as it is this that prohibits him from properly recognizing the manner 
in which language itself is caught up in the development of ideal traditions. Husserl does acknowledge the general problem of the ideal 
existence of language, yet effectively offers nothing beyond a promissory note (OG, 358).  
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The speaking and thinking subject is not a constituting consciousness capable of spontaneous acts of 
sense bestowal, and thought is not the possession of a completely constituted object. Instead, active 
thought, intertwined as it is in its expression in words, draws passively upon the sedimented 
acquisitions that are preserved in language and its sense is therefore caught up in the network of 
diacritical relationships between signs that traverse the linguistic system. It is in these relationships that 
the ‘shortcuts’ and ‘lateral evidence’ Merleau-Ponty speaks of are realized. Since thought is caught up in 
language and draws passively from its resources, the sense of ideal significations cannot be strictly 
determined by a direct ‘chain of evidence’ beginning from an original, sub-linguistic ground. A given 
language is the total product of the expressive and communicative practices of an intersubjective and 
inter-generational community of speaking subjects. In order for this diachronic development to 
continue, the individual speaking subject does not begin again from the same position as his forebears, 
but instead relies upon their expressive achievements as the background of his present acts: ‘Past 
insights remain operative in present speech’ (Besmer, 2007: 125). As Merleau-Ponty puts the point: ‘I 
do not need to reactivate in order to think along the thread of my thought of yesteryear or along the 
thread of the thought of someone else’ (HLP, 65/78). In the historical development of a language, 
there is an entirely legitimate forgetting of origins that makes possible the continued genesis of sense, and 
the institution of new ideal structures. Nonetheless, the past activity remains present through its 
sedimentation as the institution or opening of a field of possibilities for future acts of thinking. Whilst 
the passive taking up of sedimented meanings does not proceed by a reactivation of the past activity, it 
does enable an engagement with and renewal of the past in the actualization of possibilities that those 
past acts made available. As Merleau-Ponty had earlier expressed the thought, the present act gives to 
the past ‘not a survival, which is the hypocritical form of forgetfulness, but a new life, which is the 
noble form of memory’ (S, 59/74).  
 
 
iii. Beyond Foundationalism: The ‘True Husserlian Thought’ 
 
Of course, Husserl himself recognizes this integral role of passivity in the ‘lively, productively 
advancing formation of meaning’ (OG, 365) through which a scientific tradition propagates itself. 
Geometry would not have proceeded beyond its first principles if the individual geometer was required 
to begin his activity from the ground up, as it were, and could not instead rely upon the acquired results 
of his predecessors. Yet the historical development facilitated here in no way ensures that a tradition is 
genuine, leaving it susceptible to a gradual ‘emptying out’ of sense. It is for this reason that Husserl 
postulates the necessity of a total reactivation that will be facilitated by transcendental phenomenology. 
Merleau-Ponty understands his own rejection of this enterprise to be continuous with what he 
considers Husserl’s true insight: the disclosure of the intersubjective and intergenerational development 
of ideality that requires a forgetting of origins. It is in bringing this forgetfulness that ‘makes tradition 
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fruitful [féconde]’ (HLP, 20/23) to the fore that Merleau-Ponty believes Husserl to have profoundly 
elucidated the nature of ideality, even if this was inhibited by Husserl’s own framing of the issue: 
 
There is therefore a truth which is the result of Idealisierung [idealization], forgetfulness of 
its genesis – and there a more profound truth which consists in rediscovering the 
instituting movement of the universe of ideas.  
(HLP, 66/80) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the ultimate ground of ideality is to be found in this instituting movement itself, 
and not by tracing its development back to a self-sufficient ‘pre-ideal’ or foundation. He accepts, with 
Husserl, that this propagative movement leaves thought susceptible to making missteps, but crucially 
‘this possibility of error is also possibility of truth’ (HLP, 58/70). 131  The validity of our ideal 
acquisitions – their possession of a ‘genuine’ meaning – is not to be vouchsafed by a phenomenological 
return to a self-sufficient and universal ground. In fact, Merleau-Ponty proposes a reversal of this 
foundationalist way of thinking: universality is the ultimate telos or limit of our expressive practices and 
the traditions that they propagate, rather than their original foundation or condition. Husserl provides 
an historical a priori by virtue of his elucidation of this propagative, ‘fruitful’ movement of living 
traditions:  
 
There is no opposition between this a priori and history itself, for it is nothing other than 
its structure including the element of forgetfulness, i.e., the element of nonreactivation, 
i.e., including the overcoming of relations to others and to the past. 
(HLP, 63/76) 
 
The subtle yet significant shift in emphasis between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl 
provides vital insight into the shift that has taken place within Merleau-Ponty’s own thinking between 
the publication of Phenomenology of Perception and his work on The Visible and the Invisible. The concept of 
reactivation is an integral feature of the fundamentally foundationalist enterprise Husserl is proposing in 
‘The Origin of Geometry’, one that would seek to ground ideal structures in an original stratum of 
intuitive experience that is universal. By challenging the legitimacy of this concept, Merleau-Ponty is 
simultaneously staking a claim against the same kind of stratified or constitutive foundationalism that 
emerged out of the Phenomenology’s account of speech and expression. To be clear, the foundationalism 
of the Phenomenology is not identical to that offered in Husserl’s late thought. Crucially, Husserl 
seemingly does not exclude constituted language from his foundational stratum of the life-world, 
whereas we have seen how it was a dichotomy of perception and language that surfaced in Merleau-
Ponty’s early work. This difference is immaterial, however, since Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the 
concept of reactivation tells equally against his own earlier thought. As with Husserl, the source of the 
problem in Phenomenology of Perception lay with the notion that the phenomenologist is responsible for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The correction of such errors will be achieved by a continual progression and renewal of ideas rather than a regressive tracing back to a pre-
ideal, ‘intuitive’ ground.  
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awakening ‘a primordial experience beneath traditions’ (PhP, 530n7/218n1). The fundamental 
corrective Merleau-Ponty is now offering in relation to his early thought involves jettisoning this 
notion. 
This development is further evidenced by a working note from February 1960, where Merleau-Ponty 
asserts that ‘sedimentation is the sole mode of being of ideality’ (VI, 235/284), continuing: ‘I would like 
to develop that in the sense: the invisible is a hollow in the visible, a fold in passivity, not pure 
production’ (VI, 235/284). This proposal would seem to amount to a definitive articulation, in the 
language of The Visible and the Invisible, of the thinking that emerges out of Merleau-Ponty’s engagement 
with the late Husserl in the 1960 lecture course. The ‘invisible’ world of ideal objects is caught up in the 
‘visible’, sensible world insofar as it is embedded in and intertwined with language as a medium of 
expressive and communicative praxis – i.e., operative language. The passage to ideal objectivity is not 
instigated by an act of ‘pure’ production (an expressive activity of speech that would be unconditioned 
by acquired significations) but must instead occur against the background of the sedimented meanings 
that are operative in a linguistic community’s grasp of their common language. The expressive activity 
must draw passively from these acquisitions in order to realize their latent expressive possibilities and 
thus bring novel meaning to birth. The latent dualism we find in the Phenomenology’s account of speech 
and expression, and the relationship between perception and thought that was implicated there, is no 
longer to be entertained.  
It is this same shift that we find lying behind the self-criticism of the earlier work’s conception of the 
tacit Cogito. We recall (Chapter 3) that in a working note of January 1959, Merleau-Ponty explicitly 
renounces his earlier thinking in the following way: 
 
What I call the tacit cogito is impossible. To have the idea of “thinking” … to make the 
“reduction,” to return to the immanence and to the consciousness of… it is necessary to 
have words. It is by the combination of words (with their charge of sedimented 
significations, which are in principle capable of entering into other relations than the 
relations that have served to form them) that I form the transcendental attitude, that I 
constitute the constitutive consciousness. The words do not refer to positive significations 
and finally to the flux of Erlebnisse as Selbstgegeben. Mythology of a self-consciousness to 
which the word “consciousness” would refer – – There are only differences between 
significations. 
(VI, 171/222-3) 
 
What we find in this renunciation of the tacit Cogito is a revision of what phenomenology itself is 
capable of achieving. The phenomenologist’s endeavour to awaken a ‘primordial experience beneath 
traditions’ (PhP, 530n7/218n1), which Merleau-Ponty took as his own in Phenomenology of Perception – at 
least in its discussion of speech and expression – cannot be reconciled with the fact that it must 
proceed via the sedimented meanings that are preserved in language, and which in turn are constitutive 
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of our traditions.132 The notion of the tacit Cogito, predicated as it is on the fecundity of this 
foundationalist enterprise, is a philosophical chimera. Its presence in Phenomenology of Perception was 
symptomatic of the early work’s underdeveloped account of the place of language in experience. One 
cannot hope, through a renewed use of language, to pull back the veil and disclose a stratum of 
experience that serves as the ground of our linguistic significations. The intelligible or spoken world is 
not detachable from the perceived, and the speaking subject who is embodied in his language is not 
subtended by a primordial or tacit self-consciousness of the body that remains unaffected and 
unconditioned by the subject’s inauguration and participation in the traditions that continue to develop 
in and through our linguistic practices.  
This is not to deny that there is still a distinction to draw between language and the sensible world; 
there remain, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, ‘mute’ or ‘non-language significations’ (VI, 171/223) in our 
grasp of the sensible world. Yet Merleau-Ponty insists that this ‘silence’ should not be thought ‘the 
contrary of language’ (VI, 179/230). Instead, what we find is that the acquisition of language and its 
deployment in speech instigates a dialectical relationship between the ideal significations of language 
and the sensible, such that the silence ‘continues to envelop language’ (VI, 176/227) and continues to 
motivate its diachronic development via renewed expressive efforts. As such, silence (in the sense 
Merleau-Ponty intends) and speech are inextricably intertwined with one another. The mute 
significations of the sensible world are no longer held apart from the ideal significations of language. 
Instead, they each bear an ‘internal connection’ (Baldwin, ms.) to one another, such that the sense of 
each is determined by their simultaneous participation in the overarching Gestalt of the lived world. 
Indeed, it is precisely this view that we find Merleau-Ponty referring to in the course notes as the ‘True 
Husserlian thought’: 
 
True Husserlian thought: man, world, language are interwoven, verflochten. What does 
that mean: man, language, world (lived world, and objectified, idealized world) given in 
one package – in Beziehungsenheit <“relational unity”>: the references (Beziehung) relations 
which are in principle linear, form a unity, are “simultaneous” (Ideen II). That means: 
disorder cannot be overcome through a survey which is the source, one sees, of the 
priority given to the unidirectional. The most radical consciousness is that of an 
explosion or an emergence of ideality – of man and of the open, human horizon – in the 
thickness of fungierende [operative] language, which itself presupposes obviously a relation 
to a sensible Lebenswelt and to sensible, primordial consciousness, which also enter into 
the Beziehungseinheit.  
(HLP, 41-2/50) 
 
By entering into a ‘relational unity’ with language and the ‘objectified, idealized world’ it mediates, the 
sensible, ‘primordial’ world is not left unaltered, but is sublimated by the emergence of new dialectical 
relations which come to traverse those of the sensible world. This sublimation of the pre-linguistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 We might still be able to cast Merleau-Ponty’s late work as awakening an experience ‘beneath tradition’, but only insofar as it emphasizes 
the diachronic development of a living tradition, and the way in which this development is grounded in the expressive and communicative 
practices of a linguistic community. Yet this does not truly take us ‘beneath’ our traditions in the sense that we would thereby disclose an 
experience of the world that exists entirely apart from them. 
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world in the acquisition of language is gestured towards at the very end of the manuscript of The Visible 
and the Invisible. The expressive field that is opened up by language intertwines with the sensible world 
and is continuous with it, such that ‘the whole landscape is overrun with words as with an invasion, it is 
henceforth but a variant of speech before our eyes’ (VI, 155/201).133 
 
language is everything, since it is the voice of no one, since it is the voice of the things, the 
waves, and the forests. And what we have to understand is that there is no dialectical 
reversal from one of these views to the other; we do not have to reassemble them into a 
synthesis: they are two aspects of the reversibility which is the ultimate truth.  
(VI, 155/201) 
 
It is no coincidence that Merleau-Ponty offers a description of the sensible world and of the sensing-
sensible flesh that draws upon Saussurian language. The sensible horizons intertwine with those of 
language, and the sensible and ‘mute’ flesh of the world is thereby continuous with the flesh of ideas. 
The intelligible order of ideas that is preserved in language is to be understood as participating in the 
structures of the lived world and as operative there. It is continuous with the sensible, such that there is, 
indeed, ‘no frontier between language and the world’. In this way, Merleau-Ponty’s final, albeit 
lamentably incomplete, thought decisively leaves behind the troubling foundationalist construal of the 
relationship between perception and language that was present in Phenomenology of Perception. There is no 
longer the implicit methodological assumption that phenomenology is capable of pulling back the veil 
of cultural acquisitions in order to disclose a more original relationship with the world. Instead, 
Merleau-Ponty seeks to show how language is always already operative in the speaking and thinking 
subject’s engagement with the world and with others. In doing so, the late period work remains 
continuous with the Phenomenology’s conception of operative intentionality that was the focus of 
Chapters 1 and 2, above.  
At bottom, the significance of Merleau-Ponty’s work, throughout his career, lies in the consistent 
pursuit of, as he puts it, ‘a philosophy that takes into consideration the operative world’ (VI, 118/156). 
This is not a system-building philosophy that seeks theory-laden explanations or solutions to traditional 
problems. It is a philosophy that, to invoke Wittgenstein once again, ‘leaves everything as it is’ (PI, 
§124). It discloses the manner in which subjectivity is irrevocably situated within the world, not only as 
the setting of its perceptual life, but as the setting of its practical projects and goals, its affective life and 
expressive efforts, and also its intellectual or symbolic comprehension of things and of others. As we 
have seen over the course of the preceding chapters, what this situatedness amounts to is an 
understanding of the world that is not the achievement of any kind of distinct, self-sufficient or 
transcendental activity. Meaning, at every level, is not imparted to the world in a deliberate act. For 
Merleau-Ponty, our comprehension of the world is revealed as neither wholly active nor wholly passive. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Merleau-Ponty’s expression here is certainly reminiscent of Heidegger’s discussion of the intimacy between the sensible world and 
linguistic signs. E.g.: ‘if we go to the fountain, if we go through the woods, we are already going through the word ‘fountain,’ through the 
word ‘woods,’ even if we are not saying these words aloud or have any thoughts about language’ (Heidegger, 2002: 232-33). 
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Instead, it is essentially caught up in a dialectical development with the world that it discloses and in 
which it inheres.   
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Abbreviations 
 
Below is the list of abbreviations used in referring to works by Merleau-Ponty. English page 
references are followed by French page references, where available. 
 
 
HLP Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
2002), L. Lawlor & B. Bergo translation of Notes de cours sur L’origine de la géométrie de 
Husserl (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998) 
 
IPP In Praise of Philosophy (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963), J. Wild 
& J.M. Edie translation of Éloge de la Philosophie (Paris: Gallimard, 1953) 
 
PhP Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 2012), D. A. Landes translation of 
Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) 
 
PriP The Primacy of Perception, edited by J.M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964)  
 
PW The Prose of the World (London: Heinemann, 1974), J. O’Neill translation of La Prose 
du monde, edited by C. Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1969) 
 
S Signs (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), R.C. McCleary 
translation of Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960) 
 
SB The Structure of Behaviour (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1963), A.L. Fisher translation 
of La Structure du Comportement (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942) 
 
SNS Sense and Non-sense (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964) H.L 
Dreyfus & P.A. Dreyfus translation of Sens et non-sens (Paris: Nagel, 1948) 
 
TD Texts and Dialogues: On Philosophy, Politics, and Culture, edited by H.J. Silverman & J. 
Barry, Jr. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1992)  
 
TfL Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France 1952-1960 (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970) J. O’Neill translation of Résumés de cours, 
Collège de France 1952-1960 (Paris: Gallimard, 1968) 
 
VI The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), A. 
Lingis translation of Le visible et l’invisible, edited by C. Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 
1964) 
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Abbreviations used in referring to works by other authors: 
 
 
CGL Ferdinand de Saussure (1959) Course in General Linguistics edited by C. Bally & A. 
Sechehaye, W. Baskin translation of Cours de linguistique générale (New York, NY: 
Philosophical Library) 
 
I Elizabeth Anscombe (1957) Intention (Oxford: Blackwell) 
 
OG  Edmund Husserl, ‘The Origin of Geometry’ in The Crisis of the European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press), David 
Carr translation of Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954) 
 
PI Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell), G.E.M. 
Anscombe translation of Philosophische Untersuchungen 
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